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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to propose a semantic analysis of the subjunctive mood
in Modem Greek and to show how the various interpretations subjunctive clauses
may have can be accounted for in terms of independently motivated
communicative principles. My analysis is based on relevance-theoretic assumptions
about semantics and pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Wilson and Sperber
1988a, 1993).
In chapter 1 some of the existing accounts of the subjunctive are
considered and found inadequate. A new semantic account, based on the
relevance-theoretic approach to semantics, is put forward and discussed, with
special reference to the subjunctive in Modern Greek. It is argued that the
subjunctive encodes procedural meaning about propositional attitude, which is non-
truth-conditional. In particular, it constrains the interpretation of an utterance by
indicating that the proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a state
of affairs in a possible world.
In chapters 2 and 3 the issue addressed is how we can account for the
various interpretations of subjunctive clauses. Imperative-like subjunctive clauses,
and subjunctive clauses expressing wishes, potentiality and possibility are
discussed in chapter 2; expressive, narrative and interrogative subjunctive clauses
are dealt with in chapter 3. It is shown that the way subjunctive clauses are
interpreted in a particular context is a function of their semantically encoded
meaning and considerations of optimal relevance.
Chapter 4 prepares the ground for chapter 5. It is argued that definite and
indefinite descriptions are not semantically ambiguous; their various interpretations
are accounted for by a univocal semantics interacting with context and relevance
considerations, i.e. pragmatically. In chapter 5 the interpretation of Modern Greek
restrictive relatives in the indicative and subjunctive is discussed. It is shown that
the restrictions on the possible interpretations of the description which the relative
clause accompanies fall out from the semantic contrast between the indicative and
the subjunctive as defined in chapter 1.
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INTRODUCTION
In Modem Greek the subjunctive does not take the form of a distinct verbal ending
but is realised by the particle na, which may occur both in independent and in
subordinate clauses 1 2:
(1) na spoudasis
na study-2s-PF
You should study
(2) Thelo na spoudaso
want-is na study-is-PF
I want to study
The verb following the subjunctive particle is inflected for person, number, aspect,
tense and voice, as in the indicative:
1The source of Modern Greek na is the Classical Greek conjunction hina, which
was typically used as a conjunction introducing purpose clauses and was followed
by a verb in the subjunctive (in Classical Greek the subjunctive was manifested by
specific verb endings). There is an issue as to whether Modem Greek na is a
complementizer or part of the projection of the verb. For syntactic analyses of the
subjunctive in Modern Greek see Philippaki-Warburton (1987, 1992), Tsimpli
(1990), Agouraki (1991), Roussou (forthcoming). The first systematic approach to
the syntax and semantics of the subjunctive was proposed in Veloudis and
Philippaki-Warburton (1983). The main points of that paper are repeated in
Philippaki-Warburton (1992). Whatever the syntactic status of na, there is
agreement between these authors that it is the marker of subjunctive mood. A
different view is put forward by Lightfoot (1975, 1979), who takes the na+verb
complex to be a kind of future. This approach will be discussed in chapter 1.
2According to Veloudis and Philippaki-Warburton (1983), there is in Modern
Greek a second subjunctive particle, as. As may occur in independent clauses
only. As-clauses may be used to issue permission, make suggestions, or express
wishes; they may also serve as the antecedents of certain types of conditional
sentences (Nikifondou 1990). As-clauses will not be discussed in this thesis.
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SUBJUNCTIVE
Na spoudazis/spoudasis/spoudazes/spoudases/ehis spoudasi/thes spoudasi
na study-2s-1 PF/study-2s-PF/studied-2s-1 PF/studied-2s- PF/have-2s
studied/had-2s studied
INDICATIVE
spoudazis/tha spoudazis/tha spoudasis /spoudazes/spoudases/ehis
spoudasi/ihes spoudasi
study-2s-1 PF/wiII study-2s-I PF/will study-2s-PFfstudied-2s- I PF/studied-2s-
PF/have-2s studiedlhad-2s studied
Note that the non-past verb forms in the subjunctive are marked for aspect
(imperfective, IPF, and perfective, PF), but there are no distinct present and future
forms as in the indicative. The future particle tha is incompatible with the
subjunctive (*na tha spoudasi). By contrast, the indicative distinguishes between
perfective and imperfective aspect only in the future, among the non-past forms.
As we will see, independent clauses in the subjunctive may be in any tense;
however, there are restrictions on the possible tense marking of complement na-
clauses.
In addition to the preverbal particle na, the subjunctive and the indicative
are distinguished on the basis of the negative morphemes they allow. Subjunctive
clauses may be negated with mm only, whereas indicative clauses are negated
exclusively by dhen:
SUBJUNCTIVE
na mm spoudazislspoudasislspoudazes/etc.
na not study-2s-IPF/study-2s-PF/studies-2s-IPF/etc
INDICATIVE
dhen spoudazis/tha spoudazis/tha spoudasis/etc.
not study-2s-IPF/ will study-2s-PF/ will study-2s-PF
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Subjunctive complements in Modern Greek are similar to subjunctive complements
in Albanian and Romanian in that they do not require disjoint reference. In some
languages, such as French or Italian, subjunctive complements may be used only
if the subject of the main clause and the subject of the complement clause are
different; otherwise the infinitive is used (eg. Je veux qu'il vienne; Je veux venir).
This is known as the disjoint reference requirement. In Modem Greek the disjoint
reference requirement does not hold, as we can see from (2.). Moreover, there is
no distinct infinitival form.
In addition to the indicative and the subjunctive, there is in Modem Greek
a morphologically distinct imperative verb form. This occurs only in the second
person, singular and plural, and is inflected for aspect but not for tense. For
example,
(3)	 a. spoudaze/spoudase
study-2s-I PF/study-2s-PF
Study (singular)
b. spoudazete/spoudaste
study-2pl-I PF/study-2p1-PF
Study (plural)
This thesis is a study of the semantics and pragmatics of the subjunctive
mood, the na-clauses, in Modem Greek. My main concern is to propose an
account of the meaning encoded by the preverbal particle na, and to show that,
given this semantics, the various interpretations subjunctive clauses may have in
different contexts can be accounted for in terms of general ommunicative
principles. My analysis is based on relevance-theoretic assumptions about
semantics and pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Wilson and Sperber 1993).
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1 988a) have proposed that mood indicators,
such as declarative or interrogative word order and imperative syntax, encode
procedural meaning about propositional attitude. This means that the meaning
encoded by mood indicators does not directly contribute to explicitly communicated
conceptual representations involving propositional attitude descriptions (what they
call higher level explicatures), but rather indicates to the hearer what type of
10
propositional attitude representation he is expected to construct. This thesis is an
attempt to extend this analysis to the subjunctive. I will argue in chapter 1 that the
preverbal particle na in Modem Greek encodes procedural meaning about
propositional attitude. In particular, I am going to argue that the subjunctive
encodes the information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a possible world. I will show that this account is
more adequate than earlier analyses of the subjunctive in general and the
subjunctive in Modern Greek in particular. In addition, it provides a satisfactory
basis for the semantic distinction between clauses in the subjunctive, na-clauses,
and clauses in the indicative, non na-clauses.
Independent na-clauses may be interpreted in a variety of ways, depending
on the context of utterance. For example, they may be understood as issuing
orders or requests, permission or advice, making suggestions or pleas, expressing
wishes or uncertainty, or strong emotions, like surprise and disapproval, in the
course of narration, or asking questions. In chapters 2 and 3 I will provide a
detailed account, based on relevance theory, of the ways in which independent
subjunctive clauses in Modem Greek may be interpreted. I will argue that the
various interpretations such clauses may have in different contexts are a function
of their linguistically encoded content and pragmatic considerations, i.e.
considerations hinging on the principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986).
In particular, I will show that the relevance-theoretic concept of enrichment plays
a crucial role in the interpretation of na-clauses. Moreover, I will discuss both
declarative and interrogative na-clauses and I will show how the procedural
meaning encoded by declaratives and interrogatives interacts with the procedural
meaning of the subjunctive. I will also consider the differences between na-clauses
and imperatives. Finally, I will show that the differences in meanin 'g between na-
clauses and non na-clauses follow from the proposed semantic contrast between
the subjunctive and the indicative.
In the remaining chapters of the thesis, I will consider the interpretation of
restrictive relatives in the subjunctive and indicative. I will start by arguing in
chapter 4 that definite and indefinite descriptions are not semantically ambiguous.
I will take the view that the meaning of definite and indefinite descriptions should
be analyzed in procedural rather than conceptual terms. I will discuss the
attributive, the referential and the specific interpretations of definite and indefinite
11
descriptions, and I will argue that such interpretations depend on the context and
considerations of optimal relevance. The pragmatically motivated process of
enrichment will be shown to be crucially involved here as well.
Given this account of the semantics and pragmatics of definite and
indefinite descriptions, I will argue in chapter 5 that the restrictions on the possible
interpretations of descriptions followed by relatives in the subjunctive are not due
to the semantic content of the descriptions themselves, but to the semantic
contrast between na- and non na-clauses as defined in chapter 1. The restrictions
in question are related to the following three distinctions: the referential-attributive
distinction, the possibility of applying the rule of existential generalisation, and the
transparent-opaque distinction. Definite and indefinite descriptions followed by
indicative relatives may be interpreted referentially or attributively, existentially or
non-existentially, transparently or opaquely. On the other hand, there is a
correlation between the use of a na-relative and the attributive interpretation of the
modified description, the interpretation on which existential generalisation does not
apply, and, to a limited extent, the opaque interpretation. I will argue that the
source of this correlation is not the ambiguity of definite and indefinite
descriptions, but the semantic contrast between the indicative and the subjunctive.
12
CHAPTER 1
THE SEMANTICS OF NA-CLAUSES
1.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will start by considering a few semantic analyses of the subjunctive
mood. I will look at the existing analyses of the subjunctive and I will argue that
they are placed within unsatisfactory theoretical frameworks (or in no framework)
and that they are empirically inadequate to account for the MG data. I will then
consider three different semantic analyses of na-clauses. One of them will be
shown to be promising although lacking in theoretical backing. In the rest of the
chapter I present the relevance-theoretic approach to semantics and I will propose
and defend a new account of the semantics of na-clauses (and non na-clauses).
1.2. Earlier approaches to the subjunctive
In this section I want to consider three possible approaches to the subjunctive. I
will first look at the performative hypothesis, which was the first systematic attempt
to account for mood in independent clauses. (By mood" here I mean both
sentence types and inflectional mood). The performative analysis of the subjunctive
as proposed in Lakoff (1968) and Lighttoot (1975) is considered in more detail. I
will then discuss an account of the subjunctive in Spanish proposed by Hooper
(1975) which is based on the semantic notions of assertion and nonassertion.
Finally, I will turn to the speech act semantic account of sentence types which is
the theory which replaced the performative hypothesis.
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1.2.1. The performative analysis
A well known approach to mood was the so-called performative hypothesis. The
idea behind this theory was that in addition to explicit performatives like those in
(1),
(1)	 a. I promise to be back by twelve
b. I congratulate you on your promotion
c. I name this ship The Queen Victoria
discussed for the first time by Austin (1962), there are also implicit performatives.
In fact, every sentence has as its highest clause in the underlying syntactic
structure a performative clause. A performative clause is first person singular, its
indirect object is second person, and it is conjugated only in the present tense. In
standard versions of the performative hypothesis there is only one such clause per
sentence. On this view, the second member of each of the following pairs is
derived transformationally from the first by deleting the performative verb:
(2)	 a. I say that John is a fool
b. John is a fool
(3)	 a. I ask whether dinner is ready
b. Is dinner ready?
(4)	 a. I request you to put Smith's file on my desk
b. Put Smith's file on my desk
(5)	 a. I promise that I will be back by midnight
b. I will be back by midnight
(6)	 a. I predict that he will be home soon
b. He will be home soon
This approach suggests that illocutionary force is semantic in the truth conditional
sense and fully specified by the meaning of the performative clause. So for
example, (4a) and (4b) are semantically equivalent, i.e. they have the same truth
conditions.
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When the performative hypothesis was first introduced it was believed that
it was independently motivated on syntactic and semantic grounds (Ross 1970,
Sadock 1974). However, it has since been convincingly argued that it creates more
problems than it can solve and is to be rejected on both semantic and syntactic
grounds (for an overview of the arguments and a critical discussion see Palmer
1986:167-171, and especially Levinson 1983: 226-284 and Gazdar 1979: 15-36).
I will here briefly mention some of these considerations, with the aim of showing
later that the relevance theoretic approach to mood does not face these problems.
There are two basic problems with the performative hypothesis. The first
one is that it predicts that declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives are multiply
ambiguous. The second one is that it predicts the wrong truth conditions for
declarative sentences. Let me start with the second point.
According to this analysis, (7) and (8) below are truth conditionally
equivalent. However, it is intuitively clear, as Lewis (1972) pointed out, that a
sentence like (7) is necessarily false whereas (8) may be true:
(7) The moon is made of cheese
(8) I say that the moon is made of cheese
If, now, we drop the perlormative hypothesis for declarative sentences, as
Lewis (1972) did, then it no longer offers a symmetrical semantic account of all
sentences. Moreover, some of the syntactic arguments which motivated the
performative hypothesis in the first place relate to declarative sentences. For
example, the presence of the reflexive pronoun TM myself" in (9) can be explained,
it was argued, if we assume that at deep structure there is a highr performative
clause like I say:
(9) These regulations were approved by the parents' committee and myself
Moreover, if declaratives and non-declaratives have the truth-value of the
corresponding sentences with the performative verb, then they are predicted to be
as many ways ambiguous as there are distinct illocutionary uses of them. For
example, an imperative like (10):
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(10) Eat up your food
may be paraphrased with any one of the non-synonymous sentences in the
following (incomplete) list:
(11) a. I request that you eat up your food
b. I demand that you eat up your food
c. I order you to eat up your food
d. I exhort you to eat up your food
e. I permit you to eat up your food
f. I advise you to eat up your food, etc
In the same way a declarative like (12):
(12) The president has resigned
may be paraphrased with each of the following sentences:
(13)	 a. I say that the president has resigned
b. I state that the president has resigned
c. I declare that the president has resigned
d. I suppose that the president has resigned
e. I guess that the President has resigned, etc
And an interrogative like (14):
(14) Will you buy me a chocolate?
will be ambiguous between at least the following:
(15) a. I ask you whether you will buy me a chocolate
b. I wonder whether you will buy me a chocolate
c. I request that you tell me whether you will buy me a chocolate, etc
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This multiple ambiguity of all the sentence types is counterintuitive and makes one
rather suspicious of this account. An analysis on which we assign a simple
univocal semantics to each of these sentence types and deal with the vanous
illocutionary forces in temis of general communicative principles is preferable if
possible. Such an account placed within the framework of relevance theory has
been proposed by Wilson and Sperber (1 988a) and will be presented in section
1.4.
Let me now turn to performative analyses of the subjunctive mood. As far
as I know pertormative analyses have been proposed for the subjunctive in Latin
(Lakoff 1968), in Classical Greek (Lightfoot 1975), in Italian (Calboli 1971) and in
Spanish (Rivero 1971). I will discuss here Lakoff's and Lightfoot's accounts.
Lakoff (1968) proposes to account for independent subjunctives in Latin by
postulating a number of higher abstract verbs. Her proposal is motivated by the
following observations. First, independent subjunctives have various meanings. For
example, the independent subjunctive in (16) is three ways ambiguous as indicated
in (17):
(16) Venias
(17) a. imperative: NComeu You should comeN
b. wish: May you come!, if only you were to com&
c. possibility: NYou may come, NPerhaps you are coming
(Lakoff 1968:158)
Second, when an independent subjunctive is questioned (forming either a yes-no
interrogative or a wh-interrogative) it can only have the upossibilityu meaning. So,
Veniasne? may mean is it possible that you are coming? but the two other
meanings are not available (not even conceivable as Lakoff points out); and Quis
veniat? may mean Who may come? or NWho would come? but not NWho do I
wish would come? or Whom do I order to come?. Third, there are two ways of
negating an independent subjunctive: either with ne or with non. When (16) is
negated with ne it is still ambiguous between the imperative and the wish
meaning whereas when negated with non it can only have the IpossibilityN
meaning. Now, in embedded subjunctive clauses the occurrence of non or ne is
determined by certain syntactic properties of the main verb. This rule could be
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generalised to account for the negated independent subjunctives as well if we
assume that they are embedded under a higher verb, the syntactic properties of
which are responsible for the selection of the negation morpheme.
Lakoff argues that we can explain the ambiguity of independent subjunctive
clauses, the restrictions on the interpretation of interrogative subjunctive clauses
and the facts relating to negation, if we assume that these subjunctives are
embedded under abstract higher verbs in deep structure:
•The meaning-class of this verb will give the meaning of the subjunctive,
govern whether it is negated by ne or non, and account for whether or not
it can be questioned;... (Lakoff 1968:160).
These abstract verbs are absent at the surface structure because of the operation
of a late deletion rule. Lakoff proposes the following abstract verbs for independent
subjunctive clauses:
The imperative abstract verbs: [imper], [hort]
The optative abstract verb: [vel]
The jussive abstract verb: [oport]
The concessive abstract verb: [lic]
The deliberative abstract verb: [aequum]
The potential abstract verb: [poss]
The abstract verb of the purpose clause: [vol]
The abstract verb of the relative purpose clause: [designate]
The first thing to notice about Lakoff's account is that it is essentially syntactic.
Subjunctive desinences or complementizers do not have inherent meaning. They
occur as a result of a transformation which takes as input a [+IND] clause and
yields as output a [-IND] clause. The basic mood is the indicative from which the
subjunctive is derived transformationally. According to Kempchinsky (1986: 32),
this analysis recognises in some way that subjunctive complements must be
subcategorised for by the matrix verb but
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the mechanisms by which this subjunctive complement is introduced are
ad hoc in nature (there are no restrictions, for example, on where the
relevant feature for subjunctive may be inserted) and only possible in a
framework such as that of Aspects with few restrictions on the form of
grammar.
As Kempchinsky (1986:33) points out, a morphological feature changing rule which
is relevant to subcategorisation like the one proposed by Lakoff would violate
Chomsky's (1986) view that only morphological material which does not affect
theta-marking and, crucially here, which does not enter into s-selection can be
introduced after deep structure (e.g. agreement marking on the verb).
Moreover, there seems to be a contradiction in Lakoff's account, as on the
one hand, her analysis seems to assume that subjunctive clauses are multiply
ambiguous (since they may be governed in deep structure by any of the verbs
cited above, subject to certain syntactic restrictions) and, on the other hand, she
claims that the subjunctive verb form has no meaning:
Nthe markers of mood - subjunctive in Latin, subjunctive and optative in
Greek - are all complementizers and, as such, are always devoid of
meaning of their own ... (Lakoff 1968:161)
This leads to another question: assuming Lakoffs theory is correct, how are
subjunctive clauses interpreted? On what evidence does the hearer recover the
higher verb (he presumably has to recover it, otherwise he doesn't understand the
illocutionary force of the utterance) if the subjunctive mood markers do not encode
any meaning? The approach I am going to propose is essentially'difterent. I will
argue that mood markers, in particular na, have semantic content and thus
contribute to the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur.
I will now turn to Lightfoot's analysis. Lighttoot (1975) puts forward a
performative analysis for the subjunctive in Classical Greek. He shares, at least at
the beginning of the book, Lakoff's basic idea that the subjunctive does not carry
any meaning of its own:
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•The point of this chapter has been to enumerate and describe the
complement constructions of Greek and to show that despite their formal
diversity none of them carry any distinctive meaning of their own.
(Lightfoot 1975:48)
However, Lightfoot criticises Lakoff s work, arguing that the set of higher verbs she
proposes seems to be of a largely random composition and uno attempt was
made to identify a meaning class of subjunctive governing verbs (Lightfoot
1975:21). He identifies such a class: all verbs which take subjunctive complements
share the property of future directedness. He claims that
the subjunctive can be viewed as an alternative form of the future tense
whose occurrenpe is governed by the character of the main verb. That is
to say, certain main verbs will allow a future tense underneath them to be
realised with subjunctive endings (Lighttoot 1975:48).
What, then, is the difference between the indicative future and the subjunctive?
•When referring to the future..., if a sentence has no existential
presupposition the subjunctive/optative will occur; and if there is an
existential presupposition, the indicative will be used (Lightfoot 1975:133).
It is clear that by the end of the book there is a shift in Lightfoot's position: he
gives up the idea that the subjunctive carries no meaning of its own.
In later work Lightfoot (1979: 286, fnl) rejects an analysis of the subjunctive
in terms of abstract verbs; he then assumes that subjunctives will be generated
freely in the syntax and will be interpreted by semantic rules as indicating future
time and absence of an existential presupposition. This semantic account is further
considered in section 1.3.1.
No performative analysis of na-clauses in Modern Greek has ever been put
forward. It should by now be clear that the performative hypothesis does not
provide an adequate framework for the study of mood in general, so I will not
consider such an account for na-clauses. Towards the end of this chapter I will
show that the relevance-theoretic account of mood, which bears some superficial
20
similarity to the performative account, does not face any of the problems discussed
here.
1.2.2. AssertIon vs non assertion
Terrell and Hooper (1974), Hooper (1975), Klein (1975) and others argue that the
semantic notions of assertion and nonassertion have syntactic consequences in
the complement system of Spanish. In particular assertive predicates require
indicative complements, whereas nonassertive predicates require subjunctive
complements.
What do the terms assertion and nonassertion mean? Hooper (1975) tries
to sharpen up these concepts by proposing the following test for identifying the
type of predicate: only assertive predicates allow their complements to be
preposed. For example, the predicates in (18) are assertive, whereas those in (19)
are nonassertive (adapted from Hooper 1975: 94-95):
(18) a. I think the shops are open
b. The shops are open, I think
c. He says we need a new PC
d. We need a new PC, he says
(19)	 a. It's likely that she will apply
b. *She will apply, it's likely
c. Probably, all flights are booked
d. ?All flights are booked, probably
Which semantic concept corresponds to the syntactic property of preposing?
Hooper (1975:95) says:
The assertive predicates form a natural semantic class. They are all
affirmative in nature; they imply in one manner or the other that the speaker
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or subject of the sentence has an aftirmative opinion regarding the truth
value of the complement proposition....a negative opinion makes the
predicate nonassertive...
She distinguishes strong assertives, such as acknowledge, assert, explain, etc, and
weak assertives such as think, believe, seem; nonassertive predicates may be non
factive, such as be likely, be conceivable, doubt and the strong assertives when
negated, or factive such as regret, resent, be interesting, surprise, etc.
According to Hooper, in Spanish nonassertive predicates require
subjunctive complements, whereas assertive ones take indicative complements.
This generalisation, however, seems to be far from exceptionless and the concepts
of assertion and nonassertion, already quite vague, have often been stretched in
order to account for the Spanish data (for a critical discussion see Palmer 1986:
140-146).
With regard to na- and non na-clauses in MG it is easy to show that
Hooper's theory does not fare very well. To start with, predicates taking na-clauses
allow them to be preposed (although not so easily when embedded under Nit is
likely/probable, etc):
(20)	 a. thelo na figo
want-is na-leave-i s-PF
I want to go
b. na figo, thelo
na-leave-i s-PF want-is
To go, I want'
c. Lei/Protini/se simvoulevi na figis
Say-3s/suggest-3s/you advise-3s na leave-2s-PF
He says/suggests/advises you to go
'Hooper (1975) does not discuss volitional verbs which, as Klein (i977) shows,
are nonassertive predicates.
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d. na figis, Iei/protinVse simvoulevi
na Ieave-2s-Pf, say-3s/suggest-3s/you advise-3s
That you should go, he sayslis suggesting/advises you
Moreover, the classes of assertive and nonassertive verbs do not seem to
be identical in MG and Spanish. In MG predicates which are on Hooper's analysis
assertive may take na-complements as in (20c,d). More crucially, predicates which
are supposed to be nonassertive like amfivaio doubt, metaniono TMregret",
ekpllsome to be surprisedN allow only non na-complements, contrary to the
predictions of Hooper's analysis.
In addition, there doesn't seem to be a clear link between independent
indicative clauses and assertion, on the one hand, and between independent
subjunctive clauses and nonassertion on the other. What do the terms assertion
and nonassertion mean when it comes to independent clauses? Hooper (1975:97)
says:
•To this point I have been using the term ASSERTION to mean a
declarative proposition or a claim to truth that, on at least one reading, may
be taken as the semantically dominant proposition in the discourse contextN
However, if indicative clauses are assertions, i.e. claims to truth, then how are we
to explain their occurrence in interrogatives and the antecedent of conditionals as
in (21) and (22):
(21) a. Pou pige o Kostas?
Where went-3s the Kostas?
Where did Kostas go?
b. Efage i Maria?
Ate-3s the Mary?
Did Mary eat?
c. (,Viene mañana? (indicative)
Is he coming tomorrow?	 (Hooper 1975:122)
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(22) An o Kostas den me sto spiti tou, me stis Marias
If the Kostas not is at house his, is-3s at Mary's
If Kostas is not at his place, then he is at Mary's
On the other hand, the assumed link between subjunctive clauses and
nonassertion breaks down in view of the fact that independent subjunctive clauses
may be used to make assertions both in MG and in Spanish, albeit only weak
ones. According to Hooper (1975), there is a very clear difference in meaning
between (23a) and (23b):
(23) a.Tal vez venga (SUBJ) mañana
Perhaps he'll come tomorrow
b. Tal vez vendrá (IND) mañana
Perhaps he'll come tomorrow	 (Hooper 1975:123)
In the indicative version Nthe speaker actually commits himself to the truth of the
proposition and asserts it, whereas the subjunctive version Implies so much doubt
that it cannot be considered an assertion (Hooper 1975:123). In MG there is a
comparable difference in meaning between (24a) and (24b): (24a) sounds more
doubtful than (24b).
(24) a. Isos na erthi avrio
Perhaps na come-3s-PF tomorrow
Perhaps he might come tomorrow
b. Isos tha erthi avrio
Perhaps will come-3s-PF tomorrow
Perhaps he will come tomorrow
However, both (23a&b) and (24a&b) may be uttered assertively. Both members of
each pair are weak assertions; the only difference is that the subjunctive versions
are weaker than the indicative ones. Subjunctive clauses are clearly not excluded
from making assertions.
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An additional problem for the correlation of independent indicative clauses
with assertion and independent subjunctive clauses with nonassertion is that on
this view the imperative mood is lumped together with the subjunctive as
semantically identical (Terrell and Hooper 1974:487). However, there are clear
differences in meaning, at least in MG, between the imperative verb form and the
na-clause used instead of the imperative, which on this analysis would be left
unaccounted for. Na-clauses when used as imperatives are perceived to be more
polite and more indirect than the corresponding imperative forms. This issue will
be discussed in detail in chapter 2.
In conclusion, the notions of assertion and nonassertion do not provide a
theoretically or empirically adequate framework for the study of the subjunctive.
1.2.3. A speech act semantic account
As far as I know, no complete account of the indicative and the subjunctive mood
has been proposed within the speech act framework. The main concern of speech
act theorists has been to account for the semantic differences between
declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives. According to the standard speech act
account (Searle 1969, 1979b), sentences encode two types of meaning: truth
conditional information and information about illocutionary force. On this view,
cognate declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives like those in (25):
(25)	 a. John writes letters
b. Does John write letters?
c. John, write letters
express the same proposition, which is usually taken to be given by the
declarative. So, (25a-c) do not differ with respect to what they describe, i.e. their
truth conditional meaning. They differ with respect to what they indicate, i.e. their
illocutionary force. Declaratives are used to make assertive speech acts, i.e. they
indicate that the speaker is committed ,. varying degrees of strength to the
proposition expressed. Imperatives perform directive speech acts, i.e. attempts by
the speaker to get the hearer to do something. Interrogatives are a particular kind
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of directives: attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to provide some
information.
A brief proposal concerning sentences in the subjunctive is to be found in
Vanderveken (1990: 15, 93). He puts forward the claim that subjunctive sentences
are a particular type of exclamatory sentences. Exclamatory sentences perform
expressive speech acts. In particular, they pare used to express the speaker's
mental states, as in (26):
(26) How glad I am that he won! (Vanderveken 1990:15)
Subjunctive sentences, such as (27), are, according to Vanderveken, used to
express a particular type of mental state, namely the speaker's will:
(27) Let there be rain!	 (Vanderveken 1990:15)
However, not all independent subjunctive clauses are used to express the
speaker's will in MG. Consider, for example:
(28) a. Na klidosis tin eksoporta
na lock-2s-PF the front door
You should lock the front door
b. Makari na ihe girisi noritera
wish-particle na had returned-3s earlier
Would that he had returned earlier
c. Isos na me arrostos
perhaps na is ill
Perhaps he may be ill
The na-clause in (28a) is used to express the speaker's will; however, in (28b) the
speaker expresses an unrealisable wish, and in (28c) the speaker expresses her
low confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed.
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Moreover, complement clauses in the subjunctive are not used to express
the speaker's will:
(29) a. Varethika na se penmeno
bored-is na you wait-i s-IPF
I am bored of waiting for you
b. Arhisa na katharizo
began-is na clean-ls-IPF
I began to clean up
c. I Maria amite na paradehti to lathos tis
the Mary refuses-3s na admit the mistake hers
Mary refuses to admit her mistake
d. Thelo na telioso tis spoudes mou
want-is na finish-i s-PF the studies mine
I want to finish my studies
In none of these examples does the complement in the subjunctive express the
speaker's will; even in (29d) it is the main verb rather than the complement which
expresses the speaker's will.
Also, in adverbial clauses the subjunctive is not used to express the
speaker's will:
(30)	 a. na bi ksafnika o Kostas, tha lipothimisi i Maria
na enter-3s-PF suddenly the Kostas, will faint-3s the Mary
If suddenly Kostas comes in, Mary will faint
b. Prin na ksimerosi pigan kinigi
before na dawn-3s-PF went-3p1 hunt
Before it was dawn they went hunting
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Can we give a different semantic account of the subjunctive mood in the
speech act framework? It might seem initially, on the basis of examples like those
in (31) and (32), that we could claim that subjunctive clauses are directives, i.e.
attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something:
(31) Venga aqul (subjunctive)
Come here	 (Hooper 1975:122)
(32) Na erthis edo
na come-2s-PF here
Come here
Note, however, that, since imperatives are usually claimed to be directives, such
an account would render independent subjunctive clauses synonymous with
imperatives, although, as I mentioned earlier, there are differences in meaning
between imperatives and na-clauses used instead of imperatives. Even more
crucially, such a semantic analysis cannot account for any of the na-clauses in
(28)-(30) (except for (28a)).
On the other hand, there is no semantic link between indicative or non na-
clauses and assertion, as I showed in the last section. Another argument in
support of this claim comes from embedded non na-clauses:
(33) a. 0 Kostas den nomizi oti ta magazia me klista
the Kostas not think-3s that the shops are closed
Kostas does not think that the shops are closed
b. 0 Kostas arnithike oti ipe psemata
the Kostas denied-3s that said-3s lies
Kostas denied that he had lied
None of the embedded non na-clauses in (33) could be said to make assertive
speech acts.
In conclusion it is quite clear that the indicative and the subjunctive mood
cannot be argued to be illocutionary force indicators in the same way that
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declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives may be claimed to be. As a matter of
fact, it has been convincingly argued by Wilson and Sperber (1 988a) that speech
act accounts of the semantics of imperatives and interrogatives are unattainable
as well.2
1.3. Earlier semantic approaches to na-clauses
In this section I will look at three very different semantic accounts of na-clauses.
Lightfoot (1979) argues that the na+verb complex is a type of future tense.
Veloudis and Philippaki-Warburton (1983) and Philippaki-Warburton and Veloudis
(1984) argue that na-clauses encode propositional attitude information. Finally,
Christidis (1985, 1987) attempts to relate semantically the subjunctive marker na
to the stressed deictic particle na.
1.3.1. A tense analysis
According to Lightfoot (1979), the distinction between the two types of future,
characteristic of Classical Greek (see section 1.2.1), has survived in Modern
Greek: the indicative future (tha + verb, marked for person, number, and aspect)
is a future tense with existential presupposition whereas the subjunctive (na-
clauses) is a future tense with no existential presupposition.
By Nexistential presupposition Lightfoot (1975:81) means a presupposition
about reality, i.e. a presupposition that a proposition is true. Lighttoot (1975: 133)
thinks that logically,..., it is inherently impossible to treat the future factually.
However, as he points out, this is exactly what we do with sentences like:
(34) a. It will snow tomorrow
b. because it will snow tomorrow, I am taking my coat
c. he knows that it will snow tomorrow	 (Lightfoot 1975: 133)
2The arguments presented in this section are of the same type as those used
by Wilson and Sperber (1988a) and Wilson (1992) to argue against the speech act
account of declaratives and non-declaratives.
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So, Lighttoot claims that there are two ways in which we can refer to the future:
with or without an existential presupposition. This is grammaticalised in Classical
Greek and in MG with the choice between the indicative future and the subjunctive.
For example, according to Lightfoot (1979:285), when you utter (35a) you make an
assumption about reality, whereas there is no such assumption in a voluntative
expression like (35b) or a deliberative question like (35c):
(35) a. Tha vreksi avrio
will rain-3s tomorrow
It will rain tomorrow
b. Na skotosoun ton Sokrati
na kilI-3p-PF the Socrates
Let them kill Socrates
c. Ti na kanoume?
What na do-i p
What are we to do?
(adapted from Lighttoot 1979:285)
(adapted from Lightfoot 1979:282)
(adapted from Lightfoot 1979:282)
Lightfoot bases his analysis on the false claim that the subjunctive occurs
as a complement type only to future referring verbs, and that main clause
subjunctives are all future referring. He makes this point with respect to Classical
Greek but he clearly believes that it carries over to MG as well (1979: 284, 290).
However, it is far from true that all independent na-clauses are future referring. In
fact, na-main clauses may bear past tense morphology. Consider:
(36) a. Isos na efige o Janis
Perhaps na left-3s the John
Perhaps John left
b. Na agorase i Maria frouta sti laiki?
na bought-3s the Maria fruit at the market
Could it be the case that Mary bought fruit at the market?
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c. Makan na tilefonise o Kostas
wish-particle na phoned-3s the Kostas
Hopefully Kostas called
In these examples the verb preceded by na bears deictic tense specification: all
these sentences are clearly couched in the past tense. In view of this, it can hardly
be argued that the na+verb construction is a kind of future.
Moreover, it is simply not true that all the verbs which allow na-
complements are future referring. Consider, for example,
(37) a. 0 Petros thelise na spudasi
The Peter wanted-3s to study-3s-PF
Peter wanted to study
b. Akouo/vlepo to Jani na beni
hear/see-is the John na enter-IPF-3s
I hear/see John coming in
c. Akousa/ida to Jani na beni
Heard/saw-is the John na enter-3s-IPF
I heard/saw John coming in
d. I Maria niothi/eniose ton Petro na hani to tharos tou
The Mary senses/sensed-3s the Peter na Iose-3s-PF the courage his
Mary senses/sensed Peter losing his courage
Only in (37a) is the main verb future referring. The perception verbs see, hear,
sense " in (37b-d) are not future referring. The state of affairs described in the na-
clause in (37b-d) is understood to be taking place at the same time as the hearing,
the seeing and the sensing. Moreover, the occurrence of na-clauses as
complements of such verbs refutes Lightfoot's claim that a na-clause encodes the
absence of existential presupposition.
Finally, Veloudis and Philippaki-Warburton (1983), Philippaki-Warburton
(1992) put forward a few additional arguments against the analysis of na-clauses
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as future, which relate to the distribution of the negative morphemes and the
historical development of the particles na and tha. A semantic argument that they
present is that, on Lightfoot's analysis, it is not clear how the na-clauses would be
semantically distinguished from the imperative verb form, as for example in (38),
(38) TrehalTrekse
Run-ipf/run-PF
Run
which presumably also refers to the future and is characterised by the lack of
existential presupposition.
I conclude that the semantic analysis of na-clauses as a kind of future
tense with no existential presupposition as proposed in Lightfoot (1975, 1979) is
not on the right track.3
1.3.2. A propositional attitude analysis
I will now consider a much more promising semantic account of na-clauses which
was developed in Veloudis and Philippaki-Warburton (1983) and in Philippaki-
Warburton and Veloudis (1984).
3lt is worth mentioning here that it is often claimed that the future is inherently
modal. So, for example, according to Lyons (1977: 677):
Futurity is never a purely temporal concept; it necessarily includes an
element of prediction or some related notion.
I have shown in earlier work (Rouchota 1991a) that the modal uses of will in
English and the future indicative in MG follow from their semantics (lutureN) and
pragmatic considerations. There is no reason to claim that the future is necessarily
modal or does not pertain to the actual world. The position I am taking here is that
the future locates a state of affairs in the actual world thought of as historically
extended (for a similar view see Huntley 1980, 1984 and Philippaki-Warburton
1992). Since na-clauses clearly do not encode future tense, the issue of the
future's inherent modality is not very relevant here. However, an explanation
should be given for why na-clauses are often understood to locate the states of
affairs they describe in the future. This will be taken up again in chapter 2.
32
In a first attempt to describe the semantics of na-clauses, Veloudis and
Philippaki-Warburton (1983:159-160) claim that the subjunctive mood in main
clauses,
expresses desire or will, wondering, consent or indifference, exhortation
or prohibition, wish or curse, surprise or discontent, disapproval or
approval. In other words, the subjunctive denotes, one could say with
respect to these sentences, the speaker's attitude towards the propositional
content of his utterance.
This distinguishes the subjunctive from the indicative,
Nwhich is the mood of reality, i.e. it expresses a propositional content (and
not the speaker's attitude towards it) as real, locating it in time (my
translation).
These observations are more or less borne out by the data. Na-clauses do
indeed convey attitudes like the ones referred to by Veloudis and Philippaki-
Warburton (hereafter V & Ph-W). Let us consider some examples. Suppose the
hearer doesn't want to work as many hours as he is supposed to. In this context
the speaker of (39) below
(39) na dhoulevis oso thelis
na work-2s-IPF as much as want-IPF-2s
Work as much as you want
may be understood as consenting to the hearer's wish to work less. In a context
where, in addition to the hearer's unwillingness to work, the speaker has authority
over him, she is, for example, his tutor, she may be understood as issuing him
permission to work less. Alternatively, if the speaker utters (39) when asked by the
hearer for instructions as to how to go about his life as a student, she may be
understood as advising or exhorting him to work as much as he wants and not
harder. On the other hand, the non na counterpart clause in (40) below:
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(40) dhoulevis oso thelis
work-2s-IPF as much as want-IPF-2s
you are working/work as much as you want
cannot be used in any of these contexts to communicate the speaker's consenting
to, permitting or advising the hearer to work as much as he wants. The speaker
is rather typically understood as simply saying that the hearer works as much as
he likes.
A different case is illustrated by the following example. Suppose that Bill's
mother Just heard that her son had a terrible car accident. In her despair she
exclaims:
(41) na me zodano to pedhi mou
na is-3s-IPF alive the child of mine
May my child be alive
The speaker here communicates her desire that her son is alive. The
corresponding non na-clause in (42)
(42) me zodano to pedhi mou
is-3s-IPF alive the child of mine
My child is alive
cannot be used in the same context to express the speaker's attitude of desire. In
fact, (42) typically communicates that the speaker says that her child is alive and
would probably be inappropriate in the context given here.
Independent na-clauses are also often used to express wishes which
cannot but remain unfulfilled. For example, (43)
(43) Na ksanageniomouna
na was born-IPF-ls again
Would that I were born again
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may be uttered by a speaker who intends to communicate her obviously impossible
wish to be born again. B 1 contrat, uttenng the corresponding non na-clause
in (44) below,
(44) ksanageniomouna
was bom-IPF-ls again
I was being born again
the speaker would never be understood as communicating her wish to be born
again.
The speaker's surprise, approval or disapproval may also be communicated
by a na-main clause, as V & Ph-W point out. As a reply to Mary's mentioning that
her boyfriend is on holiday and sends her a letter every day, (45) below
(45) na sou stelni ena grama tin imera. Ti sinithia!
na to you send-he a letter the day. What habit!
To send you a letter every day. What a habit!
may express the speaker's disapproval if, for example, it is part of the context that
the speaker dislikes frequent expressions of sentimentality. In a different context
where, for example, the speaker expected Mary's boyfriend to forget that Mary
existed as soon as he went on holiday, (45) could communicate the speaker's
surprise. If, on the other hand, the speaker thinks that this is a good sign for the
way in which Mary's relationship is developing, then (45) may convey the speaker's
approval, and so on and so forth. Now note, that in these contexts the non na-
corresponding clause in (46):
(46) sou stelni ena grama tin imera. Ti sinithia!
to you send-he a letter the day. What habit!
He sends you a letter every day. What a habit!
may also communicate the speaker's disapproval, surprise or approval. Still there
is a difference in meaning between (45) and (46). In (46) the speaker presents the
described state of affairs as a reality, to use V & Ph-W's words. The speaker
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communicates something like: Mary's boyfriend sends her a letter every day and
I have a certain attitude towards this. On the other hand, uttering (45) the speaker
communicates her attitude without making any comments with respect to whether
the described state of affairs is a reality.
As I pointed out earlier, a na-clause may also be used to make an
assertion. Suppose we are guessing George's age, and I utter (47):
(47) To poli ikosi hronon na me o Giorgos
At most twenty years na is-3s the George
George may be/must be at most twenty years old
(47) differs in meaning from (48) below as the English translations illustrate:
(48) To poti ikosi hronon me o Giorgos
At most twenty years is-3s the George
George is at most twenty years old
Both in (47) and in (48) the speaker is understood to be saying that George is at
most twenty years old. However, choosing to utter (47) rather than (48) the
speaker indicates that she has a lower degree of commitment to the truth of this
proposition. I will return to examples like these in chapter 2, where I will also
discuss in detail the interpretation of non na- and na-clauses like those in (39)-(44).
Finally, examples like (45) and (46) will be dealt with in chapter 3.
Coming back to the claim made by V & Ph-W (1983) and quoted at the
beginning of this section, the first point I want to make is that it does not seem to
be the case, as V & Ph-W claim, that non na-clauses simply locate the described
state of affairs in time without expressing a particular attitude towards it. As I
suggested above, a speaker uttering a non na-clause may communicate at least
certain attitudes like, for example, that she is surprised at'
approves/disapproves/believes, etc. the proposition expressed. It does, however,
seem to be the case, as V & Ph-W claim, that the state of affairs described in a
non na-clause is presented as real. Clearly, these intuitions need to be sharpened
and I will try to do so shortly.
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Second, V & Ph-W use the term 'propositional attitude' in a loose way to
refer both to the speaker's attitude towards the proposition expressed (eg. belief,
desire) and to certain speech act descriptions (eg. exhortation, prohibition). I will
accept their claim that the information encoded in na concerns the speaker's
attitude towards the proposition expressed, but I am going to use this term in the
sense of Fodor (1981) to refer exclusively to mental states.
Third, and most important, the question is whether V & Ph-W's (1984) claim
that na-main clauses express the speaker's attitude towards the proposition
expressed offers an adequate basis for a precise specification of the semantics of
na-clauses. To answer this, we will first consider the semantic analysis of na-
complement clauses proposed by Philippaki-Warburton and Veloudis (1984).
Philippaki-Warburton and Veloudis (1984) point out that na-complement
clauses are syntactically different from otL'pos-complement clauses. It is shown
with syntactic arguments that whereas otiand posare complementizers introducing
the complement clause that contains them, na is not a complementizer. It is argued
instead that na-clauses are introduced by a zero complementizer. 4 Ph-W & V then
go on to argue that this syntactic difference between oti/pos- and na-complements
correlates with a semantic distinction. Looking at the examples in (49) and (50)
below,
(49) a. 0 Janis kseri oti koliba
the John know-3s that swim-IPF-3s
John knows that he is swimming
b. 0 Janis ksen na koliba
the John know-3s na swim-IPF-3s
John knows how to swim
(50) a. 0 Janis ksehase oti koliba jimnos
the John forgot-PF-3s that swim-IPF-3s nude
John forgot that he swims/is swimming nude
4This claim is not uncontroversial. For example, Agouraki (1991) argues that
na is a complementizer.
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b. 0 Janis ksehase na koliba jimnos
the John forgot-PF-3s na swim-IPF-3s nude
John forgot how to swim nude
Ph-W & V note that John's swimming (nude) is presented as a fact in (49a) and
(50a) whereas it is not a fact in (49b) and (50b). On the basis of such examples,
Ph-W & V argue that na-complement clauses describe states of affairs which are
not part of our wortd whereas oti/pos-complement clauses locate the described
state of affairs in our world.
This view is not without precedent. Chnstidis (1981, 1982) suggests a
similar semantic distinction: oti/pos-complements are said to make a claim to truth
whereas na-complements do not make such a claim.
An argument in favour of the semantics proposed by P-W and V is, as they
point out, that na-complement clauses are generally not tensed: their temporal
interpretation seems to depend on the tense of the main clause (for a couple of
exceptions however see 1.4.2). For example,
(51)	 a. kseri na koliba
knows-3s na swim-IPF-3s
he knows how to swim
b. iksere na koliba
knew-PF-3s na swim-IPF-3s
he knew how to swim
The claim that tenseless clauses locate the described stats of affairs in a
possible rather than the actual world has also been put forward by Huntley (1984).
I will explore Huntley's position in detail in section 1.4.2.
So, the state of affairs described by the proposition expressed by na-
complement clauses is located in a world other than the actual. Moreover, if we
look closely we see that the state of affairs described by the proposition expressed
by the na-main clauses in (39), (41) and (43) repeated below
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(39)	 na dhoulevis oso thelis
na work-IPF-2s as much as want-IPF-2s
You should work/work as much as you want
(41) na me zodano to pedhi mou
na is-3s alive the child of mine
May my child be alive
(43) Na ksanageniomouna
na was born-IPF-ls again
Would that I were born again
is other than actual as well, a point not noted by P-W and V. In (39) the speaker
permits or exhorts the hearer to bring about the state of affairs described by the
proposition 'you work as much as you want', which is at the time of the utterance
still unrealised. In (41) the speaker merely hopes that a certain state of affairs
holds. Given the information that her son was involved in a car accident, the
speaker can't conclude either that he is dead or that he is alive. It is still possible
that he is all right and the speaker expresses her desire that this be the case.
Lastly, in (43) the proposition expressed clearly represents a state of affairs which
although conceivable is not a state of affairs in the actual world.5
All this suggests that a unified account of the semantics of na-clauses is
possible and that such an account should involve the notion of possible or non-
actual world. However, at this point Ph-W and V do not put forward such a unifying
semantic analysis of na-clauses. One reason might be that it was probably not
obvious to Ph-W and V how the various possible attitudes expresed by na-main
clauses could be derived from the semantic specification upossible/non..actual u .
will show in chapters 2 and 3 that relevance theory provides the much needed
pragmatic framework in which we can explain the various interpretations of na-
clauses.
5Note that these observations mesh well with Lighttoot's idea that the
subjunctive marks the absence of existential presupposition. Lightfoot's proposal
is, as I have shown, too strong. The account I am about to present does not make
the false claim that na-clauses are a type of future and allows na-clauses to
describe states of affairs which exist in the actual world.
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On the other hand, the semantic analysis proposed for na-main clauses by
V & Ph-W (1983) cannot, in the form in which they present it, serve as the basis
for a unifying semantic analysis of na-clauses. For one thing, it does not generalise
over na-complement clauses. For example, in (49b) and (50b) the na-clause does
not seem to convey any of the attitudes of desire, will, wish, curse, approval,
surprise, etc. mentioned by V & Ph-W. Moreover, unless a multiple ambiguity is
stipulated, it is not explained how a na-main clause may have all these different
interpretations.
However, the semantic analysis proposed by Ph-W & V (1984) and V & Ph-
W (1983) has two major advantages. The first one is that, although these authors
did not argue systematically for a univocal semantic account of na-clauses (main
and complement), they clearly aim in this direction. So, for example, already in Ph-
W & V (1984: 157, my translation) we find:
na-complement clauses do not differ from na-main clauses in meaning
either: the subjunctive in independent clauses expresses the speaker's
attitude towards the propositional content of his utterance.... Perhaps we
may accept that the sole difference between sentences like the following
a. Thelo na kolibisoun oh
want-is na swim-PF-3pl all
I want all of them to swim
b. Na kolibisoun oh
na swim-PF-3p1 all
S
Let them all swim
is that the speaker's attitude is explicitly expressed in the first oneN.
In Joseph and Philippaki-Warburton (1987) and Philippaki-Warburton (1992) na-
clauses are treated as having a univocal semantics. So, for example in Joseph and
Philippaki-Warburton (1987:180) we read:
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The formal difference between indicative and subjunctive correlates
with a fundamental semantic distinction between sentences which
present an action or state as factual and thus locate it in time --
present, past, or future— and sentences which express the attitude
of the speaker (in main clauses) or of the higher subject (in
subordinate clauses) to an event or state which is not presented as
a fact (either of the present, past, or future), but which could
become a fact.
The second advantage is that their analysis tries to capture the intuition
that the semantic information encoded by na has to do with the speaker's attitude
towards the proposition expressed. In these two respects my own semantic
account builds on the work of Philippaki-Warburton and Veloudis.
1.3.3. A polysemy analysis
In Modem Greek there are two naps. I have already introduced the unstressed
preverbal modal particle na, usually taken to be the marker of the subjunctive
mood. The other na is a presentative particle which is stressed and means
something like uheres /there's', iook!, Ntake!u as in the following examples:
(52) a. Na i Maria
ná the Mary
Here's/There's Mary
b. Náti!
ná + nom.fem.clitic
Here/There she is
c. Nátin!
ná + acc.fem.clitic
Here/There she is
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d. Na!
Look!/Take!
In most synchronic grammars of Modem Greek (for example, Tzartzanos
1945/1989: 177-181, Triantafyllides 1941/1988: 399) this ná is assumed to be a
deictic particle. 6
 As pointed out in Householder et al. (1964), stressed ná is a
highly contextualised expression usually accompanied by a pointing gesture which
does not register the distinction between entities and locations or the distinction
between proximal and distal, as demonstrative pronouns and locative adverbs do
(aftos "this one", ekinos "that one", edo "here", eki uthereN)
There are clear phonological and syntactic differences between the two na's
which are discussed in detail in Joseph (1981). Let me mention a couple. Modal
na is unstressed and cannot appear on its own; presentative ná, on the other
hand, receives normal word stress and can occur by itself as in (52d) above.
Modal na occurs either directly before a verb or directly before a clitic pronoun
which is governed by the following verb. For example,
(53) a. Na figis
na go-2s-PF
Go
b. Na ton afisoun isiho
Na him leave-3pl-PF quiet
They should leave him in peace
(54) a. Thelo na mino
want-is na stay-i s-PF
I want to stay
6A different view is put forward in Babiniotis and Kondos (1967), who consider
deictic na to be a morpheme which attaches to pronouns thus creating the
demonstrative pronoun natos ("here he is"), nati ("here she is"), nato ("here it is").
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b. Thelo na me ksehasi
want-is na me forget-3s-PF
I want him to forget me
Presentative ná, on the other hand, never occurs immediately before a verb. In
addition to occurring on its own, it is found only before NPs, either a full NP as in
(52a) or a pronoun as in (52b and c).7
Scholars agree that the two na's are syntactically distinct but no consensus
has been reached as to the syntactic status of stressed ná. In addition to the
traditional view according to which stressed ná is a particle, Joseph (1981) argues
that it is a defective transitive verb, in particular an imperative, whereas Chnstidis
(1990) argues that it does not belong to any of the established syntactic categories
and that it is better analyzed as a "holophrase". (According to Christidis (1990:67),
holoph rases are "highly contextualised, structurally undifferentiated, holistic forms
which do not exhibit propositional structure (they are quasi-referential or quasi-
predicative)".)
Despite the syntactic and phonological differences between the two na's
Christidis (1985, 1987) argues that they are synchronically related. The evidence
for this, he claims, comes from the fact that in some expressions, like ná sou p0
("hey! let me tell you ") and ná se rotiso ("hey! let me ask you"), the stressed ná
occurs instead of the unstressed na. This, according to Christidis, can be explained
on the basis of a semantic relation between the two na's. For him, the two na's
share a common semantic core: directionality, both na's point towards something.
They differ with respect to what they point to. Presentative na points towards the
actual world, whereas subordinating na points towards an unrealised situation, a
state of affairs which does not belong in the actual world. According to Christidis
(1987:103):
7Also the two na have different origins. Preverbal na derives from the Ancient
Greek conjunction hina , which was a subordinating final conjunction ("so that", "in
order to") followed by the subjunctive. Presentative ná, on the other hand, derives
from the Ancient Greek deictic particle en. (see Christidis 1987 and references
there).
43
•subordinating na represents an abstract use ... of presentative ná,... it is
an abstract locative, and more specifically, an abstract directional
locative.8
It seems to me that there is practically no evidence to support this view.
Modal na and presentative ná are phonologically distinct and therefore any
analysis hinging on polysemy would not be a priori justified. More importantly for
the purposes of this thesis, the proposed semantics of preverbal na is at best
inadequate. In what sense does na point towards or direct our attention to a
state of affairs which is not part of this world in (54) above? The na-clause in these
examples simply represents a state of affairs which is not actual. What insight into
the semantics of na-clauses do we gain by claiming that na points to such a state
of affairs? How can we point to something which does not exist, anyway? In
addition to the fact that there is no other motivation for the directional semantics
of preverbal na than to somehow relate it to deictic ná, there is no obvious way in
which this semantics could provide the basis for accounting for the several possible
interpretations of independent na-clauses. A na-clause like those in (53) may in
different contexts be interpreted as advice or a suggestion or a plea or an order
or a wish or as issuing permission. Any pragmatic theory attempting to account for
these interpretations as deriving from the directionality semantics would have to
ascribe to speakers and hearers inferences of the sort Nsince the speaker points
to a state of affairs which does not exist she is giving advice/she is suggesting
something/she is pleading for something/she wants something/she is issuing
permission for something", depending on the context. Such inferences, however,
do not seem to be commonsensical. Moreover, on Christidis's analysis we would
have to explain why preverbat na doesn't also point to the actual world (which
would, after all, make it more semantically similar to presentative ná), or, even
stronger, why it doesn't only point to the actual world, creating a kind of sentential
counterpart to presentative ná + NP.
Given the analysis developed in Christidis (1985, 1987), Christidis and
Nikiforidou (1993) discuss the difference in meaning between conditionals where
the antecedent is a na-clause like (55a) and conditionals where the antecedent is
8A version of this proposal is adopted also in Veloudis (1987) and Philippaki-
Warburton (1992).
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introduced by an ("j?) like (55b) (note that an and na are mutually exclusive in the
antecedent of a conditional):
(55)	 a. na ihate erthi plo prin tha ton vlepate
na had come-2p1 earlier will him see-IMP-2p1
If you had come earlier you would have seen him
b. an ihate erthi plo prin tha ton vlepate
if had come-2p1 earlier will him see-IMP-2p1
If you had come earlier you would have seen him
They argue that conditional na is "another case where the deictic semantics of the
particle na survives in what is basically a subordinating use of the morpheme". In
particular, 'na serves to introduce the content of the antecedent clause in a way
directly relevant to the moment of speech and the speaker's present position " . I will
discuss na-conditionals in chapter 2 and I will show that this is not the way in
which na contributes to the meaning of a conditional. For now I mention this
analysis of na-conditionals as an example of the proliferation of senses of (at least)
the preverbal na to which a polysemous approach leads. Notice, furthermore, that
the two possible senses of preverbal na, i.e. pointing towards an unrealised event
and pointing towards the moment of speech and the speaker's present position,
are incompatible if not contradictory. For methodological reasons, usually referred
to as Modified Occam's Razor, an analysis which stipulates distinct meanings for
the same lexical item, is only to be preferred if a pragmatic explanation of the
several meanings/interpretations is not possible. This thesis is an attempt to show
that such an account is indeed possible for na-clauses.
1.4. A relevance-oriented semantic account of mood
In this thesis I want to put forward and defend a new account of the semantics of
na-clauses (and the way they contrast with non na-clauses). My analysis is based
on the approach to semantics advocated in relevance theory. So, I will first present
some basic ideas about what semantics is and should do.
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1.4.1. Semantics and relevance theory
One of the basic assumptions (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Wilson and Sperber
1993, Carston 1988, Blakemore 1987, 1992) within relevance theory is that the
linguistic properties of utterances vastly underdetermine what speakers actually
intend to say with their utterances (I am leaving aside for the moment what
speakers intend to communicate implicitly with their utterances. I will discuss this
in detail in chapter 2). For example, consider the following:
(56) a. Paul has a headache
b. Leave it there, please
c. This will help you relax
In order to understand (56a), the hearer has to determine which individual the
speaker intended to pick out with the name "Paul". To recover what is said by
(56b), the hearer has to infer what the speaker intended to refer to with the
pronoun "it" and decide where "there" is supposed to be. To grasp the content of
(56c), the hearer has to determine what the speaker is referring to with "this" and
who "you" is. The hearer will not be able to recover the proposition expressed by
each of the utterances in (56) unless he determines the intended referent of the
referential expressions. The task of assigning reference is clearly constrained by
the semantic properties of referential expressions (for example 'you" linguistically
encodes that it picks out the addressee) but it crucially depends on the context of
the utterance and the hearer's inferential abilities. No semantic rule could possibly
be built to predict the actual referent of any referential expression on any given
occasion. Reference assignment is one of the inferential tasks that hearers usually
have to perform in order to recover the meaning of an utterance.
Another such task is disambiguation. Consider (57a and b):
(57) a. He gave you a ring yesterday
b. The food is hot
9The underdeterrninacy thesis is also held by people who are not working
within relevance theory. For example, Atlas (1979, 1989) and Récanati (198gb).
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To recover the meaning of (57a) the hearer has to determine which of the two
senses of the word nng the speaker intended. Similarly, processing (57b) the
hearer will have to decide whether the speaker intended to say that the food is too
spicy or too warm. Clearly, the hearer cannot be said to have understood (57a) or
(57b) before he determines what sense of the ambiguous word was intended by
the speaker. Disambiguation, like reference assignment, crucially depends on the
hearer's ability to evaluate hypotheses about the speaker's communicative
intention in the particular situation of utterance.
Now consider the examples under (58):
(58)	 a. She is
b. No messages
c. Building number 10
d. John
e. In the garden
f. On Wednesday
(58a-f) may be perfectly appropriate utterances despite the fact that they are
sentence fragments. It is, however, impossible to understand what proposition the
speaker intended to express with each of these utterances, if we don't know the
situation in which they were uttered. The linguistic properties of these utterances
provide the hearer with the barest outline of the complete proposition the speaker
intended to communicate. So, take for example (58d). (58d) could be an
appropriate answer to at least all the questions in (59):
(59) a. Who is responsible for area D?
b. Who did you meet yesterday?
c. Whom are you having lunch with tomorrow?
d. Who saved Jane from certain death?
In the context of each of these questions the speaker of (58d) is expressing a
different proposition. Similar considerations hold for the rest of the examples. To
grasp the meaning of such utterances, the hearer has to recover, on the basis of
the context, material which is left out of the actual utterance, material which is, in
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other words, ellipsed. Moreover, he has to recover the appropriate material, i.e. he
has to determine what was the full proposition the speaker intended to
communicate in the particular situation.
Consider also the examples in (60):
(60) a. Paul's book is on the shelf
b. This box is too heavy
Interpreting (60a) the hearer has to determine what kind of relation holds between
Paul and the book: Does Paul own the book, is he the writer of the book, is it the
book that Paul is reading, is it the book that Paul always talks about, etc. Finally,
uttering (60b), the speaker may intend to communicate that the box is too heavy
for her to lift, or too heavy to be put on the back of her bike, or too heavy to send
by air mail, etc. The expressions NPauls book" and too heavy" are somehow
semantically vague. The semantic representations of these sentences have to be
enriched before the hearer is able to recover the proposition expressed.
In performing such inferential tasks as reference assignment,
disambiguation, recovery of ellipsed material and resolution of vagueness the
hearer is not simply trying to construct a truth evaluable representation on the
basis of the speaker's utterance. Rather, he is trying to recover THE truth
evaluable representation that he may reasonably assume the speaker intended to
communicate. This is very obvious in the following examples:
(61) a. It takes some time to get to the zoo on a Saturday morning
b. I've had breakfast
c. I've been to Tibet
d. There's nothing on television tonight
All these utterances express truth evaluable propositions (once the referent of "I"
in (61b and c) has been fixed). However, we tend to understand the speaker of
(61a) as saying that it takes longer than normal to get to the zoo on a Saturday
moming. And we tend to understand (61 b) as saying that the speaker had
breakfast the morning of the utterance and (61c) as saying that the speaker has
been to Tibet at some point in her life. Uttering (61d), finally, the speaker is taken
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to have said that there is nothing worth watching on television on the night of the
utterance. In such cases the semantically encoded content of the utterance is
enriched by the hearer on the basis of the situation of utterance and pragmatic
considerations. It is such examples which provide us with the clearest evidence
that the linguistic properties of utterances underdetermine what speakers intend to
say with them.
It should be clear from the discussion so far that standardly sentences do
not have determinate truth-conditions. Many of the examples we considered above
are not even complete sentences but rather sentence fragments and practically
none of them can be assigned truth-conditions in isolation. The linguistic
expression uttered provides hearers only with some evidence, sometimes very
fragmentary, about what proposition the speaker intends to express. And it is this
proposition that the hearer needs to recover; not just any truth evaluable
representation will do. To recover that proposition simple decoding is not enough.
The inferential tasks of reference assignment, disambiguation, resolution of
vagueness and recovery of ellipsed material which are presumably driven by some
general communicative/pragmatic principle(s) have to take place.
Such considerations motivate Sperber and Wilson's distinction between
Linguistic Semantics and Semantics of Mental RepresentationsN. Linguistic
semantics has to do with the mapping of words onto concepts and sentences onto
(generally incomplete) structured conceptual representations, i.e. with linguistically
encoded meaning. It is part of the grammar, representing the speaker's semantic
competence, and therefore psychologically real.1UJ The output of linguistic
decoding is partially articulated conceptual representations, usually referred to as
logical forms. For example, the logical form of (58a) might be:
(62) ______ IS ______
10Linguistic semantics is translational in the sense of Lewis (1972). For a
justification of this property of linguistic semantics as well as the general
philosophical framework in which it is placed (Fodor's language of thought) see
Clark (1991: 17-20).
11 Pronouns like Nsheu in (58a) have been argued to encode procedural
information, as I will explain shortly. They therefore do not appear in the logical
form of the utterance which is a conceptual representation, though, clearly, they
will constrain its development into a fully propositional form. The conceptual-
procedural distinction will be discussed in detail later in this section.
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Logical forms are clearly not capable of being true or false. Such incomplete
semantic representations serve as input to the pragmatic processes mentioned
earlier and the two together yield propositional forms, i.e. semantically complete
and therefore truth evaluable conceptual representations. These conceptual
representations are thoughts and as such do have truth conditions. The semantics
of mental representations has to do with the mapping of complete mental
representations, i.e. thoughts, onto their sets of truth conditions. According to
Sperber and Wilson, the semantics of mental representations is not psychologically
real in the sense that it is not represented in the mind. As Carston (1988) points
out, a speaker's knowledge of the meaning of a sentence may be best
demonstrated by his ability to specify the state of affairs it describes, but it does
not follow that this is what a speaker's semantic knowledge consists in. Moreover,
if the truth conditions of our thoughts were representations, then our semantics
would go into infinite regress. The idea that truth conditional semantics tries to
capture is that we use language in order to communicate about the world. So, the
only way in which truth conditions may be useful is if they are not psychologically
real; only then can we use this machinery to explain how language relates to the
world.
These two semantic levels are mediated by pragmatic inference, which is
driven by a single communicative, and ultimately cognitive principle, the principle
of relevance. I will discuss the principle of relevance in great detail in chapter 2.
On this view, there is a clear distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
Natural language semantics is autonomous with respect to pragmatics. However,
the semantics-pragmatics distinction on the relevance view does not coincide with
the Gricean distinction between Nwhat is said and •what is implicated". For
Gnceans, pragmatics is concerned with the implicatures of an utterance, and
pragmatic principles, the conversational maxims, play a role in the derivation of
implicatures only. For Sperber and Wilson (1986, Wilson and Sperber 1981), the
role of pragmatic principles is not only to account for the recovery of implicitly
communicated propositions but also to account for the inferential relation between
the logical form of an utterance and the proposition it is used to express explicitly.
Pragmatic principles contribute not only to the derivation of the implicatures of an
utterance but also to the recovery of its explicitly communicated content.
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So, we are assuming that utterances, or rather the thoughts these
utterances represent, have truth-conditions. A question that arises here is whether
all meaning is truth-conditional. Are there any linguistic devices or constructions
which are meaningful but which do not contribute to the truth-conditions of an
utterance? The standard answer is yes. A list of some of the linguistic
constructions which encode non-truth-conditional meaning is to be found in Wilson
and Sperber (1993) and Wilson (1 991 b):
A. Discourse/pragmatic connectives
(a) It is Sunday but the shops are open
(b) Sue can pay the rent. After all, she has a job
(C) Mary bought a flat. Moreover, she bought a car.
B. Illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials
(a) Frankly, the pizza is not edible
(b) Unfortunately, my application was rejected
C. Illocutionary and attitudinal particles
(a) John is clever, eh?
(b) John is reliable, huh!
D. Non-declarative sentence types
(a) Is Mary a student?
(b) Where is Mary?
(c) Don't touch the pan
(d) How handsome you are!
(e) May she live to be a hundred
(f) Would that I could find the way back home
It is clear in view of such data that an adequate semantic theory should be
able to account for both truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning. It is
standardly assumed that all non-truth-conditional meaning is of the same nature
and therefore can be analyzed uniformly. In fact, within speech act semantics all
the constructions which encode non truth conditional meaning are treated as
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illocutionary force indicators (Searle 1 979b, Urmson 1963, Bach and Hamish 1979,
Lyons 1977, Récanati 1987, Vanderveken 1990). A parallel line of investigation is
suggested by Grice's notion of conventional implicature. Gnce (1975/1989) argues
that connectives like but and therefore carry conventional implicatures, i.e.
although their meaning is derived by decoding, it does not contribute to the truth-
conditional content of the utterance but rather to its implicatures. So, all non-truth-
conditional meaning is seen as contributing to the implicitly communicated content
of an utterance. The speech act and the Gncean accounts are meant to be
compatible. Gnce himself (1989) links the notion of conventional implicature to the
notion of speech act. He considers conventional implicatures as corresponding to
a set of non-basic, non-central speech acts (as opposed to the central speech acts
of asserting, asking and telling which are indicated by declarative, imperative and
interrogative mood). So, for example, however indicates the non-central speech
act of contrasting.
Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Wilson (1991b, 1992), however, argue that
not all non-truth-conditional meaning is cut to the same pattern. In fact, they argue
that we cannot account for linguistically encoded meaning on the basis of the
distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning in a
satisfactory way. There are, according to them, four distinct categories of
linguistically encoded meaning which are obtained from the interaction between
two basic distinctions: the explicit-implicit distinction and the conceptual-procedural
distinction.
I will first give the definitions for the notions of explicature and implicature.
In Relevance (1986:182), Sperber and Wilson give the following definition of
explicitness:
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it
is a development of a logical form encoded by U.
Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Wilson (1991b, 1992) treat the notion of
explicature in greater detail:
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A proposition communicated by an utterance is an explicature if it is either
(a) the proposition expressed by the utterance (i.e. its truth conditional
content, what is saidN), or (b) the result of embedding this proposition
under one of a small class of descriptions, e.g. those containing speech act
or propositional attitude verbs
So for example, consider the following dialogue:
(63) Peter: Will you come to the party tonight?
Mary (happily): I don't have any lectures tomorrow
Mary's utterance might convey the following explicatures:
(64) a. Mary doesn't have any lectures on the following day
b. Mary is saying that she doesn't have any lectures the following day
c. Mary is saying happily that she doesn't have any lectures on the
following day
d. Mary believes that she doesn't have any lectures on the following day
e. Mary is happy that she doesn't have any lectures on the following day
(64a) is the proposition expressed by the utterance, or the basic explicature of the
utterance. (64b-e) are higher level explicatures, i.e. explicitly communicated
propositions which are constructed by embedding the proposition expressed by the
utterance under a speech act or propositional attitude description. The explicatures
of an utterance are obtained partly by decoding and partly by inference. So, to
recover (64a), the hearer must not only decode the utterance but also infer the
referent of T; to obtain the higher level explicatures in (64b-d) the hearer must
make additional inferences about the speech act the speaker is performing or
about the speaker's attitude towards the proposition expressed. Both the basic
explicature and the higher level explicatures of an utterance are conceptual
representations and therefore truth-evaluable in their own right. However, only the
proposition expressed is seen as the truth conditional content of the utterance with
which it is associated. For example, Mary's utterance in (63) will be true if and only
if the proposition in (64a) is true. So, on this view, the meaning encoded by a word
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makes a contribution to the truth-conditions of the utterance if and only if it
contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance.
The implicatures of an utterance, on the other hand, are all those
propositions communicated by that utterance which are not inferential
developments of its logical form. For example among the implicatures of Mary's
utterance in (63) may be:
(65) a. Mary will go to Peter's party
b. Mary wil! stay late at the party
c. Mary can drink a lot at the party
The implicatures of an utterance are also truth-evaluable mental representations
which, however, do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. (In this
respect they are similar to higher level explicatures).
Let me now move on to the distinction between conceptual and procedural
information (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Wilson and Sperber 1 988a, Wilson and
Sperber 1993, Wilson 1991b, 1992, Blakemore 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, Blass
1990, Moeschler 1989a,b, Luscher 1989, Rouchota 1990)). According to Sperber
and Wilson (1986) and Wilson and Sperber (1993), utterance interpretation
involves the construction and manipulation of conceptual representations. As I
pointed out earlier, the explicatures of an utterance are derived by a combination
of linguistic decoding and inference and the implicatures entirely by inference. This
opens up the possibility that linguistically encoded information may contribute to
the interpretation process either by forming part of a decoded conceptual
representation or by providing information on the manipulation of conceptual
representations, i.e. by offering guidance on inferencing.
Most words encode concepts. So, book encodes the concept BOOK and
write the concept WRITE. Conceptual representations differ from other kinds of
representation, such as phonetic or syntactic representations, in the following
respects: (a) they have concepts as their constituents (rather than syntactic
categories or phonetic features), and (b) they have logical and truth-conditional
properties, i.e. they enter into relations like entailment or contradiction, they act as
input to inference rules, they can describe or partially characterise a certain state
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of affairs. The proposition expressed, the higher level explicatures and the
implicatures of an utterance are conceptual representations.'2
Words encoding conceptual information may or may not contribute to the
truth conditions of an utterance. Words like book, chair, run encode concepts and
contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur. Illocutionary
and attitudinal adverbials, such as the ones under B, encode conceptual
information which, however, contributes to the higher level explicatures of the
utterances where they occur (so, they do not contribute to the truth conditional
content of the utterance - for a full account see Wilson 1991 b, Wilson and Sperber
1993 and lfantidou 1993a,b). In both of these cases conceptual information
contributes to the explicitly communicated content of the utterance. It may also turn
out that conceptual information can contribute to the implicatures of an utterance.
Wilson (1 991 b) suggests that the word yet may be a plausible candidate, although,
as she points out, one would need to find more examples to support the existence
of such a category of meaning.
Some words encode procedural information, i.e. information on how to
manipulate, how to utake a conceptual representation. Procedural information is
best understood as a way of constraining or guiding the inferential phase of
communication. As we have seen, on the relevance view, inference plays a crucial
role in the derivation of both the explicitly and the implicitly communicated content
of an utterance. So, we would expect to find, on the one hand, words which
encode procedural meaning and constrain the derivation of the explicatures of an
utterance (proposition expressed and higher level explicatures) and, on the other
hand, words which encode procedural meaning and constrain the derivation of the
implicatures of an utterance. Indeed, this is the case.
Blakemore (1987, 1988, 1989, 1992) has argued convincingly that
discourse connectives, such as the ones under A, contribute to the interpretation
process solely by indicating to the hearer what context and contextual effects he
is expected to recover. So, for example, the function of (the denial of expectation)
but in (Aa) is to indicate that the proposition it introduces (the shops are open)
must be processed in a context in which it contradicts and eliminates an implication
of the previous proposition ("It's Sunday). The function of moreover in (Ac) is to
' 2The logical form or semantic representation of an utterance is, as explained
earlier, an incomplete conceptual representation.
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indicate that the two propositions must be processed in the same or similar
contexts, giving rise to the same or similar effects. Such discourse connectives do
not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur.
On the other hand, it has been argued that pronouns such as NIN and NheN
encode procedural information which contributes to the proposition expressed by
the utterance (and therefore, to its truth-conditional content). (For arguments
against a conceptual and in favour of a procedural account of pronouns see Wilson
and Sperber 1993 and references there). In order to decide what proposition the
speaker intended to express with an utterance like He is marriedu, the hearer has
to decide on the intended referent. Pronouns leave a gap in the semantic
representation of an utterance, which has to be filled by inference. Their function
is to guide the inference process by narrowing down the class of hypotheses the
hearer has to consider. For example, the information encoded by uheN guides the
search for the intended referent by narrowing down the set of candidates the
hearer has to consider: he should only consider males.
On the other hand, non declarative sentence types, such as those under
D, have been argued (Wilson and Sperber 1988a, Clark 1991) to encode
procedural information which contributes to the higher level explicatures of an
utterance. Since the meaning encoded by mood indicators guides the construction
of higher level explicatures, it does not contribute to the truth-conditions of the
utterance. I will discuss non-declaratives in detail in the next section, where I will
also argue that na- and non na-clauses may be analyzed in the same way. Some
attitudinal and illocutionary particles like the ones in C probably contribute to the
interpretation process along similar lines (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 22-23).
So, we end up with four categories of linguistically encoded meaning: (a)
conceptual and explicit, (b) procedural and explicit, (C) conceptual and implicit and
(d) procedural and implicit. From the point of view of linguistic semantics these four
categories are exhaustive. I will show in the next section that the information
encoded by na-clauses belongs to category (b). It is non-truth-conditional
information which contributes to the interpretation process by guiding the hearer
to construct a certain type of higher level explicatures.
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1.4.2. Relevance theory and the semantics of na-clauses
Since my analysis of na-clauses is a subcase of the analysis of non-declaratives
proposed in Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Wilson and Sperber (1988a), I will
start by taking a closer look at the latter.
Talking about the relation between illocutionary force and sentence type
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 247) express their doubt as to whether there is such
a thing as Na well defined range of mutually exclusive syntactic sentence typesu
(Sperber and Wilson 1986:247):
NWhat undeniably exists is not a well-defined range of syntactic sentence
types but a variety of overt linguistic devices- e.g. indicative, imperative or
subjunctive mood, rising or falling intonation, inverted or uninverted word
order, the presence or absence of Wh-words, or of markers such as 'let's'
or 'please'- which can guide the interpretation process in various ways.N
Wilson and Sperber (1 988a) argue that semantic accounts of declaratives,
imperatives and interrogatives based on speech act theory are inadequate. They
show that there is no direct semantic link between such Nsentence typesN and the
illocutionary force that utterances of such sentences may have. They propose
instead that there is a direct semantic link between linguistic form, i.e. declarative,
imperative and interrogative syntax, and propositional attitude. According to Wilson
(1992) there are two types of propositional attitudes: descriptive and interpretive.13
13This follows from the relevance theoretic claim that there are two uses of
representation: descriptive and interpretative. According to Sperber and Wilson
(1986:228):
NAny representation with a propositional form, and in particular any
utterance, can be used to represent things in two ways. It can represent
some state of affairs in virtue of its propositional form being true of that
state of affairs; in this case we will say that the representation is a
description, or that it is used descriptively. Or it can represent some other
representation which also has a propositional form - a thought, for instance
- in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms; in this
case we will say that the first representation is an interpretation of the
second one or that it is used interpretively.N
The distinction between description and interpretation will be discussed in more
detail in chapter 3.
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Descriptive attitudes are attitudes towards states of affairs in the world whereas
interpretive attitudes are attitudes towards mental representations. States of affairs
are objects that exist (or might exist). There are several ways in which one might
think of a state of affairs. It might hold in this world, i.e. the actual world; or it might
obtain in a desirable world, i.e. a world which is desirable from someone's point of
view; or it might be located in a potential world, i.e. a world which is compatible
with the speaker's assumptions about the actual world and could therefore become
true; or it may hold in a possible, i.e. a conceivable, world. Mental representations,
on the other hand, are representations with logical properties.
According to Wilson and Sperber (1 988a), both descriptive and interpretive
attitudes are necessary for an adequate semantic account of declarative,
imperative and interrogative sentences. Declaratives and imperatives encode
particular types of descriptive attitudes whereas interrogatives encode a special
kind of interpretive attitude. On this account, a declarative encodes the information
that it represents a state of affairs in the actual or some possible world. An
imperative encodes the information that it represents a state of affairs in a potential
and desirable world. An interrogative encodes the information that it represents a
relevant thought. The meaning encoded by declaratives, imperatives and
interrogatives is non-truth-conditional and procedural: it constrains the derivation
of those higher level explicatures of an utterance which contain information about
propositional attitude.
The semantics of declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives and how they
interact with the semantics of na- and non na-clauses will be discussed in detail
in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. For the moment, let me take an imperative and
illustrate how the account proposed by Wilson and Sperber works. Suppose that
Henry has been complaining that it is too hot in this room and ha let you know
that he would like to turn off the heating. You have been ignoring him so far but
in the end you say:
(66) Ok. Turn down the heating
We would normally interpret this utterance as giving the hearer permission to turn
down the heating. Here's how the interpretation process develops on the relevance
view. Decoding the utterance the hearer will recover that a world in which he turns
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down the heating is desirable and potential. Notice that desirability is a three place
relation: something is desirable to someone to some degree. The hearer will
resolve this semantic indeterminacy on the basis of pragmatic considerations. In
this context, the hearer will probably form the hypothesis that the described state
of affairs is considered by the speaker to be desirable to him (the hearer) to a high
degree. The fact that Henry wanted to turn down the heating was in a sense
already given in the context, therefore this hypothesis must be the most readily
available one to the hearer as far as the speaker could have foreseen. Moreover,
interpreting (66), the hearer may reasonably assume that in uttering the imperative
the speaker intends to grant the potentiality of the state of affairs, i.e. she intends
to communicate that, as far she is concerned, turning down the heating is a
potential state of affairs and so it may become true. Because the desirability is
resolved in favour of the hearer and the speaker is the one who grants the
potentiality of the described state of affairs, this imperative has the illocutionary
force of giving permission - different ways of resolving such semantic
indeterminacies will yield different interpretations, as we will see in connection with
na-clauses used instead of the imperative in chapter 2. In this case the hearer will
accept this hypothesis about the interpretation of the utterance as .
 it is easily
accessible and reasonable. Obviously, on this account the semantics of
imperatives vastly underdetermines their actual interpretations. To give a detailed
explanation of how such an imperative is interpreted we need to invoke a full
fledged pragmatic theory. I will do this in chapter 2.14
In this thesis I want to propose the view that what is traditionally called the
subjunctive mood in Modern Greek encodes non-truth-conditional procedural
meaning which contributes to the interpretation process by guiding the hearer
towards the construction of a certain type of higher level explicatures rather than
others. Like imperatives, declaratives and interrogatives, na-clauses constrain
those higher level explicatures of the utterance which contain information about
propositional attitude. In particular na-clauses encode a special kind of descriptive
attitude in much the same way as declaratives and imperatives have been argued
to by Wilson and Sperber (1 988a). On the basis of the discussion in section 1.3.3.
14The relevance-theoretic approach to non-declaratives has been successfully
further explored in relation to pseudo-imperatives, exciamative inversions, and the
let and /ets-constructions by Clark (1991, 1 993a,b).
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and additional evidence to be presented shortly, my proposal is that a na-clause
encodes the information that it represents a thought which is entertained as a
descnption of a state of affairs in some possible world.
This way of defining non-indicativeness is not entirely new. It was first put
forward in a systematic way by Huntley (1984) in his study of the English
imperative. According to Huntley (1 984:1 09):
...an indicative clause, even in the future tense, represents a situation (truly
or falsely) as obtaining in the actual world (thought of as historically
extended), whereas the non-indicative clause represents it as being merely
envisaged as a possibility with no commitment as to whether it obtains in
past, present or future in the actual world.N5
Huntley's claim is based on the observation that whereas indicative clauses may
be said to be true or false non-indicative ones may not. Consider:
(67) a. That the window is broken is true/false
b. *The window's being broken is true/false
c. *To break the window is true/false
d. *That John break the window is twe/false
In English gerunds, infinitival clauses and non-finite that-clauses are non-indicative
clauses and as such represent a state of affairs as merely envisaged as a
possibility".
On the basis of such observations Huntley (1984: 120) claims that:
NENOn indicatives, VR] are distinguished from the indicatives by the absence
of the indexical reference to the actual world which is characteristic of the
latter"
' 5Donhauser (1987) puts forward an analysis of indicativeness and
nonindicativeness in German based on Huntley's proposal.
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Huntley's arguments carry over to the MG data. Consider (68a) and (68b):
(68) a. Oti to parathiro me spasmeno me alithia
that the window is broken is true
That the window is broken is true
b. *na me to parathiro spasmeno me alithia
na is the window broken is true
*for the window to be broken is true
Non na-clauses may be said to be true or false; na-clauses, however, may not. So,
there is initial evidence that a na-clause represents a state of affairs as possible,
i.e. as simply conceivable, whereas a non na-clause represents a state of affairs
as actual.
Further support for the claim that na-clauses represent states of affairs in
possible worlds comes from na-complement clauses. Verbs or predicates of desire,
wish, obligation, ability, possibility, request, precaution, prevention and modal
verbs, i.e. verbs which entail or encode non-actuality, take only na-complement
clauses. For example,
(69) a. 0 Janis theli/epithimi/efhete na pantrefti ti Maria
The John wantldesire/wish-3s na marry-PF-3s the Mary
John wants/desires/wishes to marry Mary
b. Se diatazo/ipohreono/paparakalo na paretithis
you order/oblige/plea-is na resign-2s-PF
I order/oblige/plead with you to resign
c. Prosehe na mm glistrisis
take care-2s na not slip-2s-PF
Take care not to slip
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d. Me embodise na se do
me prevented-3s na you see-2s-PF
He prevented me from seeing you
e. Bori/Prepi na figi
may-imp/must-imp na go-3s
He may/must go
f. me dinato/pithano na pame diakopes
is potential/possible na go-i pl-PF holiday
It is potential/possible (for us) to go on holiday
Moreover, in connection with those verbs which may take either type of
complement, there are striking differences in meaning depending on whether a na
or a non na-complement is selected. Consider, for example, the verbs of believing
and saying in (70), the verb "know" in (71) and the verbs "be happy/be sad" in
(72):
(70) a. Pistevo/nomizo/leo oti tha figi o Kostas avrio
believe/think/say-is that will go-3s-PF the Kostas tomorrow
I believe/think/say that Kostas will leave tomorrow
b. Pistevo/nomizo/leo na figi o Kostas avrio
believe/think/say-is na go-3s-PF the Kostas tomorrow
I believe/think/say that Kostas should leave tomorrow
(71) a. 0 Petros kseri oti magirevi
The Peter know-3s that cook-3s-IPF
Peter knows that he is cooking
b. 0 Petros kseri na magirevi
the Peter know-3s na cook-3s-IPF
Peter knows how to cook
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(72) a. Herome/Stenohorieme pou se vlepo etsi
be happy-is/be sad-is that you see like this
I am happy/sad that I see you in this situation
b. Herome/Stenohorieme na se vlepo etsi
be happy-is/be sad-is na you see like this
I am happy/sad to see you in this situation
Interestingly, causatives and verbs like continue and be bored, the complement of
which clearly describes an actual state of affairs, take na-complements; verbs of
perception may also take na-complements:
(73) a. Ton ekana na hasi to telefteo Ieoforio
him made-is na miss-3s-PF the last bus
I caused him to miss the last bus
b. SinehizVeksakolouthi na vrehi
continue-imp na rain-imp-IPF
It continues to rain
c. Varethika na se perimeno
be bored-is na you wait-ls-IPF
I was bored with waiting for you/to wait for you
d. Vlepo ton Kosta na erhete
see-is the Kostas na come-3s-IPF
I see Kostas coming
e. Akouo tin Maria na pezi piano
hear-is the Mary na play-3s piano
I (can) hear Mary playing the piano
Such examples are crucial for the analysis I will present in chapter 2 and will be
further discussed there. For now note that these cases do not constitute a
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counterexample to the semantic analysis proposed here for na-clauses: the actual
world is one of the possible worlds. Moreover, note that in the corresponding
English sentences you also get a non-indicative clause, either the infinitive or the
gerund.
Additional evidence for the proposed semantics comes from the subordinate
clauses in which na-clauses may occur. Purpose clauses are only in the
subjunctive. For example:
(74) 0 Janis pige stin Athina giaime to skopo na spoudasi
The John went to Athens forlin order na study-ls-PF
John went to Athens in order to study
On the other hand, causal clauses are always non na-clauses. Consider:
(75) 0 Janis tha paretithi giatVepidvdioti (*na) perni liga lefta
The John will resign because (na) earn-3s-IPF little money
John will resign because he earns very little money
Conditional clauses and restrictive relative clauses may be either in the indicative
or in the subjunctive. I will come back to conditionals in chapter 2 (for a couple of
examples see section 1.3.3). Restrictive relative clauses will be considered in great
detail in chapter 5. Finally, temporal clauses may be either in the subjunctive or in
the indicative depending on the complementizer: otan "when", afou "after" and
mo/is "at the moment that" do not allow na-clauses, whereas prin "before" takes
only na-clauses and mehri "until " may take either a na or a non na-clause. For
example:
(76) a. 0 Petros tha vgi sti skini otan/afou/molis (*na) milisi i Anna
The Peter will come out-3s at the stage when/after/at the moment (*na)
talk-3s-PF the Anna
Peter will appear on the stage when/after/at the moment when Anna will
talk
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b. 0 Kostas efige prin na ksimerosi
The Kostas left-3s before na was dawn-imp
Kostas left before it was dawn
c. Mehri na gini/pou tha gini eniliki den tha tis poun tipota
until na become-3s-PF/ that will become-3s-PF adult not will her say-3pl
nothing
Until she comes of age, they will say nothing to her
According to Huntley (1984: 117), the semantic contrast between indicatives
and non-indicatives correlates with the presence in the former and the absence in
the latter of the auxiliary modal and tense elements. (The presence of do in
negative imperatives is not inconsistent with this claim, as Schmerling (1977) has
shown). This argument seems to carry over to the MG data only partially. Non na-
clauses are always tensed.
(77) 0 katadikos drapetevVdrapetefse/tha drapetefsi
the prisoner escape-3s/escaped-3s/will escape-3s
The prisoner escapes/escaped/will escape
Independent na-clauses also carry tense specification. The verb in (78a) has non-
past tense morphology, and the verbs in (78b-d) have past tense morphology:
(78) a. na htenizese/na htenistis
na comb your hairlPF/PF
You should comb your hair (regularly)/(now)
b. lsos na efige (htes)
na left-PF-3s (yesterday)
Perhaps he left (yesterday)
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c. na pige o Janis me ti Maria sb theatro (htes)?
na went-PF-3s the John with the Mary to the theatre (yesterday)
Is it possible that John went to the theatre with Mary (yesterday)?
d. Ah, na imouna pall neos
ah, na were-is again young
Would that I were young again
The temporal interpretation of (78a-c) depends on the tense of the verb, whereas
the imperfective past tense in (78d) is not deictic.
Na-complement clauses, on the other hand, generally carry non-past tense
specification and depend for their temporal interpretation on the tense of the
embedding predicate (like infinitival clauses in English). Consider, for example, (79)
and alt the examples of complement na-clauses given in this section so far (except
for (69a)):
(79) a. Apofasisa/arnoume na katharizo/kathariso/*katharisa
decided-is/refuse-is na clean-i s-IPF/clean-1 sPF/*cleaned1 s
I decided/refuse to clean (regularly)/(now)
However, complement na-clauses may be marked for past tense as we can see
in (80):
(80) a. Bori/Prepi na efige
can-imp na went-PF-3s
It may be that he left
b. Apokliete na evrekse
excluded-imp na rained-PF-imp
It is impossible/out of the question that it rained
c. Elpizo/efhome/pistevo na eftase stin ora tou to gramma
hope/wish/believe-is na arnved-3s on the time its the letter
I hope/I wish that the letter arrived on time
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I do not think that the fact that na-clauses may be tensed is
counterevidence to the proposed semantic analysis. For one thing, Huntley (1984:
119-121) argues that although the presence vs absence of tense correlates with
the semantic contrast between indicative and non-indicative clauses, the latter
gives nse to an independent semantic contrast:
The presence of tense in the former [indicatives, VA] requires specification
of a time in order to fix the intension; the absence of tense in the latter
[non-indicatives, VA] corresponds to the absence of such a requirement...
However, I submit that the indicative/non-indicative mood distinction itself
gives rise to another, independent semantic contrast, one which is the
world deictic analogue of the time-deictic contrast between tensed and
tenseless clauses. (Huntley 1984: 119-120)
One of the arguments that Huntley (1984: 120-121) puts forward to support this
claim is that tense is not the only way to anchor a proposition to a point in time.
Temporal deictic adverbs are another source of temporal reference and non-
indicatives do take deictic adverbs. Consider the examples in (81) from Huntley
(1984: 114),
(81) a. Do the job tomorrow/*yesterday
b. Last week Bill demanded that you do the job yesterday
c. Last week Bill asked you to do the job yesterday
If this is correct, and time deixis is indeed independent from world deixis, then I
don't see why non-indicatives may not be tensed. The lack of tense elements may
turn out to correlate regularly with non-indicatives but it does not have to be a
necessary property of non-indicatives.
It is worth noting here that the claim that non-indicatives in English are not
marked for tense is not unchallengeable. Stowell (1982) argues that infinitives do
have tense specification under COMP. The tense of an infinitive clause is that of
a possible or unrealised future. Moreover, Salkie (1989) argues that the perfect
and the pluperfect in English should be analyzed as tense rather than aspect. If he
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is right then the correlation between non-indicative clauses and absence of tense
breaks down, since at least the perfect may occur in non-indicative clauses:
(82) a. Please, don't have made things worse (Wilson & Sperber 1988:81)
b. To have arrived yesterday/the previous day was no small achievement
(Salkie 1989:12)
c. John wants you to have finished your homework by 5.00
(Huntley 1984:115)
Moreover, my analysis of indicatives and subjunctives in MG is placed
within the relevance theoretic framework. In this framework world deixis is
conceived of as propositional attitude information. Given that tense is a property
of the proposition itself whereas communicating that the represented state of aftairs
is actual or possible is an attitude towards that proposition, I don't see why a
proposition describing a state of affairs regarded as possible cannot be tensed.
Let me now turn briefly to indicative or non na-clauses. Huntley's claim that
an indicative clause represents a situation (truly or falsely) as obtaining in the
actual world cannot be quite right in view of examples like the following:
(83) a. ean o Kostas me arrostos tha hasi to sinedrio
if the Kostas is ill will miss-3s-PF the conference
If Kostas is ill he will miss the conference
b. 0 kaliteros sou fibs ehi AIDS. Ti kanis?
the best yours friend has-3s AIDS. What do-2s?
Your best friend has AIDS. What do you do?
c. Enas Tourkos, enas Jermanos ki enas Ellinas nikiasan ena aeroplano...
A Turk, a German and a Greek hired-3p1 a plane...
A Turk, A German and a Greek hired a plane...
d. Ine pithano oti o proedros tha paretithi
is possible that the president will resign
It is possible that the president will resign
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e. lpokrithika oti imoun o antras tis
pretended-is that was-is the husband hers
I pretended that I was her husband
The indicative in the antecedent of a conditional as in (83a), in supposition as in
(83b), in jokes and fiction in general as in (83c), in the complement of verbs like
those in (83d-e) cannot be said to present a state of affairs as obtaining in the
actual world. Although I am not going to discuss the interpretation of such
examples in any detail, I propose that indicative clauses are better seen as
presenting states of affairs as obtaining in the world in which the speaker is .. Let
us call this the base world. By default the base world is the actual world. This is
why indicative clauses are usually understood as describing states of affairs which
exist in the actual world. However, in (83a) the base world is the world set up by
the conditional clause, in (83b) and (83c) the base world is a possible world, in
(83d) "it is possible" sets the base world to possible, in (83e) the state of affairs
described in the complement clause obtains in a world which although not in fact
the actual is claimed to be the actual (a "make-believe" world), as follows from the
meaning of pretend, etc.
I have argued so far that na-clauses encode the information that the
proposition expressed is entertained as a descnption of a state of affairs in a
possible world, whereas indicative clauses encode the information that the
proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the
base world 16 . I now want to argue that the information encoded by na is
procedural rather than conceptual.
161 am not sure that we need to say that indicative clauses encode the
information that the proposition they express is entertained as a description of a
state of affairs in the base world. It may be that we interpret utterances as
representations of states of affairs in the base world unless we are led, by, for
example, the semantics of a particular linguistic expression, to do otherwise (i.e.,
to interpret the utterance as a representation of a state of affairs in a specific type
of world or as a representation of another representation). For the purposes of this
thesis, however, I will assume that declaratives encode the information that the
proposition they express is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the
base world.
69
1.4.3. Mood Indicators and procedural meaning
I said earlier that the information encoded by mood indicators is seen within
relevance theory as procedural meaning contributing to the higher level
explicatures of an utterance. For example, an imperative instructs the hearer to
construct a higher level explicature involving a particular type of attitude: the
attitude that the described state of affairs is regarded as potential and desirable.
What are the arguments in favour of the claim that the information encoded by
mood indicators, and in particular the preverbal particle na, is procedural? The
arguments I will put forward here are suggested in Wilson (1992). The discussion
will focus on na-clauses.
The first consideration is that the meanings of mood indicators are
somehow not accessible to consciousness in the way that the meanings of the
words that encode conceptual meanings are (eg. house, desk, shop, etc). It is
worth noting that this seems to be typical of most of the words which have been
argued to encode procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987, Blass 1990, Wilson and
Sperber 1993, Wilson 1991b, 1992). Now, it is quite generally true that
computations cannot be brought to consciousness: for example, we don't have
conscious access to move-alpha or phonological rules. So, the difficulty in
accessing the meaning of na- or non na-clauses would be explained by the
assumption that the information they encode is procedural, i.e. concerns the
manipulation of conceptual representations and contributes to the inferential phase
of utterance interpretation.
The next argument comes from embedded na-clauses. If the information
encoded by na-clauses was conceptual, then the sentences in (84) would be
assigned by the grammar the (incomplete) semantic representations in (85):
(84) a. To na spoudasi tha itan kalo gia tin Maria
the na study-3s-PF will was good for the Mary
To study would be good for Mary
b. I Maria elpizi/theli na doulepsi
The Mary hope-3s/want-3s na work-3s-PF
Mary hopes/wants to work
70
c. 0 Petros skopevi/prospathise na metakomisi
the Peter plan-3s/tried-3s na move-3s-PF
Peter is planning/tried to move
d. 0 Kostas me etimos na ta thisiasi ola
The Kostas is ready na them sacrifice-3s-PF everything
Kostas is ready to sacrifice everything
(85) a. For it to be possible for Mary to study would be good for Mary
b.Mary wants it to be possible for her to work
c. *Peter is planing/tried for it to be possible for him to move
d . *Kostas is ready for it to be possible for him to sacrifice everything
However, the semantic representations in (85), when possible at all, are too weak.
In (84a), for example, the speaker is not saying that it would be good for Mary to
be able to study, but that it would be good for Mary to study. In (84b) the speaker
is not saying that Mary hopes or wants to be able to work but rather that she
hopes/wants to work. This problem will not arise if the information encoded by na
is taken to be procedural, since on this view na-clauses do not encode elements
of conceptual representations.
The same point holds with respect to the subordinate na-clauses in (86):
(86) a. 0 Janis irthe stin Athina jia na spoudasi
the John came to Athens in order na study-3s-PF
John came to Athens in order to study
b. Mehri na vri doulia, tha danizete hrimata
Until na find-3s job, will borrow-3s money
Until he finds a job, he will be borrowing money
c. 0 Janis theli ena aftokinito pou na me grigoro
The John want-3s a car that na is fast
John wants a car which would be fast
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Once again, if we took the information encoded by na to be conceptual, then the
semantic representations assigned to these sentences would be too weak. In (86a)
the speaker is not saying that John came to Athens in order for him to be able to
study, but that he came to Athens in order to study. In (86b) the speaker is not
saying that he will be borrowing money until it is possible for him to find a job, but
that he will be borrowing money until he finds a job. In (86c) the speaker is not
saying that John wants a car for which it is possible to be fast, but rather that he
wants a car which is fast. This problem will not arise if we treat the information
encoded by na as procedural.
The third argument hinges on the observation that not all mood indicators
in a sentence may point in the same direction. Consider the following dialogue:
(87)	 Peter: Na mm tis ksanamilisis
na not hers again speak-2s-PF
You should never speak to her again
Mary: Na mm us ksanamiliso?
na not hers again speak-i s-PF
I should never speak to her again?
As I will argue in chapter 3, section 3.6.4, Mary's utterance is a declarative na-
clause. It is not, however, uttered, with the falling intonation typical of declarative
utterances but rather with a low rise towards the end, which makes it more similar
to an interrogative. Now, because of the declarative syntactic structure and the na-
verb form Mary's utterance should be understood as describing a state of affairs
in a possible world. On the other hand, according to the interrogative-like
intonation, it should be interpreted as a representation of a relevnt thought, i.e.
as a question, or at least as expressing some doubt about the truth of the
proposition expressed. Now, if we were to assume that the information encoded
by the mood indicators in this utterance is conceptual, i.e. appearing in the
semantic representation of the utterance, then the result should be a contradiction.
However, Mary's utterance in (87) does not sound contradictory or odd. By treating
the meaning of mood indicators as procedural, i.e. as simply pointing in certain
directions, we can allow for it to be integrated in a non-contradictory whole.
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Another argument comes from Wilson (1991b). It is argued there that
illocutionary adverbials like frankly encode concepts which are integrated in a
higher level explicature, the other elements of which are pragmatically inferred. So,
for example (88a) gives rise to the higher level explicature in (88b):
(88) a. Frankly, the roof's condition is less than good
b. I am telling you frankly that the roofs condition is less than good
Now, in at least some cases, the speaker who utters a sentence like (88a) can lay
herself open to charges of untruthfulness. For example,
(89) Mary: Frankly, the roof's condition is less thQn good
Peter: That's not true. You're not being frank
(adapted from Wilson 1991b:12)
This is not surprising if frankly is an element of a conceptual representation which
may be true or false in its own right.
Now, a speaker using a na-clause does not lay herself open to similar
charges of untruthfulness. Consider:
(90) Peter (musing): Na agoraso ena spiti
na buy-is a house
To buy a house
Mary: ?That's not true. It's not possible for you to buy a house
The oddity of this exchange cannot be explained if we were to a'ssume that na
encodes the concept it is possible that...N, which in main clause cases gives rise
to the corresponding higher level explicature. By treating the information encoded
by na procedurally we don't face this problem. On this view, na does not encode
an element of the conceptual higher level representation but only some information
on how to construct one.
It should be clear by now that the relevance theoretic analysis of mood
indicators is very different from the performative hypothesis. If this account were
couched in conceptual terms, it would be a variant of the pertormative hypothesis.
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However, as I have shown, there are plenty of arguments suggesting that, for
example, na does not conceptually encode the higher level explicature it is
possible that .... The information encoded by mood indicators in general is
procedural, i.e. they provide the hearer with a set of hints for constructing the
intended higher level explicature.
Finally, let me explain how I conceive of procedural encoding in the case
of na-clauses. Note, first, that it is utterances, rather than sentences or clauses,
which carry higher level explicatures. It follows that na will guide the hearer to
construct a particular type of higher level explicatures only in the case of
independent na-clauses. So, how does na contribute to the interpretation process
in the case of embedded na-clauses? Some suggestions have been put forward
by Wilson (1992) in connection with the infinitive in English, and I will draw directly
on her observations. Consider the example in (91):
(91) I Maria theli/elpizi na taksidepsi sto eksoteriko
The Maria want-3s/hope-3s na travel abroad
Maria wants/hopes to travel abroad
Using the na-clause in (91) the speaker activates, makes more accessible the
information in (92):
(92) It is possible for Mary to travel abroad
Of course, processing (91) from left to right, the hearer will recover something
much stronger as a result of decoding the meanings of the verbs want or hope":
that is, that it is desirable and potential for Mary to travel abroad. In this case, the
hearer will not pay any attention to the information encoded by na. The same
happens with examples such as the following:
(93) a. Ine aparetito/pithano/dinato/borVprepi na taksidepsi sto eksoteriko i Maria
is necessary/possible/potentiaVcan-3s/must-3s na travel-3s-PF abroad the
Mary
It is necessary/possible/potential for Mary to travel abroad/
Mary can/may/must travel abroad
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b. I Maria sinehizi/anagastike na frontizi ti gria mitera tis
The Mary continue-3s/was forced-3s na take care-3s-IPF the old mother
her
Mary continues/was forced to take care of her old mother
In (93a) the main verb encodes possibility or necessity, and in (93b) the main verb
entails that the state of affairs described in the complement clause is actual. In
both cases the information encoded by na is, so to speak, NabsorbedN into the
information encoded by the main verb.
However, with verbs which may take either a na- or a non na-complement
the information encoded by na plays a more active role:
(94) a. Leo/nomizo oti tha pame
say/think-is that will go-i p1
I say/think that we will go
b. Leo/nomizo na pame
say/think-is na go-i p1
I say/think that we should go
In such cases the use of the na-clause makes, again, a certain attitude more
accessible. However, the particular attitude the hearer is intended to recover has
to be inferred rather than decoded from material elsewhere in the sentence as in
the previous examples.
In the case of independent na-clauses, the information encoded by na
contributes to the construction of a particular higher level explicature. Consider, for
example, (95):
(95) a. 0 Janis na me to poli-poli ikosi hronon
The John na is the most twenty years
John may be at most twenty years old
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b. Na figis amesos
na leave-2s-PF immediately
Leave/You should leave immediately
Na in these examples activates, makes more accessible the information in (96):
(96) a. It is possible that John is at most twenty years old
b. It is possible that you leave immediately
which will encourage the hearer to construct in each case a higher level explicature
involving possibility. The precise attitude of the speaker, whether she considers the
described state of affairs possible, as in (95a), or wants it, as in (95b), will be
decided on the basis of the context and considerations of optimal relevance, as I
will show in detail in the next chapter.
1.5. Summary
After arguing that earlier analyses of the subjunctive are not suitable for na-clauses
in MG and that existing analyses of na-clauses are inadequate, I have put forward,
in this chapter, the hypothesis which is going to be explored and defended in the
rest of this thesis, as well as aspects of the framework on which it is built. I argued
that the preverbal particle na encodes non-truth-conditional meaning which relates
to propositional attitude information. In particular, na-clauses indicate that the state
of affairs described is regarded as truth-evaluable in a possible world. In contrast
non na-clauses indicate that the described state of affairs is truth-e"valuable in the
base world (which, in the default case, is the actual world). I have also argued that
the information encoded by na is procedural rather than conceptual: it does not
contribute a constituent to a conceptual representation communicated by the
utterance. Rather, in the case of independent na-clauses, it guides the hearer
towards constructing a higher level explicature containing the propositional attitude
of possibility. In the case of embedded na-clauses, na also makes accessible the
information that the described state of affairs is possible, but does not give rise to
a higher level explicature. This propositional attitude information may be
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independently encoded by material elsewhere in the sentence (for example in the
main verb), or it may have to be pragmatically confirmed. In the next two chapters
I will show that assuming this semantics and adopting an adequate pragmatic
theory we can provide a psychologically plausible explanation of the various
interpretations of independent na-clauses (and the way they differ from the
corresponding non na-clauses).
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CHAPTER 2
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NA-CLAUSES: NA-CLAUSES AND
ENRICHMENT
2.1. Introduction
In chapter 1 I proposed a univocal semantics for na. I argued that na encodes
procedural information about propositional attitude which does not contribute to the
truth conditions of the utterance. In particular, I argued that na-clauses encode the
information that the proposition they express is entertained as a description of a
state of affairs in a possible world. Now, I showed in the first chapter that
independent na-clauses may be interpreted in several ways: they may be used to
grant permission, issue a command, give advice, express wishes, express surprise,
uncertainty, etc. The question that arises and that I am going to address in this
chapter is how these vanous interpretations may be reconciled with the proposed
semantics of na-clauses. I suggested in the last chapter that these interpretations
are arrived at pragmatically, i.e. via some inference process which is constrained
by some general communicative principle(s) and which takes as input the semantic
representation of the utterance and the context and yields as output the intended
interpretation. The pragmatic theory I will use is relevance theory. In this chapter
I will outline the basic tenets of relevance theory and proceed to show how we can
account for the interpretations independent na-clauses are amenable to. The
discussion will focus on na-clauses which function like imperatives, na-clauses with
hortative- and optative-like interpretations and na-clauses expressing potentiality
and possibility.
2.2. Interpreting utterances
2.2.1. Relevance Theory
In this section I will give a brief outline of relevance theory. (For detailed
presentation see Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1987; Blakemore 1992; and Wilson to
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appear a, on which I draw in this section; for critical discussion see Levinson 1989,
Mey and Talbot 1988, Hirst, Leslie and Walker 1989, Chametzky 1992 and Open
Peer Commentary in Sperber and Wilson 1987). In the remainder of this chapter
and the next one I will argue that a psychologically plausible explanation of the
way na-clauses are interpreted is possible within this framework of utterance
interpretation.
Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory is in the Gricean tradition in that
they view utterance interpretation as an essentially inferential process.
Understanding an utterance means deciding among its possible interpretations
which was the one the speaker intended to communicate. The possible
interpretations of an utterance are determined on the basis of its linguistically
encoded content and the contextual assumptions that are brought to bear.
Interpreting utterances, for both Sperber and Wilson and Gnce, involves non-
demonstrative inference: the hearer forms a hypothesis about the speaker's
intended interpretation which is then evaluated on the basis of general
communicative principles.
In contrast to Griceans, however, Sperber and Wilson do not believe that
utterance interpretation is rule- or maxim-governed. They claim that a general
criterion for evaluating possible interpretations is part and parcel of the human
makeup. Moreover, this criterion is powerful enough to exclude all but a single
interpretation. Having found an interpretation which satisfies this criterion the
hearer need not look further; he will take this interpretation as the one the speaker
intended to communicate.
As a theory of utterance interpretation, relevance theory is based on a
generalisation about human cognition. In general, we pay attention to information
that seems relevant to us. An utterance is one of those stimuli whith preempt our
attention. Because it is a request for attention, an utterance creates an expectation
of relevance. Sperber and Wilson call this fact the principle of relevance:
Principle of relevance
Every utterance communicates the presumption of its own optimal
relevance.
79
The term optimal relevance is meant to capture the level of relevance that would
justify the fact that our attention has been asked for. Sperber and Wilson's criterion
of utterance interpretation is built around this level. Optimal relevance is defined
as follows:
Optimal relevance
An utterance on a given interpretation is optimally relevant if and only if:
(a) it achieves enough contextual effects to be worth the hearer's attention;
(b) it puts the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in achieving those effects
As I said earlier, the task of any theory of utterance interpretation is to
explain how a hearer arrives at the intended interpretation. The term interpretation
is used here in a fairly broad sense to cover the recovery of what the speaker
intended to say, what she intended to imply, her intended attitude towards what
was said and implied, and the intended context.
Consider an exchange like (1):
(1)	 A: Will you have good memories of this year's Christmas party?
B: Well, everyone had a bug and I developed a fever the next day
As I argued in chapter 1, section 1.4.1, recovering what the speaker intended to
say is not a simple matter of decoding her words. B's linguistic knowledge will tell
him that bug has at least three senses, and that everyone is one of those
expressions which range over some universe of discourse, and that I and the next
day pick out a particular individual and a particular time span respectively. To
recover what B intended to say, however, A has to access the intended meaning
of the ambiguous word bug, to fix the domain over which evenjone was intended
to quantify, to assign the intended reference to the referential expressions land the
next day and to determine the intended relation, if any, between the first and the
second conjunct in B's utterance. As I argued earlier, these tasks are inferential,
i.e. they depend on the context of utterance, and therefore fall within the domain
of pragmatics.
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The preferred interpretation of what B said in (1) is that everyone
attending the Christmas party A referred to had a cold and as a result B developed
a fever the day following the day on which the Christmas party took place. Notice,
however, that this is not the only possible interpretation. Another possible
interpretation, i.e. an interpretation compatible with the linguistically encoded
content of the utterance, is that B is describing here the following two events: that
everyone in the building where the Christmas party was held had a hidden
microphone and that the next day B developed a fever; or that everyone in the
town where the building is, in which the Christmas party was held, owned an insect
and that the next day B developed a fever, etc. A theory of utterance interpretation
should be capable of explaining how the right, i.e. the intended, proposition
expressed is recovered and why no other interpretation compatible with the
linguistically encoded content of the utterance is selected. It is one of the main
concerns of this thesis to show how, with respect to na-clauses in MG, relevance
theory explains the construction of what the speaker intended to say.
Clearly, recovering the proposition expressed by an utterance does not
exhaust the process of understanding an utterance. However, if the hearer does
not recover what the speaker intended to communicate explicitly, the chances are
he will not be able to recover what the speaker intended to communicate implicitly.
On the assumption that spending an evening with people who are ill and getting
ill yourself as a result is not a very pleasant thing to happen, B will be understood
as implicating that she will not have good memories of this year's Christmas party.
B is thereby answering A's question. However, if this is all B intended to
communicate, why didn't she say No, I will not have good memories of this year's
Christmas party? Intuitively, the answer is clear. The speaker did not simply intend
to give a yes/no answer; she wanted to explain why her memories will not be as
positive as expected.' We would expect an adequate theory of utterance
'Sperber and Wilson (1986) distinguish between implicated premises and
implicated conclusions. With respect to the example in (1) the speaker has
implicated both (i) and (ii):
(i) If everyone at the last Christmas party you attended was ill and as a result
you got ill yourself, you will not have good memories of that party
(ii) The speaker will not have good memories of the last Christmas party
(i) is the implicated premise and (ii) the implicated conclusion. Implicated premises
may be recovered from memory or constructed on the spot. Once the implicated
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interpretation to provide an account of how implicatures come about and why
speakers often choose to be indirect.
Notice that the assumption that B will not have good memories is a strong
implicature of her utterance: A could hardly fail to derive it. If A had missed it, then
communication would have failed. However, utterances do not always give rise to
strong implicatures; some utterances may yield a wider range of weak implicatures.
For example, suppose we are looking at Donatello's Maddalena and I utter (2):
(2) I am so moved
In this case I am simply encouraging you to think of the way I feel about art and
in particular sculpture, the way I feel about Maddalena (the statue and the person),
my admiration of Donatello, etc. I am not, however, committed to any single
definitive interpretation nor is the recovery of any particular implicature essential
to the understanding of my utterance. I am simply communicating my impression.
Let's return to the exchange in (1). To understand B's utterance, it is
essential that A recovers B's intended attitude towards what she is saying and
implicating. Provided that the hearer trusts the speaker he will in this case infer
that the speaker believes, i.e. is committed to the truth of, what she says and
implicates. Given more contextual assumptions like, for example, that B treasures
Christmas parties, A may infer that B regrets that everyone had a cold and that
she developed a fever. In this context the hearer may also infer that the speaker
regrets that she has no good memories from this last party. Speakers, however,
do not always endorse the assumptions conveyed by their utterances. For
example, suppose I find out that our new book keeper has not updated his records
since last month. In this context I utter:
(3) He is really efficient
In this case it is clear that I do not believe what I say; rather I am being ironical.
It is an essential aspect of utterance understanding that the hearer decides
premise has been accessed, the implicated conclusion follows by a straightforward
deductive rule taking the implicated premise and the explicature of the utterance
as input.
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whether the speaker endorses or dissociates herself from the propositions explicitly
and implicitly expressed by her utterance and whether she is asserting them to be
true or wondering whether they are true or hoping they will become true, etc.
Linguistic devices, such as illocutionary and attitudinal adverbs and
particles, particular word order or verb form, help the hearer recover the speaker's
intended attitude towards the proposition expressed:
(4)	 a. Regrettably, Henry stayed over for the weekend
b. George is punctual, huh!
c. Open the door
As I have argued in chapter 1 and will discuss in more detail later on, na- and non
na-clauses convey meaning which concerns propositional attitude.
It is obvious from the discussion so far that the questions we have been
considering, i.e. what did the speaker intend to say, what did the speaker intend
to imply and what was the speaker's intended attitude towards what she said and
implied, cannot be answered if we don't know the intended context of utterance.
To recover the intended interpretation the hearer has to construct and use the
intended context. It is in this sense that the question in (d), "What was the intended
context", is, as Wilson (to appear, a: 7) says, "the most fundamental question of
all".
So, how does the definition of optimal relevance help us in answering the
questions raised in the previous paragraphs? Optimal relevance is defined in terms
of contextual effects and processing effort. On the effect side the hearer expects
that the utterance has an interpretation which is worth her attending to. In other
words, the hearer expects to be offered information which is more 'relevant to her
than any other piece of information would be in the given situation. On the effort
side the hearer expects to be able to access this information without having to put
in disproportionate amounts of effort.
According to Sperber and Wilson, there are three types of contextual
effects, i.e. three ways in which the information presented in an utterance may
combine with already available information: it may strengthen an already existing
assumption, contradict and eliminate an already existing assumption or combine
with an already existing assumption to yield a contextual implication, i.e. a logical
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implication which is not derivable from either the new or the old information alone.
Let us consider the following opening utterance in a course on computers:
(5)	 It is very easy to use a PC
Suppose that, judging from the number of people who use a PC today, you already
suspected that it was very easy to use one. In this context, assuming further that
you trust the speaker, (5) will achieve relevance by strengthening this old
assumption of yours. Suppose instead now that, on the basis of the number of
magazines on PCs one sees these days at every newsagent, you had concluded
that it must be difficult to use a PC. Assuming that you recognise an expert in the
face of the speaker and therefore trust her completely, (5) will achieve relevance
by contradicting and eliminating your existing assumption. Finally, suppose you
have been given a PC at work but you have decided you will only use it if it is easy
to do so. Then, assuming you trust the speaker, (5) will achieve relevance by
giving rise to the contextual implication that you will use the PC.
The more effects an utterance has the more relevant it is. However,
contextual effects do not come free: they cost mental effort. The greater the effort
required in deriving those effects the lower the relevance. Processing effort is
consumed in constructing a suitable context in which to process the utterance. The
easier it is to construct a context, the less processing effort is required and
therefore, other things being equal, the more relevant the utterance. For example,
(5) will seem more relevant to you if you already have plans to learn how to use
a PC. It will be easier for you then to think up a context in which (5) might achieve
some contextual effects. If, however, you never had any such plans, it will be more
difficult, though not impossible, for you to construct a context in which to process
(5). More effort will be required and therefore, other things being equal, (5) will be
less relevant.
Moreover, processing effort is caused by the psychological complexity of
the utterance itself. The psychological complexity of an utterance is a function of
its linguistic complexity and the frequency of use of its elements. For example,
compare (5) above with (6):
(6)	 It is very easy to use a PC and IBM is a big company
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Suppose the speaker utters (6), instead of (5), with the intention to strengthen the
hearer's assumption that it is easy to use a PC. Suppose further that in this context
there is no reason to remind the hearer that IBM is a big company. In this situation
(6) will yield the desired effect but, because of its structural complexity, it will
require more processing effort than (5) to do so. So, the linguistically more
complex (6) will require more effort without giving rise to any extra effects and
would therefore be less relevant.
Notice that the hypothetical scenario where the speaker utters (6) with the
intention to communicate exactly what she would have communicated with (5)
strikes us as very odd (on the assumption that the speaker knows that she could
have achieved the same effects uttering (5)). If the speaker chooses to utter (6) we
naturally assume that she intends to communicate something more or something
different than she would have communicated uttering (5). We are talking here
about overt communication, i.e. about situations where the speaker intends to
convey a message, actively helps the hearer to recover it, and would acknowledge
it if asked. So, we expect that in processing the second part of (6) we will derive
certain effects, and it is difficult even to imagine a situation where (6) would be
uttered instead of (5) and no further or different effects would be intended. In other
words, we expect a linguistically more complex utterance to give rise to extra or
different effects in comparison to a linguistically simpler utterance. This, a direct
consequence of the principle of relevance, will be crucial in the interpretation of na-
and non na-clauses.
The other factor that determines the psychological complexity of an
utterance is the frequency of use of its elements. Compare (7) and (8):
(7) Salt and pepper are already on the table
(8) Condiments are already on the table
Stylistically (7) is felt in many contexts to be more appropriate than (8). This is
because (8) contains the rare word condiments and therefore causes the hearer
more processing effort, than the familiar, although linguistically more complex, salt
and pepper. Once again, if the speaker chooses to utter (8) instead of (7), she will
85
be taken to have intended additional effects; for example, she might have intended
to communicate that he is better educated than most people, etc.
Clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance plays a decisive role in
determining which interpretation the hearer recovers. An utterance may achieve
enough effects to be worth the hearer's listening to on more than one
interpretations. For example, going back to the exchange in (1), both the
interpretation on which everyone in the party had a virus and as a result the
speaker fell ill, and the interpretation on which two facts are stated: everyone in the
town owns an insect and the next day the speaker fell ill, are interesting enough
to be worth the hearer's attention. However, only one of them satisfies both clause
(a) and, crucially, clause (b) of the definition of optimal reievance. In the context
set up by A's question and given typical general knowledge assumptions about
winter, people falling ill, etc., the interpretation on which everyone in the party
attended by the speaker was ill with the flu and as a result she got it too, requires
less processing effort. It is, therefore, the first one that occurs to the hearer and
achieves enough effects to make its processing worth while. Therefore, it is the
one the hearer should choose. With regard to the speaker, on the other hand, it
follows from clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance that she should
her
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	utterance in such a way that the first interpretation that will occur to
the hearer, as far as she can foresee, is the one she intended to communicate.
However, optimal relevance is not the criterion that Sperber and Wilson
propose. The criterion they actually propose is rather weaker. The reason is that
an utterance does not have to be optimally relevant. Suppose, for example, that
I see you in the refectory and I tell you that the two o'clock lecture has been
cancelled. As it turns out, you already know this. In this case my utterance is not
optimally relevant; it is however both acceptable and comprehensible. To account
for cases like this one, the actual criterion that Sperber and Wilson propose is a
criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance:
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Criterion of consistency with the pnnciple of relevance
An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent with the pnnciple of
relevance if and only if the speaker might rationally have expected it to be
optimally relevant to the hearer on that interpretation.
This is the criterion that hearers actually employ in utterance interpretation. The
first interpretation tested and found consistent with the principle of relevance is the
only interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance.
In conclusion, the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance is
strong enough to exclude all but a single interpretation, it explains how utterance
interpretation is achieved but also why it may fail; moreover, it does justice to the
fact that hearers do not go on expanding the context looking for even richer or
different interpretations. According to Wilson (to appear, a: 16), it follows from the
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criterion of	 with the principle of relevance that:
... all the hearer is entitled to impute as part of the intended interpretation
is the minimal (i.e. smallest, most accessible) context and contextual effects
that would be enough to make the utterance worth his attention. Thus, the
interpretation process has an inbuilt stopping place.
2.2.2. Relevance and explicatures
I argued in chapter 1, section 1.4.1., that the proposition expressed by an
utterance and its higher level explicatures are recovered by a ombination of
linguistic decoding and inference. I also pointed out that contrary to assumptions
made in Gricean pragmatics the inferential processes at this level, i.e. the bridging
of the gap between the incomplete semantic representation encoded by an
utterance and the propositions it explicitly communicates, are as much driven by
general communicative principles as are those involved in the recovery of
implicatures. In this section I want to argue that relevance theory offers a
psychologically plausible explanation of how the explicitly communicated content
of an utterance is obtained.
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Consider again the exchange in (1):
(1)	 A: Will you have good memories of this year's Christmas party?
B: Well, everyone had a bug and I developed a fever the next day
B is understood as having said that everyone attending the Christmas party
mentioned by A was ill and that as a result she developed a fever the day after the
party. The other linguistically possible interpretations, like for example that
everyone in the building where this party was held owned an insect (or was
carrying a hidden microphone) and that the speaker fell ill the next day, are not
consciously considered. We want our theory of utterance interpretation to tell us
why this is so.
Disambiguation was mentioned in chapter 1 as one of the inferential tasks
the hearer typically has to perform in order to recover the proposition expressed.
In the case of the ambiguous word bug in B's utterance, the sense Illness" will be
selected. The mention of Christmas makes accessible assumptions about it being
cold around that time of the year and people falling ill, thereby encouraging the
selection of this particular sense. So, the least costly hypothesis the hearer could
form is that by bug the speaker intended to communicate Illness". This hypothesis
must also be checked on the effect side. Does it contribute to the overall
interpretation in such a way that this interpretation is consistent with the principle
of relevance? It clearly does so. Therefore, the hearer will not go on to consider
the other linguistically encoded meanings of the word bug.2
Reference assignment is another of the inferential tasks that hearers
typically perform in order to recover what the speaker intended to communicate
explicitly. Recent work in the semantics of pronouns (Kaplan 1989, Kempson 1988,
forthcoming, Wilson and Sperber 1993) has suggested that pronouns do not
2lt is worth mentioning here that disambiguation is broadly discussed in the
psycholinguistic literature (Swinney 1979, Tanenhaus and Lucas 1986, Marslen-
Wilson and Tyler 1981). The issues discussed there have to do with whether all
the senses of an ambiguous word are activated independently of context or
whether the context somehow affects the range of activated senses, whether
disambiguation takes place at the end of the ambiguous word, or of the clause
containing it or of the whole utterance, etc. The point not addressed by such
studies and which is successfully addressed within relevance theory is what makes
a particular interpretation correct.
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encode concepts but procedures. So, for example, the pronoun I in B's utterance
might linguistically encode the instruction to identify the speaker as the referent.
There is always only one possible referent for I, determined by the situation of
utterance. Consider also the deictic expression the next day. The most accessible
interpretation that contributes towards the overall relevance of the utterance is that
by the next day the speaker intended to pick out the day following the day of the
Christmas party. However, the intended referent of a linguistic expression is not
always so easy to pin down. For example, consider (9):
(9)	 The famous rock star appeared on stage very late
Suppose I utter (9) in the course of telling you about Sting's last concert. You are
most likely to understand the famous rock star as referring to Sting. However, in
principle there are many possible referents for the definite description the famous
rock star Prince, Michael Jackson, Sting, etc. Each of the propositions "Prince
appeared on stage very lat&, "M.Jackson appeared on stage very late" and "Sting
appeared on stage very late" is worth considering on the effect side (with the last
one perhaps causing fewer effects than the other two). However, the most salient
referent is Sting and, therefore, the interpretation involving Sting will be constructed
with the least effort. Moreover, in this context this interpretation will achieve enough
contextual effects to satisfy the hearer's expectation of optimal relevance. It might,
for example, contradict and eliminate the hearer's existing assumption that Sting
always comes on the stage as soon as the concert begins or it might yield the
contextual implication that the concert was boring until quite late, etc. So, this is
an interpretation a rational speaker could have intended and is therefore the
interpretation the speaker should have intended. It follows that the h'earer does not
need to consider any other possible referents. This account offers a psychologically
plausible explanation of why hearers assign reference in the way they do.
Reference assignment and the way it is accounted for within relevance
theory is discussed in detail in Wilson (to appear, b); (for an introduction see
Blakemore 1992: 65-77). In (9) the definite description the famous rock star is
interpreted referentially, i.e. it is intended to pick out a particular individual, in the
context considered above. Notice, however, that definite descriptions are not
always interpreted in this way. So, for example, in (10)
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(10) The shortest man on earth may suffer from an inferiority complex
the definite description the shortest man on earth is most likely to be understood
attributively: the shortest man on earth, whoever he is, may suffer from an
inferiority complex. Indefinite descriptions may also be interpreted either
referentially or attributively. We have here another indeterminacy which must be
resolved pragmatically. The way definite and indefinite descriptions are interpreted
will be discussed in great detail in chapter 4.
The hearer's search for optimal relevance is responsible not only for the
way disambiguation and reference assignment take place, but also for the fact that
the hearer in (1) will probably infer that there is a causal connection between the
two conjuncts in B's utterance: everyone at the party had a bug and as a result the
speaker developed a fever the next day. I pointed out in chapter 1 that the logical
form of an utterance not only undergoes reference assignment and disambiguation,
but also forms the input to a much broader inferential process of filling in slots or
resolving vaguenesses, usually referred to within relevance theory as enrichment.
This pragmatic process is also guided by considerations of optimal relevance, as
I will now show.
Sometimes such slots are provided by the grammar. For example consider
(11):
(11) A: Where did you put the tent?
B: In the attic
The hearer will take B to have explicitly communicated the proposition B put the
tent in the attic. It can be argued that this completion of B's elliptial utterance is
made necessary by the syntactic properties of the recovered representation:
S[NP[e] ,,,[ [e] [in the attic]]]
Obviously, it is left to a pragmatic theory to explain why the hearer recovers this
explicature rather than, for example, My grandmother's chair is in the attic TM . Within
relevance theory we would say that in the context of A's question the assumption
B put the tent in the attic is the first and therefore the only interpretation which
satisfies the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance: it achieves
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enough effects (for example, it answers A's question) without putting the hearer to
unjustifiable effort in deriving them.
Even more interestingly, there are cases where the logical form of an
utterance does not include any variables instructing further filling in and yet hearers
take an enriched version of that representation to be the proposition explicitly
communicated by the utterance. For example, consider (12):
(12) A: If I'm at your place at 12.10, we'll be at the British Museum at 12.15
B: It will take us some time to get to the British Museum, you know
B is here understood as having said that it will take them more time than A
estimates to get to the British Museum. The linguistically encoded content of B's
utterance Nit will take us a certain time span to get to the British museum" highly
underdetermines the intended interpretation. This representation, which is trivially
true, will not be preferred by the hearer because, although it is the easiest one to
access, it does not have any effects and therefore could not possibly justify the
speaker's call for the hearer's attention. The next easiest assumption in the context
of A's question, i.e. that they will need more time than A thinks, obviously achieves
an adequate range of effects that the speaker could manifestly have foreseen. For
example, it may combine with other assumptions to yield the contextual implication
that A and B should meet earlier. This interpretation satisfies both clauses of the
definition of optimal relevance and is an interpretation the speaker could have
intended. It follows that this is the interpretation the hearer will choose.
Conjoined utterances are another case where enrichment of the encoded
content may take place. Consider the utterances in (13):
(13) a. Paris is the capital of France and Athens is the capital of Greece
b. Jane picked up a pen and made a note
c. The road was icy and Peter slipped
d. We were repairing the fence and discovered that the wood had rotted
e. The window was left open and a bird flew in
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And is assumed to be semantically equivalent to the truth-functional logical
operator &. (13a) is an example of symmetric conjunction, i.e. the natural
language connective and functions in exactly the same way as the logical operator
&. However, conjoined utterances, for example the ones in (1 3b-e), often convey
temporal, causal or other types of suggestions. Processing (13b) the hearer will
infer that there is a temporal sequence relation between the events described in
the two conjuncts: Jane first picked up the pen and then she made a note. In (13c)
the hearer will infer that Peter slipped because the road was icy. In (13d) the
suggestion is that we discovered that the wood had rotted in the process of
repairing the fence. In (13e) the open window enabled the bird to fly in the house.
Within the Gricean framework the temporal suggestion carried by some
conjoined sentences could be accounted for as an implicature generated via the
manner submaxim Be orderlyN. However, Carston (1988, 1993a) has argued
convincingly against the implicature analysis. She argues that such suggestions
are best accounted for as pragmatically determined aspects of the truth conditional
content of the utterance. One of her arguments is that the explicature analysis
solves the problem noted by Cohen (1971) that the temporal and causal
connotations carried by conjoined utterances fall under the scope of logical
operators, which should not be possible if they are conversational implicatures.
Consider:
(14) a. If the old king died from a heart attack and a republic was declared Sam
will be happy, but if a republic was declared and the old king died from a
heart attack Sam will be unhappy.
(Carston 1988:172; adapted from Cohen 1971)
b. It's better to meet the love of your life and get married than to get
married and meet the love of your life
(Carston 1988:172)
3An alternative view is put forward by Cohen (1971), who argues that and has
a multi-featured single sense. For arguments against this view see Posner (1980)
and Carston (1988, 1993a).
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(15) Either she became an alcoholic and her husband left her or he left her and
she became an alcoholic; I'm not sure which.
(Carston 1988:173)
If the temporal and causal connotations were implicatures, then (14a) and (14b)
should be contradictory and (15) redundant. But there is nothing odd with any of
these utterances, It follows that these suggestions cannot be treated as
implicatures, since, according to Grice, implicatures do not contribute to the truth-
conditional content of the utterance, If, however, they are regarded as
pragmatically determined aspects of the explicitly communicated content of the
utterance, then this problem would not arise. On the contrary, the explicature
account predicts that these suggestions fall under the scope of logical operators.
What is of greater interest to me here is that the enrichment of the
semantics of and is subject to relevance considerations. Let me consider (1 3b).
The explicature the hearer will typically recover is She picked up a pen and then
made a note with the pen. This interpretation is the most accessible one. We all
have a mental script about picking up pens and writing down something, perhaps
as part of a broader script concerning taking objects in our hands and performing
actions with them, which will be activated when we process (13b). Having found
an interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance, the hearer need not
look any further. So, for example the logically possible expansion of the linguistic
content NShe picked up a pen and at the same time made a note with a pencil TM will
not be considered because although it is likely to achieve more or different effects
it fails the definition of optimal relevance on the effort side.
In addition to the proposition expressed by an utterance, the pragmatic
process of enrichment is often crucial to the derivation of the higher level
explicatures of the utterance. In chapter 1 I presented the Wilson and Sperber
account of the semantics of imperatives. Imperative syntax encodes propositional
attitude information: the proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a
state of affairs in a desirable and potential world. As they point out, however, a
statement of desirability is a three place relation and needs to be further specified:
someone regards a state of affairs as desirable to someone. The enrichment of
TMdesirable follows considerations of relevance. Let's consider again the example
I used in 1.4.2. Henry has been complaining that it is too hot in this room and has
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let you know that he would like to turn off the heating. You have been ignoring him
so far, but in the end you say:
(16) Ok. Turn down the heating
Decoding the utterance, the hearer will recover the information that the world in
which he turns down the heating is desirable and potential. However, this is not all.
In this context the first hypothesis to come to the hearer's mind is that the
described state of affairs is considered by the speaker to be desirable to him (the
hearer) to a high degree and that this state of affairs is potential as far as the
speaker is concerned. Moreover, this interpretation achieves enough effects to be
worth Henry's attention: Henry may now turn down the heating, he may conclude
that the speaker is warm enough, that the speaker gave in because she was fed
up with him, etc. This interpretation achieves enough effects which the speaker
could manifestly have foreseen, without putting the hearer to unjustified effort in
recovering them. Therefore, it is the interpretation the hearer should choose. As
we will see in the next sections, enriching the semantic content of na-clauses in
accordance with considerations of optimal relevance is often crucial to the
interpretation of such clauses.
2.3. Pragmatically enriching the semantics of na-clauses
2.3.1. Declarative and interrogative na-clauses
According to Sperber and Wilson (1988a), the various syntactic structures, i.e.
declarative, interrogative, imperative, encode procedural information concerning
propositional attitude. Declaratives encode the information that the proposition
expressed is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the actual or some
possible world. Interrogatives encode the information that the proposition
expressed is entertained as a representation of a relevant thought. I proposed in
chapter 1 that na-clauses also encode information about propositional attitude: the
proposition expressed by a na-clause is entertained as a description of a state of
affairs in a possible world. I will show in the remainder of this chapter that this
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propositional attitude specification interacts with the propositional attitude encoded
by declarative syntax. In the next chapter I will show that the propositional attitude
information encoded by na-clauses may also interact with the propositional attitude
encoded by interrogative syntax. Let me, however, first establish that na-clauses
may be either declarative or interrogative.
Note that, although I will be arguing for the existence of na- and non na-
declaratives and interrogatives, there are no indicative and/or subjunctive
imperatives in MG. The imperative in MG is a distinct morphological and syntactic
category.
According to recent work in syntax (Philippaki-Warburton 1985, 1992,
Tsimpli 1990), the underlying word order in MG is VSO. It follows that an
interrogative in MG does not exhibit subject-auxiliary inversion, which is one of the
ways of identifying an interrogative in English (Radford 1988: 411):
(17) a. He will finish his PhD soon
b. Will he finish his PhD soon?
As far as the word order is concerned, declaratives and the corresponding yes-no
interrogatives are formally identical in MG. There is no way for us to tell whether
the following non na-sentences are declaratives or interrogatives by simply looking
at the word order (the sentences in (18) do not represent all possible word order
combinations - surface word order is relatively free in MG):
(18) a. Edose o Janis to vivlio tou sti Maria
Gave-3s the John-nom the book-acc his to-the Mary-acc
John gave his book to Mary
b. 0 Janis edose to vivio tou sti Maria
The John-nom gave-3s the book-acc his to-the Mary-acc
John gave his book to Mary
4Schmerling (1980, 1982) has argued convincingly that the imperative is a
distinct sentence type in English.
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c. To vivlio tou edose o Janis sti Maria
the book-acc his gave-3s the John-nom to-the Mary-acc
John gave his book to Mary
d. Sti Maria o Janis edose to vivlio tou
to-the Mary-acc the John-nom gave-3s the book-acc hin
John gave his book to Mary
The same is true of na-clauses. Nothing in the word order of the following
sentences indicates whether they are declaratives or interrogatives:
(19)	 a. Na plini o Kostas to aftokinito
na wash-3s-PF the Kostas-nom the car-acc
Kostas should wash the car
b. 0 Kostas na plini to aftokinito
the Kostas-nom na wash-3s-PF the car-acc
Kostas should wash the car
c. To aftokinito o Kostas na plini
the car-acc the Kostas-nom na wash-3s-PF
Kostas should wash the car
To avoid confusion let me point out here that in MG there are wh-
interrogatives both in the indicative and the subjunctive (some evidence will be
given at the end of this section). For example:
(20) a. Pou pai o Petros?
where go-3s the Peter
Where is Peter going/does Peter go?
b. Pou na pai o Petros?
where na go-3s-PF the Peter
Where should/could/would Peter go?
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The only formal difference in MG between declaratives and the
corresponding yes-no interrogatives usually mentioned in the literature (eg. Joseph
and Philippaki-Warburton 1987: 4) is intonation. The intonation associated with
interrogatives is a rising one with an optional slight fall at the end of the utterance,
whereas declaratives are characterised by a falling intonation. Depending on the
intonation pattern with which each of the sentences in (18) and (19) are uttered,
they are taken to be declarative or interrogative.5
It is true that, for example, (1 9a) is understood as a question when uttered
with a rising intonation, whereas when it is uttered with a generally falling
intonation it is understood as a statement. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that the different intonation patterns with which (1 9a) may be uttered are a reflex
of the different underlying syntactic structures it may have: the declarative and the
interrogative. (I assume here that what makes a syntactic representation
interrogative is the presence of a certain feature, let's call it [+q], under C; when
this feature is absent then the sentence is declarative; imperatives have a separate
feature [imp] (Beukema and Coopmans 1989)). It might, for example, be that (1 9a),
or any other of the sentences in (18) and (19), is syntactically a declarative uttered
with interrogative intonation thus functioning as a question. This does happen in
English: in English you may ask a question with a declarative sentence:
(21) John went yesterday?
In chapter 3 I will consider a case of Nfaken interrogatives in MG, i.e. sentences
which function as questions but which are not syntactically interrogatives.
Although intonation may not be a very reliable diagnostic for whether a
sentence is declarative or interrogative, there are a few other tests that we may
use to identify the syntactic sentence type. According to recent work in syntax
(Ladusaw 1981, Linebarger 1987, Progovac 1993), negative polarity items are
licensed by certain kinds of operators. One such operator is the operator
associated with interrogative syntax, as we can see from the English examples in
(22):
5 lntonation is the only grammatical feature marking interrogatives in other
languages as well, for example Jacaltec (Craig 1977).
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(22) a. Will John meet anyone?
b. John will meet anyone
(22a) is fine whereas (22b) is ungrammatical because there is no operator to
license the polarity item anyone. It follows that a fake interrogative, like the one in
(21), will not allow a polarity item. This is indeed the case as we can see from (23):
(23) *John went anywhere yesterday?
If this is correct, then we can use polarity items as a diagnostic for whether a
sentence is declarative or interrogative in MG. Consider (24):
(24) Ide o Janis kanena
saw-3s the John anyone/noone
The prediction is that (24) will be acceptable, if there is an interrogative operator
in the sentence structure thereby licensing the polarity item kanena; otherwise it
will be ungrammatical. And indeed, uttered with a rising intonation, and therefore
interpreted as a question, (24) is grammatical; uttered with a falling intonation,
however, and therefore interpreted as a statement, it is ungrammatical. So, using
the full stop to indicate a declarative and the question mark to indicate an
interrogative, we get:
(25) a. Ide o Janis kanena?
saw-3s the John-nom anyone/noone
Did John see anyone/noone?
b. ide o Janis kanena.
saw-3s the John-nom anyone
*John saw anyone/noone
The situation is the same with respect to na-clauses: (26a) uttered with a rising
intonation is fine, which indicates the presence of the interrogative operator,
whereas (26b) uttered with falling intonation is out:
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(26) a. Na di o Janis kanena?
na see-3s-PF the John-nom anyone/noone
Should John see anyone/noone?
b.Na di o Janis kanena.
na see-3s-PF the John-nom anyone/noone
John should see anyone/noone
Another way of distinguishing between declaratives and the corresponding
yes-no interrogatives in English is the phrase or not?, which may be part of a yes-
no interrogative, but may only follow a declarative sentence forming a separate
utterance. For example, consider the sentences in (27):
(27) a. Did John leave yesterday or not?
b. John left yesterday. Or not?
c. *John left yesterday or not?
In (27a) the phrase or not? has been appended to the interrogative Did John leave
yesterday, thereby forming what Bolinger (1978) calls an alternative question. Or
not? may of course be a separate utterance following a declarative sentence as
in (27b). However, or not? cannot be appended to a declarative sentence as we
see from (27c).
In MG the situation is the same. Consider:
(28)	 a. Pige sto komotirio htes i Maria i ohi?
went-3s to the hairdresser's-acc yesterday the Mary-nom or not
Did Mary go to the hairdresser's yesterday or not?
b. Pige sto komotino htes i Maria. I ohi?
went-3s to the hairdresser's-acc yesterday the Mary-nom. Or not?
Mary went to the hairdresser's yesterday. Or not?
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c. *Pige sto komotirio htes i Maria i ohi.
went-3s to the hairdresser's-acc yesterday the Mary-nom or not.
Mary went to the hairdresser's yesterday or not.
I ohi? may be appended to the sentence pige sf0 komot!rio htes i Maria when
uttered with a rising intonation, which suggests that (28a) has interrogative
structure. I ohi? may be a separate utterance following a declarative sentence as
in (28b). Finally, as expected, i oh!? cannot be appended to the sentence pige sf0
komotirio ! Maria when it is uttered with a generally falling intonation. This suggests
that (28c) is declarative.
Na-clauses behave in exactly the same way:
(29)	 a. Na pai sto komotirio i Maria i ohi?
na go-3s-PF to the hairdresser's-acc the Mary-nom or not
Should/could Mary go to the hairdresser's or not?
b. Na pai sto komotirio i Maria. I ohi?
na go-3s-PF to the hairdresser's-acc the Mary. Or not?
Mary should/could go to the hairdresser's. Or not?
c. *Na pai sto komotirio i Maria i ohi.
na go-3s-PF to the hairdresser's-acc the Mary-nom or not
Mary should go to the hairdresser's or not
(29a) is uttered with a rising intonation; (29c) with falling intonation.
Finally, with regard to utterances like (20) above, it can easily be shown
that they are interrogatives. First, note the wh-word. Second, they can be
embedded under interrogative predicates, such as ask and wonder. It is generally
assumed (Grimshaw 1977, Radford 1988: 464) that inherently interrogative
predicates take interrogative complements. So, for example, in English:
(30) a. I asked you why John left
b. I wonder where John is staying
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There is little doubt that the embedded sentences in (30a,b) are interrogatives. The
same holds for the embedded clauses with or without na in (31):
(31) a. Se rotao jati (na) efige o Janis
you ask-is why (na) Ieft-3s the John
I am asking you why John left/would leave
b. Anarotieme pou (na) meni o Janis
wonder-is where (na) stay-3s the John
I wonder where John is staying/may be staying
If the embedded clauses in (31) are interrogative, then they should also be
interrogative when they occur on their own, as in (32):
(32) a. Jati (na) efige o Janis?
why (na) Ieft-3s the John
Why did John leave/Why would John leave?
b. Pou (na) meni 0 Janis
Where (na) stay-3s the John
Where is John staying/Where may John be staying?
In conclusion, there is good evidence that na- and non na- clauses may be
either declaratives or interrogatives. The hearer decides whether a sentence is
declarative or a yes-no interrogative on the basis of the intonation pattern: rising
intonation with an optional slight fall at the end indicates interrogafive syntax and
falling intonation indicates declarative syntax. As for utterances like (32), the hearer
knows they are wh-interrogatives because of the presence of the wh-word and
because they are typically uttered rising intonation with an optional fall at the
end. In the remaining sections of this chapter and in the first half of the next
chapter I will discuss the interpretation of declarative na-clauses, i.e. na-clauses
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uttered with a falling intonation which indicates that they are underlyingly
declaratives. 6
2.3.2. The role of processing effort considerations
In this section I will show that processing effort considerations play an important
role in the way na-clauses are interpreted. In particular, I will argue that as a result
of such considerations a na-clause is typically interpreted as describing a state of
affairs in a world other than the actual one.
Let me start by taking a step back. In earlier work (Rouchota 1991 b) I
suggested that na-clauses encode the information that the proposition expressed
is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a non-actual world. This
proposal had to be dropped and replaced by the weaker one I put forward in
Rouchota (to appear, a) and in the first chapter of this thesis, namely, that na-
clauses encode the information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a possible world. This change was motivated
mainly by na-clauses like those in (33), where the world described is actual (the
actual world is standardly considered to be one of the possible worlds):
(33)	 a. Sinehizi na vrehi
continue-3s na rain-3s
It continues to rain
b. Arhizi na vrehi
begin-3s na rain-3s
It begins to rain
Note that such verbs may not take a non na-complement.
There is no doubt that the semantics of na-clauses should involve the
notion of possible rather than non-actual world. On the other hand, there is also
little doubt that na-clauses are very often interpreted as describing states of affairs
61 am indebted to Hans van de Koot and Misi Brody for helping me conuct the
arguments presented in this section.
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in worlds other than the actual one. We saw many examples of this in chapter 1;
here are a couple more:
(34) a. Na katharisis to banio
na clean-2s-PF the bathroom-acc
Clean the bathroom
b. makari na iha zisi tin epohi tou Napoleonta
wish-particle na had lived-is the time of Napoleon
I wish I had lived in the time of Napoleon
If we consider na-complement clauses more carefully, we will note that mostly,
when the main verb allows both a na- and a non na-complement, the na-
complement represents the described state of affairs as existing in a world other
than the actual one. Consider for example:
(35) a. ksero oti magirevo
know-is that cook-is
I know that I am cooking
b. ksero na magirevo
know-is na cook-is-IPF
I know how to cook
(36) a. Herome pou se vlepo
be happy-is that you see-is
I am happy that I see you
b. Herome na se vlepo
be happy-is na you see-is
I am happy to see you
(35a) entails that the speaker is cooking, (35b) does not; (36a) entails that the
speaker sees the hearer at the time of utterance; (36b) does not.
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This can be easily explained on the basis of considerations of relevance.
As argued in chapter 1, non na-clauses represent states of affairs in the base
world. In contexts other than fiction, antecedents of conditionals, suppositions,
jokes, etc., the base world will typically be the actual world. The weaker, possible
worlds, semantics of na-clauses, on the other hand, is such that it allows for the
proposition expressed to be entertained as a description of the actual world.
Considerations of processing effort, however, predict that if the speaker intends to
communicate that the proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a
state of affairs in the actual world she will generally use, if allowed by the grammar
(Cf. (33a&b)), the non na-complement clause to do so. As I explained earlier, the
amount of effort required to process an utterance depends on the accessibility of
the interpretations under consideration, on the one hand, and on the linguistic
complexity of the utterance, on the other. The actual world interpretation is the
standard interpretation of a non na-clause. So, in processing na-clauses, for
example (36b), the hearer will infer that the proposition expressed by the
complement clause is entertained as a description of a world other than the actual
one. If the speaker had intended to communicate that the proposition expressed
by the complement clause is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the
actual world, then she would have uttered (36a), thus saving the hearer some
processing effort.
An interesting case to consider here is the perception verbs, like viepo
NseeN akouo NhearN and niotho "feel". They may take na-complements, in which
case the world described in the na-complement is understood to be actual, as we
can see in the following example:
(37) vlepo/ida to Jani na pezi piano
see/saw-is the John-acc na play-3s-IPF piano
I see/saw John play the piano
Such verbs, however, may also take non na-complements introduced by the
complementisers pou and otL Consider:
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(38) Vlepo pou o Janis pezi/epekse piano
see-is that the John-acc play-3s/played-3s piano
I see John playing the piano/that John played the piano
(39) vlepo oti o Janis pezVepekse piano
see-is that the John-acc play-3s/played-3s piano
I see (:1 infer) that John plays/played the piano
Note that in (39) the complement clause is not a description of a state of affairs but
rather a report of a thought.7 On the other hand, in both (37) and (38) the
complement clause describes a state of affairs in the actual world. One of the
differences between (37) and (38) is that the complement verb in (38) may bear
tense morphology whereas in (37) it cannot. When (37) and (38) are negated, the
familiar contrast between possible (= other than the actual) - actual world returns
(as well as the ability of the na-clause to be tensed):
(40) Den ida na epekse piano o Janis
not saw-is na played-3s piano the John
I didn't see John play the piano (:John may not have played the piano as
far as I saw)
(41) Den ida pou epekse piano o Janis
not saw-is that played piano the John
I didn't see John playing the piano (:John played the piano but I did not see
him)
A full account of these data would require a study of the semantics of perception
verbs and the different types of complementation in MG, and lies outside the scope
of this dissertation. Two points are interesting for my purposes here. First, the fact
that perception verbs may take na-complements is not a counterexample to the
proposed semantics for na-clauses: the actual world interpretation is allowed by the
7This suggests that the complementizer oti in MG may be analyzed as an
interpretive use marker. Similar suggestions have been put forward for the
complementizer that in English by Blass (i 990). For the notion of interpretive use
see Sperber and Wilson (i986:224-231) or chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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semantics of na-clauses, and in the case of a na-clause which is the complement
of a perception verb it is imposed by the verb itself. Second, the accessibility
considerations which account for the interpretation of (35a&b) and (36a&b) do not
seem to play such an obvious role in the interpretation of (37) and (38). I do not
think that this is a serious objection to the pragmatic account I proposed, especially
since the same considerations seem to be back in the picture when such clauses
are negated as in (40) and (41). Nevertheless, we need a more detailed
investigation of the semantic differences between (37) and (38).
In adverbial clauses we find that the same pragmatically motivated
considerations are in operation. For example, the antecedent of a conditional may
be introduced by an Nifu followed by an indicative clause, or it might be a na-clause
as illustrated in (42):
(42)	 a. an ton ipostiriksi o tipos, tha kerdisi ke tis epomenes ekloges
if him support-3s the press will win-3s and the next election
If the press supports him, he will win the next election as well
b. na ton ipostiriksi o tipos, tha kerdisi ke tis epomenes ekloges
na him support-3s the press will win-3s and the next election
Should the press support him, he will win the next election as well
Now, na-conditionals cannot be used if the state of affairs described in the
antecedent has been contextually established to be actual, as noted by Nikiforidou
(1990:47-59). For example,
8 For a discussion of the semantic and syntactic differences between pou and
na-complement clauses see Christidis (1982, 1983). This issue relates to the
semantic and syntactic differences between gerundival and infinitival complements
of perception verbs in English (Akmajian 1977, Declerck 1981, 1982, Mittwoch
1990):
(i) I saw John cross the road
(ii) I saw John crossing the road
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(43)	 a. pigeno stin Ellada avrio
go-is to the Greece tomorrow
I am going to Greece tomorrow
b.? na pigenis stin Ellada avno dose se parakalo afto to gramma ston Petro
na go-2s to the Greece tomorrow give-imp please this the letter to the
Peter
Should you be going to Greece tomorrow give this letter to Peter please
c. an pigenis stin Ellada avrio dose se parakalo afto to gramma ston Petro
if go-2s to the Greece tomorrow give-imp please this the letter to the Peter
If you're going to Greece tomorrow give this letter to Peter please
In the context of (43a) only (43c) is acceptable. This follows naturally from the
semantics I am proposing for na-clauses together with the pragmatically motivated
assumption that, if the speaker intends to express a proposition entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in the actual world, she will use a non na-clause.9
Processing effort considerations hinging on accessibility play an important
role in the interpretation of independent na-clauses as well. Moreover, note that
non na-clauses are linguistically less complex than na-clauses. It follows that if the
speaker intends to communicate that the proposition expressed is entertained as
a description of a state of affairs in the actual world she will typically choose to
utter a non na-clause because this is the linguistically cheapest way to do so. If,
on the other hand, she intends to communicate that the proposition expressed is
entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world, i.e. in a world
other than the actual, then she will choose a na-clause. This assumption is the
basis for the discussion in the following sections. In chapter 5 I will discuss in detail
9A full account of na-conditionals and the way they differ from the
corresponding indicative conditionals lies outside the scope of this dissertation. It
is interesting to note here that in MG na-clauses may occur as the antecedent of
both hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals, unlike other languages where the
subjunctive is used only in counterfactual conditionals. Another interesting issue
in connection with what are usually called na-conditionals is whether this
construction is semantically a conditional at all or whether the conditional
interpretation is pragmatically derived (see Rouchota in preparation).
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the interpretation of restrictive relative clauses in the indicative and subjunctive and
I will show that the same considerations play a crucial role there as well.
2.3.3. Na-clauses with imperatival force
I will now discuss the interpretation of independent declarative na-clauses with
imperatival force. When I say na-clauses with imperatival force", I mean na-
clauses used in virtually every way that imperatives may be used. To put it in
terms of traditional grammar, I will be looking at na-clauses used "instead of " the
imperative. I will then compare the interpretation of such na-clauses and the
corresponding imperatives, and explain the factors which determine the speaker's
choice between a na-clause and an imperative in a particular situation.
Let us consider the following situation: Peter has been working very hard
and feels so fed up with studying that he is considering giving it up. Jane is a very
close friend of his who has been through a similar phase in the past and believes
that Peter should not give up his studies. The following exchange takes place:
(44)	 Peter: Eho trellathi sti doulia
have gone mad-is at work
I'm overwhelmed by work
Jane: na dhoulevis mono oso thelis
na work-IPF-2s as much as want-2s
Work only as much as you want
Jane will typically be understood to be advising Peter to work as muth as he wants
and no more. Let me now trace the interpretation process.
Processing Jane's utterance, the hearer will recognise, partly by decoding
and partly by inference, that the proposition "Peter works only as much as he
wants" is entertained as a description of a possible world. This interpretation,
however, is too weak to be consistent with the hearer's expectation of optimal
relevance, i.e. it does not achieve enough effects to be worth the hearer's
attention. For example, it doesddress Peter's current problems. The hearer will,
therefore, have to put in some more inferential work and enrich this schematic
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representation up to the point where it yields an adequate range of contextual
effects.
To start with, the hearer is intended to infer that the state of affairs
represented by Jane's utterance is truth-evaluable in a world other than the actual
one, since, if the speaker had intended to communicate that it is a description of
the actual world, she would have used the non na-counterpart in (45):
(45)	 doulevis oso thelis
work-2s as much as want-2s
you work/are working as much as you want
However, the interpretation of (44), on which Jane is communicating that the
proposition expressed by her utterance is entertained as a description of a state
of affairs in a world other than the actual one, is not consistent with the principle
of relevance either: it does not give rise to enough effects to be worth the hearer's
attention. Clearly, the indeterminate world type description non-actual has to be
further enriched.
Given contextual assumptions such as that Jane has gone through a similar
phase herself and therefore knows how to deal with such a crisis, and given that
she is very close to Peter and wants to help him, the first interpretation which
comes to mind and gives rise to an adequate range of effects is that the
proposition expressed by Jane's utterance is entertained (by Jane) as a description
of a state of affairs in a world which is desirable and potential. 1 ° Jane regards the
world in which Peter works only as much as he wants as quite desirable to Peter
himself. Moreover, she regards this world as potential, i.e. as far as she knows,
nothing prevents this world from becoming actual. In fact in this context the world
where Peter works as much as he likes is entirely under Peter's control. This
interpretation gives rise to enough contextual effects. It provides Peter with s'-
possible solution to his problem: Peter should work as much as he wants and no
more. Moreover, it may contradict and eliminate Peter's existing belief that Jane
does not believe in taking it easy, or it may combine with the contextual
'°As we will see in chapter 3, the proposition expressed by a na-clause (as by
any clause) may be entertained by the speaker or the hearer or someone else.
This is another pragmatically inferred aspect of the interpretation of na-clauses.
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assumption "if Peter works as much as he wants then he will work less than he
does now" to yield the contextual implication that Peter will work less than he does
now, etc.
This interpretation is the first one to come to the hearer's mind and to give
rise to adequate effects which the speaker could manifestly have foreseen. So, this
is the interpretation the hearer should accept, since the first interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance is the only interpretation consistent with
the principle of relevance. On this analysis, the hearer processing Jane's utterance
in (44) will recover the higher level explicature in (46):
(46) It is desirable to Peter and potential that he works only as much as he
wants11
The analysis proposed here explains why in this context Jane is understood
to be advising Peter: communicating that the world in which Peter works as much
as he likes is potential and desirable from his point of view gives rise to the same
set of contextual effects as advising him to work as much as he likes. In Sperber
and Wilson's terms (1986:245), advising is not a communicated act: you don't have
to communicate that you are advising in order to advise. The potentiality and the
degree and point of view of desirability of this world is all the speaker needs to
communicate. This is not to say that the hearer will never construct a
representation like (47) below:
(47) Jane is advising Peter to work as much as he wants
The hearer may construct such a higher level explicature when a doubt about the
type of world, point of view of desirability, etc. enters his mind and this is the
easiest way of consciously resolving them. But the construction of (47) is not
essential in comprehending (44).
The claim put forward here, that because of considerations of relevance,
the semantics of a na-clause may be enriched into "the world represented is
Since higher level explicatures are conceptual representations, pronouns, like
"he" in (46), do not appear in them. I will often be loose in my exposition of the
conceptual representations of an utterance in order to make them easier to read.
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potential and desirable", can explain a range of interpretations that a na-clause
may have. Suppose, for example, that you are a university lecturer and you have
been complaining to your boss that one day a week for your research is not
enough. After sufficient moaning or arguing, your boss might say:
(48) Endaksi. Na asholise me tin erevna dio meres tin evdomada.
OK. na engage-2s-IPF with the research two days the week
OK. Engage in research two days a week.
In this case the speaker is understood to be issuing permission to the hearer to
take two days a week for his research.
The na-clause in (48) stands in clear semantic contrast with the non na-
clause in (49), which would be unsuitable in the context described above for (48):
(49) Asholise me tin erevna dio meres tin evdomada
engage-2s with the research two days the week
You are engaging in research two days a week
It follows that, in uttering (48), the speaker does not intend to communicate that the
state of affairs where the hearer engages in research is located in the actual world.
If this was her intention, she would have uttered (49). It is also obvious that the
speaker does not intend to say simply that the proposition Nthe hearer engages in
research two days per week" is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in
a world other than the actual one. This interpretation would not even make sense
after the speaker's expression of agreement by saying Endaksi "Ok". The most
easily accessible interpretation that yields enough effects which the' speaker could
manifestly have foreseen in this context, without putting the hearer to unjustified
effort in deriving them, is that the proposition "the hearer engages in research two
days a week" is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a desirable and
potential world. It is already manifest in this context that the described state of
affairs is very desirable to the hearer. What is at issue, is the potentiality of this
state of affairs, which, as is clear from the context, depends on the speaker, who
is in a position of authority. So, by uttering (48), the speaker is not only conceding
the desirability of the described state of affairs, but more crucially she is
111
guaranteeing its potentiality. This interpretation gives nse to enough effects to be
worth the hearer's attention. For example, it may combine with other contextual
assumptions to yield the contextual implication that the speaker will now be able
to write some paper, or that he may work at home two days a week; it may
strengthen the hearer's belief that doing research is an important aspect of his job,
etc. Since this interpretation satisfies the optimal relevance criterion, it is the one
the hearer should accept.
As with (44), the hearer processing (48) may, if the need arises, construct
a higher level explicature along the lines of (50):
(50) The speaker permits the hearer to engage in his research two days a week
To understand (48), however, all the hearer needs to recognise, is that the speaker
grants the potentiality of a state of affairs which is desirable to the hearer.
It may be interesting at this point to compare (48) with (51) below, uttered
in the context I gave earlier for (48):
(51) Endaksi. Tha asholise me tin erevna dio meres tin evdomada
OK. will engage-2s with the research two days the week
OK. You will engage in research two days a week
Note first that both (48) and (51) describe a state of affairs that does not obtain at
the time of utterance and which may take place in the future, but they achieve this
in different ways. Processing (48), the hearer infers, as I showed, that the
described state of affairs is located in a desirable and potential world. A potential
world is a world which is not yet actual but may become actual, it ian achievable
world. Moreover it is evident in the context that the hearer is capable of bringing
about this world. It follows that if the described state of affairs is ever brought
about, this may only happen at some point in time after the time of utterance. So,
the future time interpretation of (48) is pragmatically inferred from the particular
way of enriching the semantics of na-clauses and contextual assumptions about
the hearer's control over the described state of affairs. The same point holds of
course for (44). In (51), on the other hand, future time is linguistically encoded in
the future particle tha (and by wi/un English). The proposition expressed by (51)
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is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the actual world extended in
the future.
This does not mean that every time a na-clause describes a state of affairs
in a desirable and potential world it will have a future time interpretation. In
predetermined cases, i.e. in cases where it is evident that the actualization of the
described state of affairs is not within anyone's reach, the default future
interpretation may be excluded by specific tense marking on the verb. Consider for
example:
(52) Ah, na mm figate htes
ah, na not went-2p yesterday
Ah, don't have left yesterday
In this case the past tense morphology and the adverb htes Nyesterdayu leave no
doubt that the described state of affairs is located in the past. Note that as far as
the speaker knows, the state of aftairs where they did not leave yesterday is part
of a potential world: given her assumptions about the actual world, they may have
left or not. On the other hand, (53) below has future time interpretation and is a
predetermined case:
(53) Ah, na mm ehis magirepsi protou ftaso
Ah, na not have cooked-2s before arrive-is
Ah, don't have cooked before I arrive
Such examples suggest that, if the na-clause describes a state of affairs in a
desirable and potential world and has past tense marking,' then it is a
predetermined case; if, however, the na-clause describes a state of affairs which
is not within the speaker's or the hearer's reach (i.e. is a predetermined case), then
it may be located either in the future, in the past or in the present (for example,
u Dont be angry, uttered while waiting for the addressee to open the door). This
makes sense since you may consider a state of affairs desirable and potential
whether it already holds or not, as long as you do not know whether it holds.
To complete the comparison of (48) and (51), note that whereas (51) could
be uttered in the context given for (48), it would have a different impact. The
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speaker would be understood as saying that the hearer will engage in research two
days a weekand only thereby granting him permission to do so. Uttering a non
na-clause, the speaker communicates that the proposition Nthe hearer will engage
in research two days per week is entertained by her as a description of a state of
affairs in the actual world. It is mutually manifest from the context that the world in
which the hearer does research two days a week is desirable to the hearer; it is
also mutually manifest that the speaker is in a position of authority over the hearer
and that it is up to her to decide whether the hearer may spend two days per week
doing research. In this context (51) succeeds in granting the hearer permission to
carry out research two days every week by contextually implicating it. On the other
hand, (48) achieves the same result in virtue of what it is taken to communicate
explicitly, as shown earlier.
The analysis proposed here also accounts for cases, where the speaker
uttering a na-clause expresses her will or desire that something be done: the
typical illocutionary force of an imperative. For example, suppose you have told me
you needed some files but I still have not brought them to you. Next time you see
me, you say:
(54) na mou feris tous fakelous amesos, parakalo
na me-gen bring-2s-PF the files-acc immediately, please
Bring me the files immediately, please
Obviously, (54) is not intended to be construed as describing the actual world.
Such an interpretation would not be suitable in this context. It is also not intended
to be understood as just describing a world other than the actual one. This
interpretation would not be relevant enough to be worth any attentidn. The request
marker parakalo please, as well as the rest of the context will help the hearer
form the hypothesis that the proposition expressed by (54) is entertained by the
speaker as a description of a state of affairs in a potential and desirable world. In
this case the hearer is expected to infer that the speaker regards the world
represented as desirable to herself and potential. Given that it is evident that the
hearer can bring about the described state of affairs, (54) will be understood as a
request. This interpretation satisfies the principle of relevance, because it is the
first one to come to mind that yields an adequate range of contextual effects for
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no unjustifiable effort. For example, it may combine with other contextual
assumptions to yield the contextual implication that the speaker needs to see the
files quickly or that the speaker does not trust the hearer to remember that he
should bring her the files, etc.
As with the other examples we considered, the hearer may construct a
higher level explicature like (55) below; this, however, is not necessary in order to
understand (54).
(55) The speaker requests the addressee to bnng her the files immediately
This account provides a reasonable explanation of why, in cases like (54),
the hearer will in typical circumstances do what the speaker tells him to do: the
assumption that the described wortd is desirable to the speaker provides the
hearer with a reason for bringing it into existence. On the other hand, when the
speaker uses a na-clause to offer advice, as in (44), or grant permission, as in
(48), she doesn't (necessarily) care whether the world represented will become
actual or not. On the proposed analysis, this is explained by the assumption that,
in these cases, the speaker regards the described world as potential and desirable
to the hearer: whether he will go on to bring it about is his own concern and not
the speaker's.
When the desirability of the described state of affairs is resolved in favour
of the speaker, the na-clause may be interpreted as a request or an order or a
plea, depending on additional contextual assumptions. In the above context (54)
is interpreted as a request. Suppose now that it is uttered in a military office, by a
general to a soldier. In this case, (54) is more likely to be interpreted as a
command, given the contextual assumptions about the social'status of the
participants. Alternatively, suppose that it is evident from the context that it is
extremely desirable to the speaker to have the files brought to her. Say, for
example, that (54) is uttered by a research student, desperate to lay her hands on
certain documents, to an uncooperative librarian. In this case, (54) would be
understood as a plea.
I have shown in this section how the interpretation of na-clauses expressing
advice, permission, order,'request, exhortation, plea, suggestion etc. can be given
a psychologically plausible account within relevance theory. Such interpretations
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involve pragmatically enriching the semantics of na-clauses into desirable and
potential world; they are distinguished on the basis of (a) from whose point of view
the described world is desirable: when the described world is understood to be
desirable to the hearer, the utterance has the illocutionary force of permission or
advice; when the described world is desirable to the speaker, then the utterance
has the illocutionary force of an order, request, or plea, etc; (b) the degree of
desirability: in the case of a plea the described state of affairs will be more strongly
desired than in the case of a simple request. In all the examples we have
considered, the propositional attitude description desirable and potential worldN is
derived inferentially on the basis of considerations of optimal relevance. The
context of utterance, certain linguistic elements functioning as illocutionary force
indicators like parakalo please, endaksi 0K, ebros and ade come on and the
intonation will guide the hearer in obtaining the intended interpretation by making
certain assumptions more accessible than others.
2.3.4. Na-clauses and the imperative in MG
In MG there is a morphologically distinct imperative form which, following the
Wilson and Sperber semantic analysis of imperatives, I assume, encodes the
information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a state
of affairs in a desirable and potential world. The imperative in MG, like the
imperative in English may be used to issue advice, grant permission, give orders,
make requests, pleas, etc. So, for every na-clause discussed in the previous
section there is a corresponding imperative. For example, instead of (54) the
speaker could have uttered (56) in the same context:
(56) Fere mou tous fakelous
bring-imp me the files-acc
Bring me the files
According to the analysis I have proposed here, (54) is costlier to process than
(56): whereas the imperative in (56) encodes that the state of affairs represented
is located in a potential and desirable world, (54) encodes simply that the state of
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affairs described is located in a possible world; this will then be enriched into
Ndesirable and potential, as the result of inference made necessary by the context
and considerations of relevance, as I explained in the previous section. We could
say that (54) is less explicit than (56) in the same way that (57) is less explicit than
(58) below:
(57) It will take some time to repair your watch
(58) It will take longer than you think to repair your watch
Notice also that the na-clause in (54) is longer, linguistically more complex, than
the imperative in (56). Therefore, one would expect, on the basis of the principle
of relevance, that (54) would yield some extra or different contextual effects. And
indeed it does. (54), and na-clauses in general when compared to their imperative
counterparts, are gentler, politer, less direct, more remote (cf. Tzartzanos
1945/1 989, Veloudis 1987). These overtones follow naturally from the semantics
of na-clauses: because of their semantic indeterminacy, na-clauses are less
imposing than the corresponding imperatives. This is why they are very often best
translated into English with the modals (eg. 'you should bring me the files').
In some contexts the use of a na-clause instead of an imperative is
inappropriate. For example, if the speaker and the hearer are in danger and must
run to save their lives, the speaker will most probably utter the imperative in (59)
rather than the na-clause in (60):
(59) trekse
run-imp-PF
run
(60) na treksis
na run-2s-PF
run
This can be easily explained within my analysis. It is clear that in this situation
there is no room for politeness or indirectness; all the speaker wants to
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communicate is that It is very desirable and potential that you runu. Given the
situation, she wants to communicate this in the most straightforward way. Thus,
between the na-clause and the imperative construction the speaker will choose the
imperative because it is less costly and doesn't give rise to unwanted effects.
For similar reasons the na-clause construction will not be used instead of
the imperative when there is no addressee. Suppose, for example that you are late
and your car won't start, or your phone is ringing and the front door is stuck:
(61) a. Ksekina panathema se
start-imp-IPF damn you
Start damn you!
b. Anikse panathema se
open-imp-PF damn you
Open damn you
In such audienceless cases there is no reason for the speaker to sound polite or
indirect, so the imperative is preferred.
Moreover, as was noted in Veloudis (1987), in certain idiomatic expressions
like those in (62) the imperative cannot be replaced by a na-clause:
(62) a. Akou na sou p0 (??Na akous na sou po)
Listen-imp-IPF na you say-ls-PF (na listen-2s-IPF na you tell-ls-PF)
Listen for me to speak! (:Listen to me)
b. S'ehi siko-katse (??S'ehi na sikonese-na kathese")
you have-3s-IPF get up-imp-IPF - sit down-imp-IPF (you have-3s-IPF "na
get up-2s-IPF - na sit down-2s-IPF)
He/She has you "get up-sit down" (:he/she does what she wants with you)
My analysis explains this: the na-clause sounds less imposing than the
imperatives, which is incompatible with the meaning of these idiomatic expressions.
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On the other hand, na-clauses may be used to describe states of affairs in
desirable and potential worlds when imperative clauses are impossible to use. For
example, if the subject is first or third person. Consider (63):
(63) Na perasi o kinos Manou
na come in-3s-PF the Mr Manou
Let Mr Manou come in
uttered by a doctor seeing her patients. The hearer is expected to infer in this
context that the speaker regards the world in which Mr Manou comes in as
desirable to Mr Manou and potential as far as she is concerned. The imperative
could not have been used here. The same goes for (64) addressed by the speaker
to herself on a lazy Sunday morning:
(64) Ante, na sikotho tora
Come on, na get up-i s-PF now
Come on, let me get up now
The speaker is expressing her belief that the world in which she gets up now is
desirable to her and potential. Since this world is entirely under her control she is
understood to be encouraging herself to get up. In a different context, say one in
which one of the interlocutors has to get up to check something every now and
then, the speaker might be understood as offering to get up now. In this case she
would be granting the potentiality of the described state of affairs. (This
interpretation would be more prominent, if the speaker used the pronoun lN uttered
with focus stress: Ante, na sikotho EGO tora, Come on, let ME get up now)
Imperatives in MG cannot be negated. Instead, negated na-clauses are
used. For example,
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(65) Na mm vjis ekso apopse/*min vjes ekso apopse
na not go out-2s-PF tonight/*not go out-imp tonight
Do not go out tonight12
Moreover, imperatives in MG cannot carry past tense morphology. If,
however, the speaker wishes to indicate that the described state of affairs has
been completed in the past, if it took place at all, she may use a na-clause. For
example, (52) repeated below:
(52) Ah, na mm figate htes
ah, na not went-2p yesterday
Ah, don't have left yesterday
Finally, I want to point out a few examples, which are apparently
problematic for the Wilson and Sperber analysis of imperatives and the analysis
of na-clauses used instead of the imperatives put forward here:
(66) Na adiaforis/adiaforise gia to nomo (ke tha dis ti tha pathis)
na ignore-2s-lPFfignore-imp-PF the law (and will see-2s what will happen-
2s)
Ignore the law (and you'll see what becomes of you)
(67) Ebros, na to katastrepsis/katastrepse to kenourjio mou hali
go on, na it destroy-2s-PF/destroy-imp-PF the new mine carpet
Go on, destroy my new carpet
Such threats and dares seem to be counterexamples to the proposed analysis
since it is obvious that the state of affairs described by the na-clause or the
' 21n negated clauses the na may be dropped (this seems to be easier if the
subject of the clause is second person, but it is also possible with first and third
person negated na-clauses):
(i)	 (Na) mm vjis ekso apopse
(na) not go out-2s-PF tonight
Do not go out tonight
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imperative is not believed by the speaker to be desirable to anyone. I will return
to such examples in chapter 3.
2.3.5. Na-clauses and the expression of wishes
According to Wilson and Sperber, all imperatives encode the information that the
proposition expressed is entertained as a descnption of a state of affairs in a
desirable and potential world. However, not all utterances which express
propositions entertained as descriptions of states of affairs in desirable and
potential worlds are imperatives. The na-clauses we looked at in the last sections
illustrate this point.
Hortatives in English are another case where an utterance interprets a
thought entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a desirable and potential
world without being an imperative. Consider the following examples:
(68) a. May you live to be a hundred
b. May you be convinced of his innocence before it's too late
c. May you not have changed your mind before I get there
d. May you get well soon
The proposition expressed by each of the utterances in (68) is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a desirable and potential world.13
' 3lmperatives and hortatives, although semantically similar, are not
synonymous, as you can see by comparing (68) and (i) below:
(i)	 a. *Live to be a hundred
b. *Be convinced of his innocence before it's too late
c. Don't have changed your mind before I get there
d. Get well soon
Although imperatives may be used to express good wishes and in what we called
predetermined cases, they cannot always replace hortatives. Hortatives, as
suggested by Wilson (1990), seem to encode the information that the proposition
expressed is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a world which is
desirable and potential but clearly not within the speaker's or the hearer's control.
This is why hortatives cannot be used to grant permission or give advice or issue
a command. (For example, *May you turn left at the end of the road, *May you
open the door). Hortatives express a certain type of wish: a wish which as far as
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In MG there is no distinct hortative structure. Na-clauses are used instead.
Consider,
(69)	 a. Makari/Ithe na pistis gia tin athootita tou telika
desire-particle na be convinced-2s-PF for his innocence eventually
May you be convinced of his innocence eventually!
b. Makari na me zontano to pedi mou
desire-particle na is-3s-IMP the child mine
May my child be alive!
The interpretation of such na-clauses again involves pragmatically enriching the
semantics of na into the world described is desirable and potential. To give one
example, let's follow the way (69b) is interpreted. Suppose (69b) is uttered by a
distressed mother who has just heard that her beloved son has had a car accident.
In this context the interpretation, on which the world in which the son is alive is
merely possible, will not be considered: to start with, such an interpretation is too
weak given the presence of the particle makan which indicates that a wish is being
expressed. On the basis of the semantics of this particle, standard contextual
assumptions about mothers' love for their children and their wish that they have a
long, happy and healthy life, and the contextual assumption that the speaker does
not know whether her son has survived the accident, the hearer will infer that the
world in which the son is alive is very desirable to the speaker and potential, i.e.
may be true as far as she knows, although not within the speaker's or the hearer's
control.
Na-clauses may be used not only to express good wishes but also curses.
Suppose I am very angry with your friend Peter, I might say:
the speaker knows may become actual (although its realisation does not depend
on the speaker or the hearer). Such a wish can also be expressed with an
imperative as we see in (ic&d). The only difference is that in that case the
assumption that the world described is potential but not within the speaker's or the
hearer's control is pragmatically inferred. This, however, does not exhaust the
semantic difference between imperatives and hortatives, because it does not
account for the fact that (68a&b) are fine whereas (ia&b) are not.
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(70) Kako hrono na ehi
bad year na have-3s-IPF
May he have a bad year
Processing (70), the hearer will infer that the world in which Peter has a bad year
is very desirable to the speaker and potential. So, curses and wishes involve the
same interpretation process; what distinguishes them is the content of the
proposition expressed.
I have argued so far that a na-clause may communicate explicitly that the
world represented is desirable and potential as a result of pragmatic enrichment
of the attitudinal information na encodes. One would expect that, subject to
particular contexts and considerations of relevance, other ways of enriching the
semantics of na-clauses should be possible. This is indeed the case, as we will
now see.
In addition to wishes which may come true, there are wishes which cannot
but remain unfulfilled. For example, consider:
(71) a. I want/hope to visit Tibet one day
b. I wish I were Kate Moss
The contrast between wanting or hoping and wishing is expressed in main clauses
in English by the use of imperatives and hortatives, on the one hand, and optatives
on the other. Optatives, like those in (72), seem to be specialised for the
expression of unrealised wishes:
(72) a. If only I had been born a man
b. Would that I had been born a man
As suggested by Sperber and Wilson (1983, ch. VII), optatives encode the
information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a state
of affairs in a desirable and possible (i.e. simply conceivable) world.
In MG there is no distinct optative structure. Na-clauses are used instead.
Suppose (73) is uttered by a speaker who feels disappointed by the way her life
has turned out:
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(73) Ah, na ksanageniomoun
Ah, na was born-again-ls-IPF
Would that I were born again
Here (73) is understood to be communicating an unrealisable wish.
According to the analysis I have proposed, the na-clause in (73) encodes
the information that the world in which the speaker is born again is possible.
Assuniing that the hearer shares the commonly held view that people are born only
once, he will not enrich the semantic specification upossible worldN
 into TMpotential
worldN .
 Certain linguistic clues, like for example the particle ah which often
functions as a desirability marker and the imperfect tense, together with contextual
assumptions such as that the speaker is disappointed with her life, would have
done things differently if given a second chance, etc., will guide the hearer to form
the hypothesis that the proposition expressed by (73) is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a desirable and possible world. On this
interpretation the utterance achieves enough effects without putting the hearer to
unjustified processing effort in deriving them. For example, it may strengthen the
hearer's assumption that the speaker is in the middle of a life crisis, or it may
combine with other contextual assumptions to yield the contextual implication that
the speaker has regretted some of the things she did, etc.
On this analysis, (73) communicates explicitly something like (74):
(74) It is possible and very desirable to the speaker that she is born again
In addition, (73) communicates strongly the suggestion that the world in
which the speaker is born again is conceivable but could never become actual, it
is not a potential world. Note here that the subjunctive in different languages is
standardly associated with the expression of counterfactuality. Consider, for
instance, the following examples from English and German:
(75) a. Wenn du em Sprachwissenschaftler wrest, würde dich jeder bewundern
b. Hans tat so, als wire er em begeisterter Linguist
(from Donhauser 1988)
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(76) a. Had I started at 9 o'clock sharp I would have finished by 4 in the
afternoon
On the analysis I am proposing here, the suggestion of counterfactuality is
implicitly communicated. One of the reasons for a proposition to be entertained as
a description of a state of affairs in a possible world is that that state of affairs
cannot be realised in the actual world. Contextual assumptions (the speaker's and
hearer's beliefs about what may become actual and what may not) will make this
interpretation more accessible. A linguistic clue pointing towards this interpretation
is the imperfect tense. The imperfect and pluperfect in MG seem to encourage the
derivation of such an implicature. The connection between forms of past tense and
the expression of irrealis across languages is well known, although no satisfactory
explanation of it has been offered (Palmer 1986: 209-21 5). Evidence for the claim
that the imperfect and the pluperfect are often used in MG to indicate that the
world represented is merely possible comes from their systematic use in the
antecedent of counterfactual conditionals:
(77) An to mathena/iha mathi noritera, tha iha pai
if it found out-i s-IPF/had found out-is earlier, will had gone-is
If I had found out earlier, I would have gone
2.3.6. Na-clauses and the expression of potentiality
All the na-clauses we have considered so far involve expression of lesirability: the
described state of affairs is pragmatically inferred to exist in a desirable world. In
the last two sections, I want to show that the proposition expressed by a na-clause
may be entertained as a description of a state of affairs which is merely potential
or possible.
Imagine the following situation. Mary has been engaged to John for a year
now. Peter knows that they have recently had a chat about when they are going
to get married. When they meet Peter asks Mary whether they are planning to get
married soon, and she says:
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(78) Isos na pantreftoume ton Septemvri
Perhaps na get married-i p-PF the September
Perhaps we may get married in September
In this context the hearer, Peter, is expected to infer that the world in which Mary
and John get married in September is not just possible, i.e. conceivable. He knows
that Mary has reason to believe that this world may become actual: they have
been engaged for a long time, they both want to get married, they have been
discussing when the marriage should take place. Given such contextual
assumptions, the hearer will infer that the world in which Mary and John get
married in September is potential. So, (78) communicates the higher level
explicature:
(79) It is potential that Mary and John get married in September
Further support for the claim that the semantics of a na-clause may be
enriched into the world described is potential comes from the idiomatic use
illustrated in (80):
(80) a. Ego, na pis, agonistika gia na megaloso ta pedia mou
I, na say-2s-PF, fought-is in order to bring up the children mine
I, you could say, had to fight in order to bring up my children
b. Esi, na poume, tin epiases tin kali
you, na say-lpl-PF, her got the good
You, we could say, did very well for yourself
In this parenthetical use it is clear that the proposition expressed by the na-clause
is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a potential world.
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2.3.7. Na-clauses and the expression of possibility
I have shown so far that the interpretation of independent na-clauses may involve
enriching the semantics of na into "the world described is desirable and potential",
"the world described is desirable and possible" and •the world described is
potential, depending on the context and considerations of optimal relevance. Are
there any cases where independent na-clauses are interpreted as representing
states of affairs which are merely possible, i.e. simply conceivable (without being
desirable and/or potential)?
Note first that, as I pointed out in chapter 1, the proposition expressed by
a na-clause may be entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible
world in complement clauses, for example (81), and in certain adverbial clauses,
for example the relative in (82):
(81) Apofasisa na figo
decided-is na leave-ls-PF
I decided to leave
(82) Hriazomaste mia gineka pou na kseri galika
need-i p1 a woma tha na kno-3s-IPF French
We need a woman who knows French
Also, consider the independent na-clauses in (83):
(83) a. Akoma na erthi to leoforio
yet na come-3s-PF the bus
The bus is yet to come
b. Paraligo na pnigoume
nearly na drown-i p1-P F
We nearly drowned
i 27
The proposition expressed by the na-clause in these examples is entertained as
a description of a state of affairs in a possible world. 14 In the next chapter I will
consider na-clauses like (84):
(84) Na tis grafi ena grama kathe mera. Ti sinithia!
na her write-3s a letter every day. What habit!
To write her a letter every day. What a habit!
I will show that in such cases also the proposition expressed by the na-clause is
entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world (with no
commitment as to whether it holds in the actual world or not), though more needs
to be said to account for their expressiveness.
2.4. Summary
In this chapter I have argued that, assuming the univocal semantics for na-clauses
I proposed in chapter 1, we can account pragmatically for the several
interpretations independent na-clauses may have. I have shown that the semantic
representation of an utterance containing a na-clause highly underdetermines the
interpretation it may have in a certain context. I considered na-clauses used
instead of imperatives, na-clauses used to express realisable and unrealisable
wishes and na-clauses expressing potentiality. I showed that all these
interpretations are arrived at by pragmatically enriching the semantics of na. This
pragmatic process is motivated and constrained by considerations of optimal
relevance. In this chapter I also looked at declarative na-clauses expressing mere
possibility. In the next chapter I will consider more cases of na-declaratives
expressing possibility, as well as interrogative na-clauses, the interpretation of
which hinges on the relevance-theoretic notion of interpretive use.
140n this account, the implications The bus has not come yet and We did not
drown communicated by (83a) and (83b) respectively would have to be analysed
as contributing to the implicitly communicated content of the utterance.
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CHAPTER 3
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NA-CLAUSES: NA-CLAUSES AND
INTERPRETIVE USE
3.1. Introduction
In Chapter 1 I argued that na-clauses encode the information that the proposition
expressed is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world.
In the last chapter I showed that we can maintain this unitary semantics despite
the apparently diverse interpretations independent na-clauses may have. I argued
that the imperative-, hortative-, and optative-like interpretations of na-clauses, as
well as the interpretation of na-clauses expressing potentiality are arrived at by
pragmatically enriching the semantics of na. In this chapter I will discuss the
interpretation of na-clauses expressing surprise and disapproval, na-clauses used
instead of tensed clauses in narration and independent interrogative na-clauses.
I will argue that the interpretation of such na-clauses can also be accounted for as
falling out from the semantics of na-clauses, on the one hand, and considerations
of optimal relevance on the other. In particular, I will show that the interpretation
of emotive and narrative na-clauses involves the communication of a complex
higher level explicature consisting of two levels of embedding. As for interrogative
na-clauses, I will argue that their interpretations may be given a psychologically
plausible explanation on the basis of the relevance-theoretic assumptions about
the way interrogative utterances are interpreted in general.
3.2. Na-clauses and actual states of affairs
I have proposed a semantic account of na, according to which na-clauses encode
the information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a descri ption of a
state of affairs in a possible world. I then argued extensively in the last chapter that
because of processing effort considerations an independent na-clause is standardly
interpreted as describing a state of affairs in a world other than the actual. In this
section I want to start considering a few uses of na-clauses which do not seem to
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be amenable to such an analysis. The problem is twofold: (a) there are na-clauses
which seem to describe states of affairs which exist in the actual world, and (b)
there are na-clauses the interpretation of which does not involve the description of
a state of affairs in a world but rather the representation of a proposition (thought
or utterance).
Consider the following situation. Suppose that in the weekends Peter does
nothing but watch television all day. Both his mother and father know this and do
not like it. They had expected their son to have friends, go out and in general have
an active social life. Suppose further that they have just walked in and out of the
sitting room where Peter is watching TV. His mother utters (1) with an angry and
sad tone of voice':
(1)	 Na pemai oh tou tin ora brosta stin tileorasi
na spend-3s-IPF all his the time in front of the television
To spend all his time in front of the television
Obviously, the state of affairs described by the na-clause in (1) exists in the actual
world. Moreover, both speaker and hearer know this. The speaker does not utter
(1) in order to inform the hearer that Peter spends all his time watching television
or, for that matter, in order to inform him that it is possible that Peter spends his
time in this way. The point of the speaker's utterance is to express how she feels
with regard to Peter's way of life. In this context the speaker clearly disapproves
of Peter's life style and is disappointed in him. She may in fact choose to make her
attitude explicit by exclaiming how terrible!N before or after uttering (1).
Now consider the following situation. Liz has been known to be rather lazy
at school. She is now in her first university year and has done v'ery well in her
exams. Her mother may utter (2) in a happy tone of voice, while discussing with
her husband Liz's progress:
'The na-clauses I am discussing here are typically uttered with a generally
falling intonation with a low to middle rise towards the end. This intonation pattern
is one of the clues that help the hearer infer the intended interpretation. Keep in
mind that such clauses may have any of the interpretations we saw
in the last chapter, if uttered with the appropriate intonation in the appropriate
context.
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(2) na pan toso kalous vathmous
na get-3s-PF such good marks
To get such good marks
Here again the state of affairs described by the na-clause is known to exist in the
actual world. The speaker utters (2) in order to express her pleasure, even
admiration for Liz's achievement and may do so explicitly by following up her
utterance with an expression like Wonderful!.
Such uses of na-clauses are often referred to in traditional grammars as
Nthe subjunctive of surprise and disapproval. For example, according to
Tzartzanos (1945/1989:311), such na-clauses are in some sense uexclamativeN
and they are used in order to express surprise at something which is happening
or has happened and which is Nunexpected or strange... Such utterances may be
expressions of surprise, admiration, anger, sadness, disapproval, criticism, etc.N
Can non na-clauses be used to express surprise, admiration,
disapproval,etc.? Yes. Instead of (1), for example, the speaker could have uttered
(3), and instead of (2) she could have uttered (4):
(3) pernai oh tou tin ora brosta stin tileorasi. (Fovero!)
spend-3rd all his the time in front of the television. (Terrible!)
He spends all his time in front of the television. (Terrible!)
(4) Pire toso kalous vathmous. (Kataphiktiko!)
got-3s so good marks. (Wonderful!)
She got such good marks. (Wonderful!)
The overall effect of (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (3) and (4), on the other,
is similar but not identical, as you would expect given the semantic contrast
between na- and non na-clauses. Both (1) and (3) communicate in this context the
speaker's disappointment and disapproval; both (2) and (4) convey the speaker's
pleasure. However, (1) and (2) communicate that the speaker finds the described
state of affairs difficult to believe, strange or unexpected in some sense, whereas
(3) and (4) do not carry such a suggestion. The speaker is expressing her
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disapproval or pleasure towards an event which she presents in a neutral way, as
a description of actuality.
A similar use of na-clauses is found in narrative contexts. Na-clauses may
be used in narration instead of non na-clauses in the imperfect. Suppose, for
example, that Mary is describing a fight her parents had when she was still in
elementary school. In the course of her narration she may utter (5):
(5) ltan enas tromeros kavgas. Na mm miliounte dio evdomades. Ti miseria!
Was-3s a terrible fight. Na not talk to each other-3p1 two weeks. What
misery!
It was a terrible fight. Not to talk to each other for two weeks. How
miserable!
Tzartzanos (1945/1989:314) refers to such examples as the narrative subjunctive";
the narrative subjunctive is used, according to him, in the description of events
which have already happened and especially in the expression of emotions". This
latter comment is supposed to capture the difference between the na-clause in (5)
and its non na-counterpart in (6):
(6) Itan enas tromeros kavgas. Den miliontousan dio evdomades. Ti miseria!
Was-3s a terrible fight. Not talked to each other-3pl two weeks. What
misery!
It was a terrible fight. They were not talking to each other for two weeks.
How miserable!
According to Tzartzanos, (5) is characterised by liveliness and a crtain dramatic
tone", which (6) lacks.
The difference in meaning between (5) and (6) could be described in a
similar way as the difference between (1) and (3), and (2) and (4). Both (5) and (6)
succeed in communicating the hearer's negative feelings about the fact that her
parents were not talking to each other for two weeks. However, the na-clause in
(5) carries the additional suggestion, which causes it to have a "dramatic tone",
that the speaker regards the state of affairs where her parents were not talking to
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each other for two weeks as strange, in some sense unexpected and difficult to
believe.
The na-clauses in (1), (2) and (5) seem to create a problem for the
generalisation I argued for in the last chapter, that is that independent na-clauses
are standardly interpreted as describing states of affairs in a world other than the
actual. These na-clauses seem to describe states of affairs which exist in the
actual world. On the other hand, there is a clear difference in meaning between
such na-clauses and their non na-counterparts, which may be caused by the
semantic contrast between na- and non na-clauses. Moreover, notice that there is
a difference between the na-clauses in (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (5) on
the other (as well as between the corresponding non na-clauses). The speaker
utters (1) and (2) in order to inform the hearer of her attitude towards a state of
affairs; the speaker of (5) however, seems to utter the na-clause in order to inform
her hearer both of a particular state of affairs and of her attitude towards it.
Now consider the following example. Suppose you have been telling me
how an old friend of yours played a nasty business trick against you. I am appalled
by the situation and utter (7) in a disapproving tone of voice:
(7)	 Na ferthi kata afto ton tropo apenanti se ena fib tou. Ke mono i skepsi me
anastatoni!
Na-behave-3s-PF in this the way opposite in a friend his. And only the
thought me upset-3s!
To behave in such a way towards a friend. The mere thought upsets me!
As in examples (1) and (2), the speaker utters (7) in order to give way to her
emotions: she is disgusted, appalled, upset. So, (7) is another eample of what
Tzartzanos called uthe subjunctive of surprise and disapproval". However, as made
explicit by the second utterance in (7), in this case the speaker expresses her
attitude towards the thought that someone may behave in this way towards a
friend, rather than towards the fact that someone did behave in this way.
Instead of (7) the speaker could have uttered (8):
133
(8) Ferthike kata afton ton tropo apenanti se ena fib tou. Ke mono i skepsi me
anastatoni!
Behaved-3s according this the way opposite in a friend his. And only the
thought me upset-3s
He behaved in such a way towards a friend. The mere thought upsets me'
Here the speaker is expressing her attitude towards the thought that someone
behaved in a nasty way towards one of his friends. As with the other pairs of na-
and non na-clauses we considered, (7) and (8) differ in that uttering (7) the
speaker communicates that she has difficulty believing that such a state of affairs
could be the case; i.e. difficulty in accepting its representation as true.
Similar cases where a na-clause seems to represent a thought rather than
to describe a state of affairs may be found in narrative contexts. For example,
suppose you have been telling me about the hardships you had to go through
during the war and you utter (9):
(9) Skepsou mono afto: Na mm ehoume gala oute gia to neogenito moro mas.
Think-imp only this: na not have-i p1 milk not even for the newly-born baby
ours
Just think of this: Not to have milk even for our newly born baby
In this case the speaker explicitly invites the hearer to interpret the na-clause as
a representation of a thought rather than a description of a state of affairs in a
possible world. Once again the speaker could have uttered the non na-counterpart
in (10):
(10) Skepsou mono afto: Den ihame gala oute gia to neogenito moro mas.
Think-imp only this: not had-i p1 milk not even for the newly-born baby ours
Just think of this: we didn't have milk even for our newly born baby
As with the na-clause in (9), the hearer is expected to interpret the non na-clause
in (10) as a representation of a thought, rather than a description of a state of
affairs in the base world. Both (9) and (i 0) succeed in communicating implicitly the
speaker's attitude towards the thought that there was no food for her baby: the
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thought was terrifying and upsetting. The difference between (9) and (10) is that
(9) sounds more expressive, more 'emphatic, more Ndramaticu; the speaker
communicates that she has difficulty accepting that such a state of affairs could be
the case.
The fact that na-clauses may be interpreted as representations of
propositions rather than descriptions of states of affairs in a possibte world requires
an explanation. Can it be reconciled with the semantic analysis of na I have
proposed? According to this analysis, na encodes information about a particular
kind of descriptive attitude, i.e. a kind of attitude towards a state of affairs. In
particular, na encodes the information that the proposition expressed is entertained
as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world. Or, is na ambiguous
between two senses, encoding two types of attitude? Does it encode, in addition
to a particular kind of descriptive attitude, a kind of interpretive attitude, i.e. an
attitude towards a representation? I will argue that na is not ambiguous in this way.
In the next section I will introduce the relevance theoretic distinction between
description and interpretation, and I will then argue that the interpretation of the na-
clauses in (7) and (9) depends on pragmatically inferring that they are used
interpretively. I will then return to the examples in (1), (2) and (5), and reconsider
them in the light of this distinction.
3.3. Description, interpretation and the mood indicators
In Relevance Sperber and Wilson (1986) draw a distinction between the descriptive
and interpretive dimensions of language and thought. This is further explored in
Wilson and Sperber (1988b, 1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1981 1985/6).
An utterance or thought or any other representation with a propositional
form is used descriptively when it is used to represent the state of affairs that
makes it true. So, for example, an ordinary assertion like (11)
(11) Margaret Thatcher resigned a few years ago
is a truth conditional, i.e. descriptive, representation of a state of affairs.
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In addition to the notion of descriptive representation, already familiar from
truth conditional semantics, Sperber and Wilson introduce another variety of
representation, namely interpretive representation. A thought or utterance can be
used to represent another thought or utterance by virtue of a resemblance between
the two propositional forms. A propositional form resembles another when they
share logical and contextual implications. For example, suppose that you know that
Paul called and you ask what he had to say and I answer with (12):
(12) He is happy with his new job
In (12) the speaker is not committed to the truth of the proposition UPauI is happy
with his new job; she is simply reporting what Paul told her on the phone. Her
utterance doesn't come with a guarantee of truthfulness (as a Gncean would
expect) but rather with the guarantee that it is a faithful enough representation of
the original, i.e. that it resembles it closely enough in relevant respects.
According to Sperber and Wilson, two propositional forms interpretively
resemble one another to the extent that they share their analytic and contextual
implications in a particular context. Interpretive resemblance is a comparative
notion. A thought or utterance may be interpretively used to represent another
thought or utterance with which it shares all analytic and contextual implications,
i.e. their propositional forms are identical. Free indirect speech is a case in point.
Suppose Paul actually uttered (13):
(13) I am happy with my new job
In this case the speaker of (12) has reproduced Paul's utterance (12) and (13)
have identical propositional forms and share all their analytic and contextual
implications. In Sperber and Wilson's terms, (12) is a literal interpretation of (13).
Alternatively, a thought or utterance may be used to interpretively represent
another with which it shares just a proper subset of its analytic and contextual
implications in a particular context. Suppose, for example, that what Paul really
said was
(14) I am well paid in my new job and my colleagues are nice people
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In this case (12) is a less than literal interpretation of (14). In a context, however,
in which it is manifest that Paul's main complaints with his old job were that he was
not well paid and his colleagues were unfriendly, (12) and (14) would share the
relevant analytic and contextual implications. For example, they would both give
rise to implicatures such as that Paul may now settle in this job, that he will now
stop complaining about his working conditions and may become pleasant company
again, that the speaker and the hearer need not worry any more about Paul, etc.
So, although (12) is not a literal interpretation of (14) it resembles it closely enough
in the relevant respects: in this context it gives rise to the implicatures Paul
intended his utterance to yield.
Notice that (12), on both scenarios we considered, achieves relevance by
informing the hearer of the (propositional) content of Paul's utterance. Alternatively,
as Wilson and Sperber point out, an interpretively used utterance may achieve
relevance by informing the hearer that the speaker has in mind what someone said
and has a certain attitude to it. Consider, for example, the following dialogue:
(15) Peter: That was a good old Clint Eastwood movie
Mary (happily): A good old Clint Eastwood movie
Mary's utterance is not used descriptively, but rather to represent an utterance it
resembles, namely Peter's utterance. By contrast to the cases we have considered
so far, Mary's utterance does not achieve relevance by informing Peter of what he
just said but rather by giving him some evidence of her attitude towards his
utterance, namely that she agrees with what he said. When interpretively used
utterances achieve relevance in this way, Sperber and Wilson call them echoic.
Mary echoes Peter's utterance, i.e. attributes the proposition exressed by her
utterance to Peter and expresses an attitude towards it, in this case the attitude of
endorsement.
In the examples we have considered so far, an utterance is used to
interpretively represent another utterance. An utterance can also be used to
interpretively represent a thought. For example,
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(16) a. John saw his father getting out of the car. He looked tired and old, John
thought.
b. John saw his father getting out of the car. He looked tired and old.
In (16) the utterance he looked tired and old does not represent a thought
entertained by the speaker as a description of a state of affairs, but rather it is
used to report a thought which the speaker attributes to John, explicitly in (1 6a)
and implicitly in (16b).
At a more fundamental level, Sperber and Wilson claim that every utterance
is interpretively used to represent a thought. In other words, the proposition
expressed by an utterance is put forward as resembling a thought that the speaker
intends to communicate. The next question is whether this thought is itself
entertained as a description of a state of affairs or as an interpretation of another
thought or utterance. So, the utterance in (11) is an interpretation of the thought
it represents, namely that Margaret Thatcher resigned a few years ago, which is
entertained by the speaker as a description, i.e. truth conditional representation,
of a state of affairs. The utterance in (12), on the other hand, is an interpretation
of the thought Paul is happy with his new jobN which is entertained as a more or
less literal interpretation of what Paul actually said. We say respectively that (11)
is used descriptively and (12) is used interpretively or that it is doubly interpretive.
Interpretive resemblance is the key concept in Sperber and Wilson's
account of metaphor and irony. Metaphor is seen as resulting from the speaker's
decision to choose an utterance that is a less than literal interpretation of her
thought. For example, suppose you utter (17) while telling me about your friend
Mary:
(17) Mary's ego is very fraQile
In interpreting this utterance the hearer will infer that it is a less than literal
interpretation of the speaker's thought: no rational speaker could have intended to
communicate that if you drop Mary's ego it will break. As with all utterances,
including literal ones, the speaker intends to communicate only a subset of the
analytic and contextual implications of her utterance. However, (17) differs crucially
from cases of literal interpretation in that the propositional form itself is not
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communicated. Considerations of relevance will help the hearer decide what the
speaker intends to communicate implicitly. So, for example, she is likely to be
intending to communicate that Mary is very sensitive and easily hurt. To justify the
element of indirectness in (17), however, the hearer will infer that the speaker
intended to communicate something more than what would have been
communicated by saying simply wMary is very sensitive and easily hurt. So, the
hearer is encouraged to explore a variety of other contextual implications having
to do with the degree of Mary's sensitivity, her lack of confidence, her social
behaviour, the way other people treat her, etc. Such implicatures are weaker than
the one mentioned earlier and the hearer takes a greater degree of responsibility
in deriving them. It is the communication of this range of weak implicatures that
makes the utterance the best possible way of representing the speaker's thoughts.
(For a more detailed account of metaphor within relevance theory see Sperber and
Wilson 1986: 231 -237 and Wilson and Sperber 1988b: 142-145).
Verbal irony, on the other hand, arises when the proposition expressed by
an utterance represents a belief attributed by the speaker to someone else and
implicitly expresses the speaker's attitude of dissociation towards the belief
represented. So, consider the following dialogue:
(18) Peter: I'm so happy there is a Clint Eastwood movie tonight
Mary (contemptuously): I'm so happy there is a Clint Eastwood movie
tonight
Peter is expected to infer that Mary is attributing the proposition expressed by her
utterance to him and implicitly dissociates herself from it. She is, in this way,
implicating that she is not happy that there is a Clint Eastwood movie tonight, that
she would prefer to watch something else, that she doesn't think very highly of
people who like Clint Eastwood, etc. This interpretation satisfies the criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance and is therefore the one the hearer
should choose. (For a detailed account of irony within relevance theory see
Sperber and Wilson 1986: 237-243; Wilson and Sperber 1988b: 145-147, Wilson
and Sperber 1992).
The information that an utterance is to be interpreted as a second degree
interpretive representation may be pragmatically inferred, as in the case of irony,
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or it may be linguistically encoded. For example, Blass (1989) argues that the
particle ré in Sissala is a marker of echoic interpretive use. More interestingly for
the purposes of this thesis, Wilson and Sperber (1986: 243-254; 1988a,b) have
argued that interrogative and exclamative sentences encode the information that
they represent a thought which itself interpretively represents another thought.
Both interrogatives and exclamatives are analysed as second degree
interpretations of desirable thoughts. A thought is desirable if it is relevant, i.e. if
it yields enough effects to be worth the individual's attention. Yes-no and wh-
interrogatives encode the information that they are interpretively used to represent
thoughts which the speaker considers relevant from someone's point of view.
Which thoughts? Their answers. For example, consider the interrogatives in (19):
(19) a. Where is the orange-juice?
b. Is John in?
(19a), like all wh-questions, does not express a complete proposition but only an
incomplete logical form. The speaker uses this incomplete logical form to indicate
that she would like to entertain a complete proposition that it resembles, i.e. the
proposition which results from the completion of the incomplete logical form. So,
the speaker indicates that she would regard some completion of the logical form
of her question as relevant. (1 gb), in a similar way, expresses a complete
proposition which resembles what the speaker regards as a relevant answer.
There is an indeterminacy in the semantics of interrogatives: from whose
point of view does the speaker represent the answer to the question as being
desirable? This indeterminacy is to be resolved pragmatically on each occasion.
For example, with questions which are understood as requests for information and
with self-addressed questions, the indeterminacy is resolved in favour of the
speaker, who regards the answer to her question as relevant to herself. For
example, suppose I want some cream on my cake and I ask you:
(20) Do we have any cream left?
The answer to this question is regarded by the speaker as relevant from her own
point of view. Moreover, it is manifest from the context that I do not know the
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answer, that I believe you do, and that I address my question to you. Such
contextual assumptions will lead the hearer to understand (20) as a request for
information and encourage him to provide the speaker with an answer if he can.
Alternatively, if I uttered (20) when I was on my own eating some cake, then I
would still be representing the answer as relevant to myself, but my question would
be understood as a self-addressed question.2
On the other hand, with questions which are understood as offers of
information and rhetorical questions, the speaker represents the answer to her
question as relevant to the hearer. Consider for example (21 a) where the speaker
is typically understood as offering information to the hearer, and the rhetorical
question in (21b) which achieves relevance by reminding the hearer of a piece of
information he has apparently forgotten:
(21) a. What are the points I've argued for so far? Representation by
resmblance is...
b. What do you say when you get a present?
Further contextual assumptions will help the hearer to interpret (21a) as an offer
of information, and (21b) as a rhetorical question. For (21a) to be interpreted as
an offer of information, the hearer has to infer that the speaker already knows the
answer to her question. For (21 b) to be understood as a rhetorical question, it has
to be manifest in the context that both speaker and hearer know the answer
(although the hearer had momentarily forgotten it).
Exclamatives, like for example (22),
(22) How full this room is!
encode the information that they are second degree interpretations of relevant
thoughts which are already available to the speaker and which the speaker regards
as relevant to herself (Wilson and Sperber 1 988b, Clark 1991). The speaker of (22)
expresses an incomplete logical form and indicates that she would regard some
2It is not clear to me whether self-addressed questions, and, in general, cases
where there is no hearer, are cases of ostensive-inferential communication. Here,
I will assume that they are genuine cases of ostensive-inferential communication,
although I think that this is an interesting issue requiring further consideration.
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already available completion of it as relevant to herself. So, the speaker of (22) is
indicating that this room is so full that it is worth noticing, that she is surprised that
the room is so full, etc.
Within the relevance theoretic framework, interrogatives and exclamatives,
like other mood indicators, are seen as encoding information about propositional
attitude. Moreover, their meaning is analysed in procedural rather than conceptual
terms. In particular, the information encoded by interrogatives and exclamatives is
analysed as a constraint on the higher level explicatures of the utterance. Like
imperatives and declaratives, interrogatives and exclamatives constrain the
interpretation process by instructing the hearer to construct a higher level
explicature involving one type of attitude rather than another. The difference is that,
while declaratives and imperatives express descriptive attitudes, i.e. attitudes
towards states of affairs, interrogatives and exclamatives express interpretive
attitudes, i.e. attitudes towards propositions.
3.4. Na-clauses and Interpretive use
On the basis of examples like (7) and (9), repeated below, where the na-clause
seems to represent a proposition (a thought) rather than a state of affairs,
(7)	 na ferthi kata afto ton tropo apenanti se ena fib tou. Ke mono i skepsi me
anastatoni!
na-behave-3s-PF in this the way opposite in a friend his. And only the
thought me upset-3s
To behave in such a way towards a friend. The mere thought upsets me.
(9)	 Skepsou mono afto: Na mm ehoume gala oute gia to neogenito moro mas.
Think-imp only this: na not have-ipI milk not even for the newly-born baby
ours
Just think this: Not to have milk even for our newly born baby
one may wonder whether na-clauses encode the information that they represent
a thought which itself interpretively represents another thought. I want to argue that
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this idea is not on the nght track. To accept it, we would either have to reject the
semantics I argued for in the earlier chapters, or we would have to claim that na-
clauses are ambiguous. If we assume that na-clauses encode interpretive use,
then we cannot account for any of the interpretations of na-clauses I discussed in
chapter 2. As far as I can see, there is no way to reconcile such a semantics with
the imperative-, hortative-, and optative-like interpretations of na-clauses. On the
other hand, Modified Occam's Razor suggests that we should stipu'ate a semantic
ambiguity only in those cases where we cannot account pragmatically for the
apparently diverse meanings of a linguistic device. I will argue that there is no
need to postulate an ambiguity and that the interpretation of the na-clauses in (7)
and (9) can be accounted for in pragmatic terms.
I have presented in the previous chapters ample evidence that na-clauses
encode the information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a possible world. In chapter 1 I considered a
variety of examples which suggest this semantics, and in chapter 2 I argued that,
on the basis of this semantics and an adequate theory of utterance interpretation,
we can give a psychologically plausible account of several interpretations
independent na-clauses may have. Let me point out again a few examples where
it would not make sense to claim that na-clauses encode interpretive use:
(23) a. Akoma na erthi to Ieoforio
yet na come-3s-PF the bus
The bus is yet to come
b. Paraligo na pnigoume
almost/nearly na drown-i pI-PF
We nearly drowned
c. lsos na erthi
perhaps na come-3s-PF
Perhaps he may came
In (23a) the na-clause represents a state of affairs which does not hold yet; in
(23b) the na-clause represents a state of affairs which was close to becoming
143
actual (but did not happen); in (23c) the na-clause represents a state of affairs
which may happen. All these interpretations can only be explained on the
assumption that na-clauses are in some sense descriptions of states of affairs in
possible worlds.
Convincing evidence comes also from the following examples:
(24) a. 0 Kostas varethike na perimeni
The Kostas is bored-3s na wait-3s-IPF
Kostas is bored with waiting
b. Ton ekana na hasi to treno
him made-is na miss-3s-PF the train
I made/caused him miss the train
c. I Maria arhise na milai
The Maria began-3s na speak-3s-IPF
Mary began to speak
d. Sinehizi na vrehi
continues-3s na rain-3s-IPF
It continues to rain
In (24a) Kostas is not bored with entertaining the thought of waiting but with
actually waiting. In (24b) the speaker did not make the hearer entertain the thought
of missing the train, she made him miss the train. In (24c) Mary did not start
entertaining the thought of speaking; she started speaking. Finally, in (24d) there
is not even a conceivable way of understanding the na-clause as representing a
thought rather than a state of affairs.
So, there is no reason, a priori, to think that na is a marker of (some type
of) interpretive use. However, we would expect that, like all linguistic expressions,
a na-clause may be used to represent a thought that merely resembles it in
propositional form, as is the case with metaphor, and it may, further, be doubly
interpretive, in that it involves the attribution of a thought or utterance, as is the
144
case with ironical and other echoic utterances. If this is true, then it is very likely
that, to interpret the na-clauses in (7) and (9), all the hearer has to do is to
pragmatically infer that they are used to represent thoughts which are entertained
as interpretive representations of other thoughts.
As expected, na-clauses may be used metaphorically. For example,
consider (25):
(25) Makari na anthisi i agapi sas
Wish-particle na bloom-3s-PF the love yours
May your love blossom
Here the speaker commits herself to only a subset of the analytic and contextual
implications of her utterance and not to the propositional form itself: she
communicates, for example, that she hopes their love develops in a beautiful way,
reaches a peak, is productive, etc. She does not commit herself to other
implications, such as that their love has the shape and the colours of a flower, etc.
Considerations of relevance help the hearer decide which are the implications the
speaker intends to communicate.
Na-clauses may also be used to report what someone else said or thought.
For example, suppose Mary has been to see her doctor about some stomach
problems she had, and Peter wants to know what the doctor said. Then Mary may
very well utter the na-clause in (26):
(26) Na apofevgo ta lipara
na-avoid-is the fat food
I should avoid fat food
In this context Mary's utterance is not to be interpreted as a description of a state
of affairs in a possible world. The first interpretation that comes to mind and is
worth the hearer's attention is that Mary's utterance is a more or less faithful
representation of what the doctor said.
Suppose, moreover, that Mary utters (26) in an approving tone of voice;
imagine, for example, that she had already guessed that it was fat food that was
causing her problems. In this context (26) would achieve relevance by informing
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Peter not only of what the doctor said, but also of Mary's attitude towards that, i.e.
that Mary endorses the doctor's opinion. In this case the na-clause in (26) is being
used echoically.
Na-clauses may also be ironical. For example, suppose Peter has
expressed his desire to see the Clint Eastwood movie and Mary, who hates Clint
Eastwood, utters (27) in a sarcastic tone of voice:
(27) Na doume to film me ton Clint Eastwood
na watch-i pl-PF the film with the Clint Eastwood
Let's watch the movie with Clint Eastwood
Here Mary attributes to Peter the thought that it is desirable and potential to watch
the film with Clint Eastwood and implicitly dissociates herself from it. In this way
she is implicating that she does not want to watch this movie, that Peter's taste in
films is not good, etc. This is the most easily accessible interpretation which gives
rise to an adequate range of effects, and therefore this is the interpretation the
hearer should choose.
This analysis extends easily to threats and dares like (28) and (29):
(28) Na adiaforis/adiaforise gia to nomo (ke tha ipoferis)
na ignore-2s-lPFlignore-imp-PF the law (and will sufter-2s
Ignore the law (and you'll suffer)
(29) Ebros, na to katastrepsis/katastrepse to kenourjio mou hali
go on, na it destroy-2s-PF/destroy-imp-PF the new mine carpet
Go on, destroy my new carpet
It was mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.3.3, that such examples may seem
problematic for the Wilson and Sperber semantic account of imperatives, as well
as for my account of na-clauses used instead of imperatives. The problem is that,
when such utterances are uttered threateningly, the speaker does not commit
herself in regarding the described state of affairs as desirable from anyone's point
of view. This problem, however, disappears when we realise that such imperatives
and such na-clauses are being interpretively used: the speaker is attributing to the
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hearer the thought that the described state of affairs is desirable and potential. (28)
will typically be uttered threateningly in a context where the hearer has ignored the
law or is considering ignoring the law. In this context we may informally paraphrase
(28) as: You are thinking (may be thinking) that it is desirable and potential to
ignore the Iaw. In the same vein, (29) will be typically uttered in a context where
the hearer has behaved in a way consistent with the propositions (29) makes
manifest, for example he has threatened to spill red wine on the carpet. In this
context we may informally paraphrase (29) with You think (You may be thinking)
that it is desirable and potential that you destroy my carpet. What makes these
utterances threats is the communication of the undesirable consequences of the
realisation of the described state of affairs for the hearer. In (28) these negative
effects are explicitly represented in the following declarative, whereas in (29) they
are left implicit. (For a detailed account of imperatives used to issue threats and
dares and pseudo-imperatives, such as (28), see Clark 1 993a: 104-106).
In (28) and (29) the na-clause is used to express a thought which is itself
entertained as an interpretation of a possible (or potential) thought that the speaker
attributes to the hearer. I want to suggest that in the examples in (7) and (9) the
na-clause is used to express a thought which is itself entertained as an
interpretation of a thought of the speaker's.
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 229) discuss cases where the speaker utters
P to represent a thought which itself interpretively represents another thought
without attributing it to anyone. A typical case is when the speaker asks the hearer
to consider an assumption. For example, suppose I ask you to consider the
assumption in (30):
(30) If I were not Greek, I would be Chinese
According to Sperber and Wilson, I have Just used an utterance interpretively to
represent an assumption without attributing this assumption to anyone. Another
case, Sperber and Wilson mention, is speculative thinking, where thoughts may be
entertained as approximate representations of assumptions one would like to be
able to formulate better. For example, in trying to think of a new hypothesis which
will account better for the data you are analysing, you are bound to entertain
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incomplete hypotheses as representations of the hypothesis you ultimately want
to construct.
The type of interpretive use involved in the interpretation of the na-clauses
in (7) and (9) is similar to these cases, in that the speaker does not attribute the
interpretively represented thought to someone else. It differs from these cases in
that the speaker has a particular attitude towards this thought and intends to inform
the hearer of her attitude towards the represented thought.
In the context given for (7) the speaker has been given an account of how
badly someone, let us say John, treated one of his friends. So, she holds a bunch
of thoughts which describe that state of affairs, one of which is that John behaved
badly towards a friend. In uttering (7), she is considering an implication of that very
thought, namely the thought that the state of affairs in which John treats one of his
friends badly is possible (i.e. exists in some possible world). So, we might
informally paraphrase the na-clause in (7) with "I am entertaining the thought that
the state of affairs in which John behaves in a nasty way towards one of his
friends is possible". With her next utterance the speaker goes on to explicitly
express her attitude towards this thought: she finds it upsetting. (9) is interpreted
along similar lines. The speaker is telling the story of their life during the war. She
holds a number of thoughts which are entertained as descriptions of what was
going on during that time. One of them is that they didn't have milk for the baby.
One of the implications of this thought is the thought that the state of affairs in
which they didn't have milk for their newly born baby exists in some possible world.
Uttering (9), the speaker is thinking about this thought. So, we might informally
paraphrase the na-clause in (9) with I am entertaining the thought that the state
of affairs in which we didn't have milk for our newly born baby was possible". 3 In
this case the speaker leaves it up to the hearer to infer her attitude towards the
described state of affairs. In this context, and after the speaker's explicit instruction
to the hearer in her first utterance to consider the represented thought, the hearer
is likely to infer that the speaker considers this thought appalling and upsetting.
The examples in (8) and (10) repeated below are interpreted in a similar
way:
3The na-clause in (8) is not marked for past tense. The hearer will infer on the
basis of the fact that (8) is part of a narration of past events that the described
state of affairs took place in the past. See also section 3.5.
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(8)	 Ferthike kata afton ton tropo apenanti se ena fib tou. Ke mono i skepsi me
anastatoni!
Behaved-3s according this the way opposite in a friend his. And only the
thought me upset-3s
He behaved in such a way towards a friend. The mere thought upsets me!
(10) Skepsou mono afto: Den ihame gala oute gia to neogenito moro mas.
Think-imp only this: not had-i p1 milk not even for the newly-born baby ours
Just think this: we didn't have milk even for our newly born baby
The corresponding non na-clauses are used to represent a thought which is itself
entertained as an interpretation of a thought of the speaker's. (8) and (10) differ
from (7) and (9) in that that thought is entertained as a description of a state of
affairs in the base world, which in these cases is the actual world. So, a
paraphrase for (8) would be something like "I am entertaining the thought that he
behaved in such a way towards one of his friendsN; and (10) could be paraphrased
in the following way: NI am entertaining the thought that we did not have milk for
our newly born babyN. As before, the speaker intends to inform the hearer of her
attitude towards these thoughts and does so explicitly in (8) and implicitly in (10).
I have shown in this section that the fact that in examples like (7) and (9)
a na-clause may be used to represent a thought rather than to describe a state of
affairs in a possible world is an instance of a much broader phenomenon: Any
representation (utterance or thought) may be used to represent another
representation by virtue of resembling it. There is no reason to assume that na-
clauses are semantically specialised for the representation of utterances or
thoughts. To interpret utterances such as (7)-(1O), the hearer has'to infer on the
basis of context and considerations of optimal relevance that they are being used
interpretively.
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3.5. Na-clauses and the expression of emotions
I now want to consider again the na-clauses in (1), (2) and (5), repeated below:
(1) Na pemai oh tou tin ora brosta stin tileorasi.
na spend-3s-IPF all his the time in front of the television.
To spend all his time in front of the television.
(2) na pan toso kalous vathmous.
na get-3s-PF such good marks.
To get such good marks.
(5)	 Itan enas tromeros kavgas. Na mm miliounte dio evdomades. Ti miseria!
Was-3s a terrible fight. Na not talk to each other-3p1 two weeks. What
misery!
It was a terrible fight. Not to talk to each other for two weeks. How
miserable!
As I explained in section 3.2., these na-clauses may seem problematic for the
account I proposed of the interpretation of na-clauses in chapter 2, since the state
of affairs described by the na-clause is actual rather than simply possible. How
could we account for such examples? There is a range of possibilities. Is this
another case of enrichment, where the semantics of the na-clause is strengthened
from NpossibIe world" to "actual world"? Does the interpretation of such examples
involve interpretive use? Or, are such utterances interpreted in a slightly different
way?
I want to start by arguing that the interpretation of such examples does not
involve enriching the semantics of the na-clause from "possible world" into Nactual
world N .
 I will first consider (1) and (2).
To begin with, an enrichment-based analysis is counterintuitive. Intuitively
the speaker does not intend to say in (1) and (2) that the described state of affairs
is actual. Second on this analysis, (1) and its non na-counterpart in (3), on the one
hand, and (2) and its non na-counterpart in (4), on the other, would communicate
identical higher level explicatures.
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(3)	 pernai oh tou tin ora brosta stin tileorasi. (Foverol)
spend-3rd all his the time in front of the television. (Terrible!)
He spends all his time in front of the television. (Terrible!)
(4)	 Pire toso kalous vathmous. (Katapliktiko!)
got-3s so good marks. (Wonderful!)
She got such good marks. (Wonderful!)
(1) and (3) would communicate the higher level explicature I disapprove of the fact
that Peter spends all his time in front of the TV, and (2) and (4) would
communicate the higher level exphicature I am pleasantly surprised with the fact
that Liz got such good marksu. This, however, does not account for the difference
in meaning between the na-clauses and their non na-counterparts. (1) and (2)
communicate an extra piece of information about the intended propositional
attitude: that the described state of affairs is in some sense unexpected, strange,
difficult to believe. Notice that we could not justify the enrichment analysis by
claiming that this extra bit of meaning is a by-product of the enrichment process;
in other words, that the logical form of the utterance has to be enriched for this
extra bit of meaning to be communicated. The reason is that the hearer is likely to
infer that the speaker regards the described state of affairs strange or unexpected
simply by realising that there is a mismatch between what the speaker says,
namely that the described state of affairs is possible, and the highly salient
contextual assumption shared by both interlocutors that this state of affairs is in
fact actual.
I want to suggest that these na-clauses are similar to the na-clauses in
(31), the interpretation of which was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.3.6.:
(31)	 a. Paraligo na pnigi
Almost na drown-3s-IPF
He almost drowned
b. Akoma na erthi to leofono
yet na come-3s the bus
The bus hasn't come yet
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(31a) and (31b) communicate that the speaker believes that the described state
of affairs exists in a (merely) possible world.
Let me start with (2). The speaker knows that Liz got very good marks in
her exams. It follows from this that it is possible for Liz to get very good marks.
Now, processing (2) the hearer will recover partly by decoding and partly by
inference a higher level explicature like (32):
(32) The speaker is surprised that it is possible for Liz to get such good marks
(or more formally The speaker is surprised that the state of affairs in which Liz got
very good marks exists in a possible world"). The hearer will not go on to infer that
this state of affairs holds in the actual world. If this was what the speaker intended
to communicate, then she would have uttered the non na-clause in (4), thus saving
the hearer some processing effort. Uttered in the same context, (4) communicates
a higher level explicature like (33):
(33) The speaker is surprised that Liz got such good marks
On this view, (2) and (4) differ with regard to the higher level explicatures they
communicate. In (4) the speaker intends to communicate explicitly that she is
surprised that Liz got good marks, whereas in (2) she intends to communicate
explicitly that she is surprised that it is even possible for Liz to get such good
marks. (32) is stronger, i.e. communicates more, than (33), because (32) suggests
or makes accessible the assumption that the speaker did not believe it was even
possible for Liz to get such good marks. This is why (1) carries the suggestion that
the speaker finds the described state of affairs in some sense str'ange, that she
cannot quite believe it (although she knows it is actual): she has difficulties
accepting it because she did not believe it to be possible. By contrast, in (4) the
speaker is simply expressing her surprise towards an actual state of affairs.
Of course, on the basis of (32) and the contextual assumption that Liz did
indeed get good marks, the hearer processing (2) is very likely to infer that the
speaker is surprised that Liz did indeed get such good marks. So, (2) gives rise to
all the contextual effects that (4) yields, plus the implication that the speaker did
not think it was even possible for Liz to get very good marks.
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(1) is interpreted along similar lines. In the context given earlier for (1) it is
manifest to both speaker and hearer that the state of affairs in which Peter spends
all his time in front of the TV exists in the actual world. One of the logical
implications of this proposition is that the state of affairs in which Peter spends all
his time in front of the TV exists in a possible world. Processing (1), the hearer will
recover partly by decoding and partly by inference a higher level explicature like
the speaker disapproves of the fact that the state of affairs in which Peter spends
all his time in front of the TV exists in a possible world. The hearer will not go on
to infer that the described state of affairs is actual. If this was the interpretation the
speaker intended, she would have used a non na-clause, as in (3), thus saving the
hearer some processing effort. On this account, (1) and (3) communicate different
higher level explicatures, which we might informally represent as in (34) and (35):
(34) I disapprove of the fact that it is even possible for Peter to spend all his
time in front of the television
(35) I disapprove of the fact that Peter spends all his time in front of the
television
By communicating the higher level explicature in (34), the na-clause in (1) makes
accessible the assumption that the speaker did not regard the state of affairs in
which Peter spends all his time in front of the TV as possible. The fact that it is
indeed possible is in conflict with her beliefs and assumptions about the world.
Hence, the difference in meaning between (1) and (3). The non na-clause does not
give rise to any such implication. Uttering (3), the speaker intends to inform the
hearer of her attitude towards a state of affairs which they both know to exist in the
actual world.
Again, on the basis of (34) and the contextual assumption that Peter does
indeed spend all his time in front of the TV, the hearer will infer in processing (1)
that the speaker disapproves of Peter's life style. So, (1) gives rise to all the effects
that (3) gives rise to, plus the implication that the speaker did not expect Peter to
behave in this way.
So, the interpretation of na-clauses like those in (1) and (2) does not
involve enriching the semantics of na-clauses from possible world into actual
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worldu .
 Moreover, such na-clauses differ from those I looked at in chapter 1 in that
the higher level explicature has two levels of embedding: the proposition expressed
is embedded under the propositional attitude description It is possible as
indicated by the na-clause, and that higher level proposition is embedded under
a propositional attitude description like •the speaker is surprised/disapproves
which is derived inferentially.
If this analysis is correct, there is no need to assume that the interpretation
of such examples involves interpretive use. Is an interpretive use based analysis
even conceivable? Well, I could think of two analyses of such examples involving
interpretive use. One could explore the possibility that the utterances in (1)-(4) are
exclamatives, and that they thereby indicate that the proposition expressed
represents a thought entertained as an interpretation of a thought the speaker
considers relevant from her own point of view. However, although such utterances
have an exclamative feel, there is no syntactic evidence that they are
exclamatives. Another possibility to explore would be that the proposition
expressed by such utterances (echoically) represents a thought which is itself
entertained as an interpretation of a thought of the speaker's. In this case, (1)-(4)
would be seen to be similar to (7)-(1O). Again, I think that this is not the most
suitable analysis of (1)-(4) taking into consideration the contexts in which they are
uttered. It's quite clear in the contexts in which (1) and (2) are uttered that the na-
clause is used to represent a thought which is entertained as a description of a
state of affairs in a possible world. Similar considerations hold for the non na-
clauses in (3) and (4): they are used to represent a thought entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in the base world (which is to be understood in
these cases as the actual world).4
4There may be some difficulty in applying the theoretical distinction between a
thought entertained as a representation of another thought and a thought
entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world in analysing
certain cases extracted from particular contexts. However, in real-life conversations
the context and considerations of optimal relevance will help the hearer decide
which of the two interpretations is intended. So, for example, interpreting (7) the
hearer may first take the na-clause to express a thought entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a possible world. Once he processes the second
clause, however, the hearer will have to pragmatically reanalyse" the na-clause
as expressing a thought entertained as an interpretive representation of another
thought.
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Finally, I want to discuss the interpretation of (5). The speaker utters (5)
while narrating an incident from her childhood. So, (5) differs from (1) and (2) in
that the state of affairs described is not already known to the hearer to exist or to
have existed in the actual world. Does that mean that the hearer is expected to
enrich the semantics of the na-clause from "possible world" into actual world"? No.
If the speaker intended to communicate that she regarded the described state of
affairs as actual, she would have uttered (6), thus saving the hearer some
processing effort:
(6)	 Itan enas tromeros kavgas. Den miliontousan dio evdomades. Ti miseria!
Was-3s a terrible fight. Not talked to each other-3p1 two weeks. What
misery!
It was a terrible fight. They were not talking to each other for two weeks.
How miserable!
Processing (5) the hearer will infer, partly by decoding and partly by inference, the
higher level explicature in (36):
(36) The speaker is appalled that it was even possible for her parents not to talk
to each other for two weeks
This proposition makes accessible the contextual assumption that the speaker had
not expected her parents to treat one another in this way. She did not believe this
was possible and she therefore finds it difficult to accept. Hence, the "dramatic
tone". By contrast, (6) gives rise to the higher level explicature in (37):
(37) The speaker is appalled with the fact that her parents were not talking to
each other for two weeks
and does not carry such a suggestion. The hearer processing (5) is of course
expected to realise that the speaker's parents did indeed behave in this way.
However, this is not part of what (5) communicates explicitly but rather follows
independently from the contextual assumption that the speaker is narrating past
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events. In this way we can account for the difference in meaning between (5) and
(6).
So far, I have discussed na-clauses with imperative-, hortative- and
optative-like interpretations, na-clauses expressing potentiality and possibility, na-
clauses used to represent thoughts rather states of affairs and na-clauses
expressing emotions. The context and considerations of optimal relevance help the
hearer decide which of these interpretations the speaker had in mind. All the na-
clauses we have considered so far are declaratives. Their interpretation is partly
the result of the semantics of declarative syntax and the na-verb form and partly
the result of pragmatic considerations. In what follows I want to look at na-
interrogatives, i.e. main clause interrogatives with the na-verb form. Such na-
interrogatives will be shown to be the interrogative counterpart of the types of na.
clauses we have already discussed.
3.6. Na-interrogatives6
3.6.1. The data and a possible classification
Pavlidou (1991) discusses subjunctive interrogatives, i.e. independent interrogative
clauses where the main verb is preceded by na and offers a classification/typology
of questions that can be performed with na-interrogatives. These questions fall into
two main categories:
(a) Indirect speech acts: These can be indirect requests for permission to do
something, as in (38), and indirect proposals or offers, as in (39):
5This account of narrative na-clauses and their non na-counterparts should be
placed within a general theory of narration. A full account, for example, should
make mention of the role of different tenses in narration (Smith 1990).
61 first proposed a relevance theoretic account of na-interrogatives in Rouchota
(1993) and Rouchota (to appear, b).
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(38) na rotiso kati?
na ask-i s-PF something?
Can I ask something?
	 (from Pavlidou 1991: 16)
(39) na plino ego ta piata?
na wash-i s-PF the dishes
Shall I do the dishes?
	 (from Pavlidou 1991: 17)
Indirect requests for permission and indirect proposals are yes-no questions.
Pavlidou places rhetorical questions with na-clauses in this category as
well, presumably because they seem to indirectly convey negative assertions. For
example:
(40) Mrs.Anna: Me ksehase o Petros
me forgot-3s Peter
Peter forgot me
Mary: 0 Petros na se ksehasi, kiria Anna?
The Peter na you forget-3s-PF, Mrs. Anna?
Peter forget you, Mrs Anna?
Mary's utterance strongly implies that Peter could/would not forget Mrs Anna. I will
discuss na-rhetorical questions in detail in section 3.6.4.
(b) Questions that are posed rather than being asked of someone: These are
deliberative and dubitative questions, as in (41) and (42):
(41) na pao sinema (i ohi)?
na go-i s-PF to the movies (or not)?
To go to the movies or not to go?
(adapted from Pavlidou 1991: 18)
(42) Pu na troi i Maria?
where na eat-3s-IPF the Mary?
Where might Mary eat/be eating?
(adapted from Pavlidou 1991: 20)
157
Deliberative questions can be yes-no or wh-interrogatives (except for why-
interrogatives); dubitative questions may be yes-no and wh-interrogatives.
In addition to this classification, Pavlidou suggests a set of explicit criteria
for distinguishing the different types of na-interrogatives. Besides intonation (which
she does not discuss), the various question types differ from one another along the
following dimensions:
(a) person of reference in the reference act (speaker, addressee, a third party),
(b) tj'pe of predication (act, state, event),
(c) beneficiary of the act mentioned with the predication act (speaker, addressee),
(d) attitude of speaker towards the propositional content,
(e) the question's position in the discourse (initiating question, echo question),
(f) the combinability of the question with other illocutionary force indicators or
paraphrasability to other typical forms.
For example, for na-interrogatives which perform indirect requests for
permission as in (38) we get the following description/definition on the basis of the
factors in (a)-(f) above:
(a) The person referred to has to be the speaker or in some cases a third party
(eg. na rotisi kati i Maria? = Can Mary ask something?, but the subject cannot be
in the second person).
(b) The predication concerns a future act of the speaker.
(C) The act mentioned has to be in the interest of the referent (i.e. the speaker or
a third party).
(d) The attitude of the speaker is his or her wish or desire to perform the act
mentioned.
(e) The question presupposes at least a non verbal context between speaker and
addressee, i.e. such questions are typically continuation moves in a sequence.
(f) Questions like (1) readily combine with typical markers of requesting like
parakalo, 'please', and ligo, 'a little'.
The general problem with typologies of the sort proposed by Pavlidou
(1991) is that they amount to a simple list of the possible interpretations na-
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interrogatives may have. They do not say anything about how these interpretations
are actually arrived at by hearers. It is from this point of view that I want to look at
these data.
The classification that Pavlidou proposes should not lead one to believe
that she takes na-interrogatives to be multiply ambiguous. She assumes a univocal
semantics for na-clauses in terms of possible worlds, as proposed in Philippaki-
Warburton and Veloudis (1984) and Vetoudis and Philippaki-Warburton (1983). Her
views on the semantics of interrogatives, on the other hand, are not explicit but she
probably takes them to be directive speech acts. The question she does not
address is •how can one explain the several different interpretations of na-
interrogatives? N .
 I will argue that a psychologically plausible explanation can be
given for the several interpretations of na-interrogatives if (a) we assume the
semantics of na-clauses proposed in chapter 1, (b) we assume the semantic
account of interrogatives proposed by Wilson and Sperber (1 988a) and discussed
in section 3.3., and (c) use relevance theory as our theory of utterance
interpretation. Moreover, I will show that a typology, like the one proposed by
Pavlidou, plays no role in the way a hearer interprets a na-interrogative. We do not
need to posit categories of questions in order to account for their interpretation.
The other issue that I want to discuss is the differences between na- and
non na-interrogatives. Some types of questions, such as indirect requests for
permissions and indirect proposals like (38) and (39), can be performed with na-
interrogatives only. Real questions, on the other hand, that is questions seeking
information about the world (Pavlidou 1987) can be asked with non na-
interrogatives only. As Pavlidou (1991 :37) puts it: it is evident from this typology
that in using subjunctive interrogatives one does not neutrally seek information
about the world as is the case with 'real' questions. The questions that arise here
are: Why can't urealN questions be asked with na-clauses? And, why can't we use
a non na-interrogative to ask a question which functions as an indirect request or
proposal? I will argue that such restrictions as to what type of question may be
asked with a na- or a non na-interrogative follow from the semantic contrast
between na- and non na-clauses.
On the other hand, some of the types of questions that can be performed
by na-interrogatives can also be performed by non na-interrogatives. For example,
dubitative questions:
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(43) Pu troi arage?
where eat-3s perhaps?
Where does he perhaps eat?
The question here is this: Are there any differences between na- and non na-
dubitative questions and, if so, of what sort and how do we account for them?
Finally, I want to discuss briefly the status of the criteria that Pavlidou
proposes in order to distinguish between the different types of na-interrogatives.
I will argue that, as they stand, these criteria are nothing but simple descriptive
statements about each type of question. Looking at these criteria from the point of
view of how na-interrogatives are interpreted on particular occasions one may
wonder whether they are all of equal importance. I will show that some of them are
of little or no importance and that others are integral parts of the interpretation
process and therefore do not need to be stipulated as distinct entities in our
analysis. Viewed as such, they do not constitute descriptive distinguishing criteria
but important aspects of the overall interpretation of na-interrogatives as driven by
considerations of optimal relevance.
3.6.2. A relevance-theoretic account of na-interrogatives
According to Wilson and Sperber (1988a), interrogatives encode the information
that the proposition expressed represents a thought which is entertained as an
interpretive representation of a desirable, i.e. relevant, thought. That thought is,
obviously, an answer to the question. So, a speaker uttering an interrogative
indicates that she regards the answer to her question as relevant fr'om someone's
point of view. Interrogatives in English have distinct word order from declaratives.
As I argued in chapter 2, in MG interrogative syntax is not marked by a particular
word order. A particular intonation contour, high rise with an optional tall towards
the end of a sentence, is the only surface marker of yes-no interrogatives. As I
argued in chapter 2, we can establish, on the basis of evidence from tests bearing
on the behaviour of polarity items and the expression or not, that sentences with
this particular intonation have underlyingly interrogative syntax. If there is a one to
one correlation between this intonation contour and interrogative syntax, then we
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may claim that in MG such intonation encodes the information that is encoded in
English by interrogative word order. If there is no such correlation, then the hearer
has to decide on the basis of the context and considerations of optimal relevance
whether a given utterance is to be interpreted as a question. In this case, the
information encoded in English by interrogative word order would have to be
pragmatically inferred in MG. Here, I will assume that with respect to yes-no
interrogatives in MG rising intonation with an optional slight fall at the end encodes
the information carried by interrogative word order in English. This does not seem
unreasonable to me given the existence of wh-interrogatives in MG (for arguments
see chapter 2), as well as the fact that there is syntactic evidence that such
sentences are interrogatives. The na- and non na-questions that I will be
discussing in the remainder of this chapter are, on the basis of the tests discussed
in chapter 2, interrogatives and are uttered with a rising intonation optionally
followed by a fall, unless otherwise specified.7
According to the relevance-theoretic account of interrogatives, the
interrogative in (38) encodes the information that it interpretively represents its
answer:
(38)	 na rotiso kati?
na ask-i s-PF something?
Can I ask something?
The important thing to note here is that the typical answer to this question is a na-
clause:
7There is an extra complication here relating to whether we can say at all that
particular intonation contours encode meaning. The issue is whether intonational
meaning is arbitrary (i.e. encoded, in the way that words encode meaning) or
iconic (i.e. whether intonation provides evidence for the communication of some
information, in the way that gestures or facial expressions do). This issue is
discussed in detail in Lindsey (1985, 1991) who argues that intonational meanings
are neither purely iconic nor purely grammatical. Following Lindsey (1985), Clark
and Lindsey (1990) propose a theory which accounts for both the arbitrary and the
iconic aspects of intonational meaning. Here, I follow Clark (1991: 188-194) in
assuming that intonational interpretation can be seen as internal to the language
module: in particular, intonation contours may encode procedural meaning.
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(44)	 Na rotisis kati
na ask-2s-PF something
You may ask something
I argued in chapter 2 that in (44) we have an imperative-like na-clause: the
speaker is issuing permission to the hearer to ask something. As I argued there,
this interpretation is reached by (a) pragmatically enriching the semantics of the
na-clause possible world into desirable and potential world. This process, I
showed, is driven by the context and considerations of optimal relevance; and (b)
pragmatically resolving the semantic indeterminacy relating to from whose point
of view is the described state of affairs desirable". When the state of affairs
described in the na-clause is desirable from the hearer's point of view and its
potentiality is granted by the speaker, (44) is understood as issuing permission.
I want to argue that (38) is the interrogative counterpart of (44). Because
of the particular context (say in a classroom, a pupil asks permission to ask a
question), the hearer realises that the speaker does not intend to ask simply
whether the state of affairs where she asks something is possible (as the
semantics of na dictates). Such an interpretation is too weak, in the sense that it
does not achieve enough contextual effects. For example, such an interpretation
would not explain why the hearer, in this context the teacher, would typically react
by granting or not granting permission to the pupil to speak; or why the pupil would
then typically go on to ask her question or not, depending on the teacher's answer.
So, in accordance with the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance,
the semantics of the na-clause has to be enriched into "the world described is
desirable and potential". Moreover, in this particular context the hearer will infer
that the world described by the na-clause is desirable to the speaer and that its
potentiality depends on the hearer himself. Note that "possible" has to be enriched
into "desirable and potential": the element of desirability will explain why the
speaker will go on to ask the question if she is granted permission; the element of
potentiality will explain why the speaker asks before going on with her wishes.
Now, on the assumption that (38) is an interrogative and as such encodes
the information that it interpretively represents a relevant thought, one final
semantic indeterminacy has to be resolved pragmatically: From whose point of
view does the speaker represent the answer to her question as relevant? Since it
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is obvious from the context that the speaker expects an answer, the hearer will
infer that the interpretively represented thought is considered by the speaker
relevant from her own point of view. So, we might informally paraphrase the
explicitly communicated content of (38) in the following way: l would find it
relevant from my own point of view to entertain the following proposition: It is
desirable to me and potential that I ask something.
When an interrogative na-clause ends up communicating a higher level
explicature of this sort and it is clear from the context that it is up to the hearer to
grant the potentiality of the described state of affairs, then the na-interrogative is
understood as having the illocutionary force of a request for permission to do
something". Notice that on this account there is no arbitrary link between na-
interrogatives and the force of "asking for permission". The "asking for permissionN
interpretation is simply the interpretation on which the utterance is optimally
relevant in this context.
Questions like (38), i.e. questions the explicit content of which is a request
for permission, cannot be asked with non na-clauses. The reason is that non na-
clauses encode the information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in the base world. So, non na-interrogatives typically
ask questions about the actual world, "real questions" as Pavlidou puts it. But, a
world which is both desirable and potential is a kind of possible world, so there
cannot be any enrichment from "actual" into "desirable and potential".
Let me now consider (39), which is classified by Pavlidou as an indirect
offer or proposal to do something:
(39)	 na plino ego ta piata?
na wash-ls-PF the dishes
Shall I do the dishes?
Let us imagine a context. In Mary's and Peter's household the usual practice is
that when one of them does the cooking, the other does the washing up. Tonight
Mary did the cooking but she can see that Peter is very tired, so in uttering (39)
she offers to do the washing up.
Decoding (39) the hearer will recover the proposition that Mary is asking
whether the state of affairs where she does the washing up is possible. This
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interpretation, however, is too weak to be the interpretation that Mary intended:
Mary does not want to know simply whether this state of affairs is possible (both
Mary and Peter know that this state of affairs is in principle possible). So, the
hearer will realise that some more inferential work is needed on his part in order
to recover a relevant enough interpretation. How is the hearer to enrich the
semantics of the interrogative na-clause in this case? The line of enrichment is
indicated by certain contextual assumptions, such as that Mary has noticed that
Peter is tired, Mary is not too tired, Mary has offered in the past to do the washing
up if Peter was tired and so on. In a context like this the hearer is expected to infer
that the state of affairs where Mary does the washing up is regarded by the
speaker as potential and desirable to Peter. The typical answer to (39) would be
a na-clause whereby Peter would communicate that this state of affairs is/is not
desirable to him. Finally, the indeterminacy with respect to from whose point of
view the speaker regards the answer to this question as relevant has to be
resolved. In this particular context Mary genuinely seeks an answer, so she
considers the answer to her question as relevant to herself. So, put informally,
Mary ends up communicating explicitly something like I would find it relevant from
my own point of view to entertain the following proposition: It is desirable to Peter
and potential that I do the washing UPN.
When a na-interrogative communicates such a higher level explicature and
it is obvious from the context that the potentiality of the described state of affairs
is granted by the speaker, then it has the illocutionary force of an offer to do
something. This interpretation is the result of the linguistically encoded content of
the utterance, on the one hand, and considerations of context and optimal
relevance, on the other.
Questions where the speaker is explicitly offering to do something cannot
be asked with non na-clauses because, as explained earlier, the semantics of non
na-clauses cannot be enriched into ihe world described is desirable and potentialN.
I argued that in both (38) and (39) the semantics of the na-clause is
enriched into •the world described is desirable and potentialN as a result of
pragmatic considerations. (38) and (39) differ in that in (38) the world described is
desirable from the speaker's point of view and its potentiality depends on the
hearer whereas in (39) the world described is desirable from the hearer's point of
view and its potentiality is granted by the speaker. Now, notice that in (38) the
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speaker ends up asking about the potentiality of the described world (and not its
desirability), whereas in (39) the speaker ends up asking about the desirability of
the described world (and not its potentiality). This is because the desirability of the
state of affairs described in (38) and the potentiality of the state of affairs in (39)
depends on the speaker herself.
Finally, according to Pavlidou, the na-interrogatives in (38) and (39) are
used to perform indirect speech acts. The direct speech act performed by these
utterances is presumably a (direct) request for information. This direct speech act,
however, is only performed in order to perform an indirect speech act: that of
requesting permission in (38) and that of offering to do something in (39). On the
speech act view, the hearer has to recover the indirect speech act involved in
order to interpret an utterance like (38) or (39). I have shown, however, that no
such thing is needed in order to understand these utterances. The "indirect offer"
and "indirect request for permission" interpretations are simply the result of the
hearer's search for an optimally relevant interpretation. 8
Let's now consider (41), which is classified as a deliberative question.
Suppose that A is bored and doesn't know how to spend her evening. Among the
options she considers is going to the movies. So, she utters:
(41) na pao sinema (I ohi)?
na go-i s-PF to the movies (or not)?
To go to the movies or not?
Deliberative questions can also be introduced by a wh-word (except for "why"9).
For example, consider (45) uttered by a speaker trying to decide where she should
spend her holiday:
8For further discussion of the issue of the role of indirect speech acts in
communication with special reference to the so-called "short circuited implicaturesN,
see Groefsema (1992). She reaches the same conclusion as here, namely that the
recovery of indirect speech acts is not needed in order to account for the
interpretation of the related utterances.
91t is interesting that why-interrogatives cannot be deliberative questions. Maybe
this is because deliberation is concerned with decision making, and the sort of
thing one can make a decision about is concrete, like taking some action, in a
place, at a time, involving other persons or objects. One can't decide to bring about
psychological entities like reasons or motivations.
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(45) Pou na pao?
Where na go-ls-PF
Where to go?
Such questions do not expect answers. The speaker is wondering whether she
should go to the movies or not in (41), and where she should go in (45).
As with the other examples, the hearer processing (41) will realise that the
speaker cannot be simply wondering whether it is possible to go to the movies in
the given context. It is part of the context that the speaker is trying to decide
whether she wants to go to the movies. It is also clear from the context that the
speaker regards the answer to her question as relevant to herself. By virtue of
being an alternative -question, (41) represents both a positive and a negative
proposition (Wilson and Sperber 1988b: 96, Clark 1991): It is desirable and
potential that I go to the movies or it not desirable and potential that I go to the
movies". The utterance of (41) communicates that each of these disjuncts
represents a thought which would be relevant if true. Given the contextual
assumption that there is no addressee, the na-interrogative in (41) is understood
as a deliberative question.
Similar considerations hold for the interpretation of the wh-interrogative na-
clause in (45), which in the given context ends up communicating a higher level
explicature like: "It would be relevant to me to entertain some completion of the
following (incomplete) representation: It is desirable to me and potential to go to
N
Finally, let us look at (42), which is classified as a dubitative question.
Suppose, we never meet Mary any more in the College refectory and so I ask you:
(42)	 Pu na troi i Maria?
where na eat-3s-IPF the Mary?
Where might Mary eat/be eating?
Dubitative questions may also be yes-no interrogatives. For example, suppose we
are expecting Kostas for lunch and I utter:
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(46) Na me o Kostas idi sto dromo, arage?
na is-3s the Kostas already on the road, perhaps?
Could Kostas be already on his way, perhaps?
In these cases there is no reason for the semantics of the na-clause to be
enriched. (42) communicates a higher level explicature like: I would find it relevant
from my own point of view to entertain some completion of the following incomplete
representation: it is possible that Mary is eating at _____ . (46), in the same vein,
communicates a higher level explicature like: I would find it relevant from my own
point of view to entertain the following proposition: It is possible that Kostas is
already on his way. On the other hand, if it is obvious in the context that the
assumption that Kostas may be on his way already is compatible with the
individual's beliefs about the world and may therefore be actual (suppose for
example, that it is almost lunchtime and Kostas is known to never be late), then
the hearer may infer that the described state of affairs is not simply possible but
potential. There are, however, cases where, because of our beliefs about the
world, the state of affairs described by the na-clause has to be possible (i.e. cannot
be enriched into potential). For example:
(47) a. Na ehi zisi 400 hronia?
na has lived-3s 400 years
Could she have lived for 400 years?
b. Na ehi arage ksanagenithi?
na has perhaps be born-3s again
Could she have been reborn perhaps?
	 *
Now, if it is obvious from the context in which such dubitative questions are
uttered that the speaker expects an answer and believes the hearer is in a position
to give her one, then such dubitative questions will be understood as requests for
information. The typically expected answer would be a na-clause, for example for
(47a): Isos na ehi zisi 400 hronia NPerhaps she has lived for 400 yearsN. If, on the
other hand, the speaker does not expect an answer and does not consider the
hearer capable of providing him with one or there is no hearer, then such
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dubitative questions wilt be understood as (self-addressed) speculative questions.
Pavlidou (1991: 20-21) considers the latter possibility only, since she claims that
dubitative questions are questions with which the hearer wonders [my underlining]
about the truth of the propositional content, in the case of yes/no interrogatives, or
about that element of the propositional content that would make a true proposition
out of it, in the case of wh-interrogatives. However, what type of question may be
performed with a dubitative na-clause, i.e. an interrogative na-clause where the
state of affairs described is regarded as possible or potential, depends on the rest
of the context. So, such an interrogative na-clause may function as an information
seeking question, or a speculative question, or a guess question as in (48), or a
rhetorical question such as those discussed in 3.6.4., etc., depending on the
context:
(48) [the speaker is looking at two cards; the hearer cannot see what is on
them]
Pia na me o asos?
which na is the ace?
Which one might be the ace?
Questions where the speaker expresses some doubt may also be
performed with non na-interrogatives. For example,
(49) lne o Kostas idi sto dromo, (arage)?
ls-3s the Kostas already on the road, (perhaps)?
Is Kostas already on his way, (perhaps)?
The difference in meaning between a question like (46) and a question like (49) is
that in choosing a na-clause the speaker commljnicates a higher degree of doubt.
This can be explained on the basis of the semantic contrast between na- and non
na-clauses. The state of affairs descnbed by the interpretively represented thought
in (49) is regarded as actual. So, (49) communicates a higher level explicature like
I would find it relevant to entertain the following proposition: Kostas is already on
his way. An adverbial like arage perhaps may be used in addition to, for
example, a hesitating tone of voice, some characteristic movement of the eyes,
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etc., to indicate the intended interpretation. In other words, it is the presence of this
adverbial and other contextual or paralinguistic features which encourage the
hearer to interpret (49) as a dubitative question. Some such clue is necessary for
(49) to be interpreted as a dubitative question, otherwise it is interpreted as a real
question. On the other hand, in (42) and (46)-(48) the speaker's doubt has been
shown to follow from the semantics of the na-clause.
At this point one might wonder whether the speaker uttering a na-
interrogative always regards the answer as relevant from her own point of view.
This is not the case. Expository questions, i.e. questions where the answer is
available to the speaker and she considers it as relevant to the hearer, may be
asked with na-interrogatives. For example, consider (50):
(50) Ti na diavasete gia tis eksetasis? Ti simasiologiki analisi ton erotiseon,...
what na-study-2p1-PF for the exams? The semantic analysis of
interrogatives,...
What should you study for the exams? The semantic account of
interrogatives,...
In this case the speaker represents the answer to her question as relevant from
the hearer's point of view.
Finally, let me briefly mention that, as expected on the basis of the
discussion in section 3.3, all the interrogative na-clauses we have considered in
this section may be interpretively used given the appropriate context: the speaker
may, for example, attribute the interrogative utterance to someone else; or she
may attribute the utterance to someone else and express an attitude towards it, i.e.
use the utterance echoically, etc. In such cases interrogative na-clauses are triply
interpretive.
In this section I have proposed a relevance-theoretic account of the ways
in which na-interrogatives may be interpreted. On this account, the meaning of a
na-interrogative is a function of the meaning of the interrogative syntax and the na-
verb form on the other. My analysis supports Wilson and Sperber's (1 988a: 99)
position expressed in the following quote:
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...The assumption is that the moods are unanalyzable and mutually
exclusive semantic categories: that every sentence belongs to one and only
one mood, which is not itself decomposable into more elementary moods.
It is easy to think of grounds for questioning this assumption. For
instance, most languages have two types of interrogative sentence: those
with an indicative verb, which expect an indicative answer, and those with
a subjunctive verb, which expect a subjunctive answer. The Omotic
languages of Southern Ethiopia have both indicative and imperative
interrogatives, that is interrogatives with an imperative verb, which expect
an imperative answer. In each case, the meaning of the interrogative is a
function of the meaning of the interrogative marker on the one hand, and
of indicative, subjunctive or imperative verb form, on the other
My analysis is based on the fact that na-questions suggest na-clauses for
answers. This suggests that a na-question specifies what type of answer the
speaker would regard as relevant, that is a na-answer. The interpretation of the na-
interrogatives considered here is, therefore, parasitic on the interpretation of the
na-clauses which are their answers. In a similar way, Wilson and Sperber
(1988a:96) and in greater detail Clark (1991:151-156) account for the differences
in meaning between positive yes-no questions, negative yes-no questions and
alternative questions, like those in (51),
(51) a. Did you finish your homework?
b. Didn't you finish your homework?
c. Did you or did you not finish your homework?
in terms of the answer the speaker would regard as relevant in each case.
Considerations of relevance, in particular considerations of processing effort,
suggest that the speaker has chosen to express the proposition she would regard
as relevant if true. So, a positive question such as (51a), which expresses a
positive proposition, indicates that a positive answer would be more relevant than
a negative one; a negative question such as (51 b), which expresses a negative
proposition, indicates that a negative answer would be more relevant than a
positive one; and, an alternative question such as (51 c), which expresses both a
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positive and a negative proposition, indicates that a positive and a negative answer
would be equally relevant. In the same vein, a na-question indicates that a na-
clause would be, as far as the speaker can foresee, a more relevant answer than
a non na-clause.
Finally, I have argued that the fact that certain types of questions may be
asked with na-interrogatives but not with non na-interrogatives as well as the
differences in meaning between na- and non na-interrogatives when used to
perform the same types of questions follow from the semantic contrast between
na- and non na-clauses.
3.6.3. Pavlidou's criteria as aspects of interpretation
I would now like to consider again Pavlidou's criteria for distinguishing between
what she calls the different types of questions performed by na-interrogatives"
which were mentioned in section 3.6.1. On the approach I have developed here,
some of these criteria seem to be actual aspects of the interpretation process and
some seem to have no psychological basis at all.
What Pavlidou calls "the beneficiary of the act"
 and "the speaker's attitude"
are on the relevance theoretic analysis I proposed necessary aspects of the
interpretation process. They correspond to that part of the interpretation process
where the semantics of the na-clause is enriched into "desirable and potential". On
my approach, however, they are not defining characteristics of any type of
questions performed by na-interrogatives but rather stages in the interpretation
process well-justified by pragmatic considerations.
One of the criteria that Pavlidou proposes is "the combinability of the
question with other illocutionary force indicators". Pavlidou has in mind typical
markers of requesting like parakalo ("please") and ligo ("a little") which may
combine with na-interrogatives like (38), expressions that seek agreement or
reassurance like simfoni ("agreed") or endaksi ("all right") which may cooccur with
na-interrogatives like (39), and dubitative adverbials like arage, taha ("perhaps")
or the standardised verbal expression les na ("do you say/think that...") which may
combine with dubitative na-interrogatives. For example:
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(52) a. na rotiso kati parakalo?
na ask-i s-PF something please?
Can I ask something please?
b. na plino ego ta piata? Simfoni?
na wash-i s-PF the dishes? Agreed?
Shall I do the dishes? Agreed?
C. Pu na troi arage?
where na eat-3s-PF perhaps?
Where might he eat/be eating perhaps?
On the relevance view the combinability of such expressions with particular
interpretations of na-interrogatives can be given a psychologically plausible
explanation. Typical markers of requesting simply make the "indirect request"
interpretation more accessible to the hearer; expressions that seek agreement
make the "indirect offer" interpretation more accessible; dubitative adverbial and
other expressions make the "dubitative" interpretation more accessible. It follows
from the principle of relevance that a speaker will try to make the intended
interpretation of her utterance as accessible as possible. One way of achieving this
is by giving the hearer clues as to the context he is supposed to Construct and use
for the interpretation of the utterance. So, by using a request marker or an
agreement expression or an expression of doubt the speaker ensures the recovery
of the intended interpretation by making the right contextual assumptions
accessible.
Pavlidou's fifth criterion has to do with the question's position in the
discourse. Indirect requests and offers are, according to Pavlidou, continuation
moves in a sequence, whereas deliberative and dubitative questions can be
isolated in discourse. On the relevance view assumptions about the question's
position in the discourse may sometimes be part of the context in which an
utterance is processed, i.e. among the assumptions against which the relevance
of the utterance is established. In the analysis I proposed the question's position
in the discourse is not a defining property of the possible interpretations but may
contribute to the interpretation process by virtue of contributing to the context.
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Finally, Pavlidou's "person of reference" and "type of predication do
contribute to the interpretation but only in the trivial sense of being parts of the
linguistically encoded content of an utterance. "The person of reference is as far
as I can see the subject of the clause (so in the case of na-interrogatives like (38)
the subject will be either the speaker or some third person as Pavlidou observes,
in the case of examples like (39) the subject has to be the speaker, etc.) and the
type of predication" depends on the meaning of the verb and also has to do with
the temporal interpretation of the na-clause. When there is no tense marking on
the verb, as in examples (38), (39) and (41), the na-clause will have its usual
futural temporal interpretation. When there is some tense marking, as for example
with asking hesitantly about what happened in the past, the temporal interpretation
will be in accordance.
In conclusion, the criteria that Pavlidou proposes in order to distinguish
between the different types of questions performed by na-interrogatives are on her
analysis simple descriptive features. On the relevance analysis I am proposing they
can be explained in terms of their more or less significant contribution to the
interpretation process.
3.6.4. On "rhetorical" questions
In addition to the types of questions I have already discussed, Pavlidou (1991)
distinguishes five types of rhetorical questions that may be performed with
interrogative na-clauses. With the term rhetorical questions Pavlidou (1991:20)
refers to questions to which the speaker does not expect an answer, but suggests
her/himself implicitly what the answer looks like. In particular, in all the cases she
discusses the insinuated answer involves the negation of the proposition expressed
by the question. The other characteristic property of these na-questions, according
to Pavlidou, is that they have an exclamative feel: the speaker utters them in order
to expresses her negative attitude towards the proposition expressed.
According to Pavlidou, the first type of na-rhetorical question involves yes-
no interrogatives with which the speaker expresses a negative evaluation of the
propositional content P, which s/he considers impossible. The implied answer is -
P, i.e. that the negation of P holds. In general, rhetorical questions of this type are
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rebuttals of the addressee's preceding speech act or behaviour. For example,
suppose Mrs Anna has been Peter's nanny. Peter is now a grown up but has
maintained contact with Mrs Anna. However, lately he has not been to see her as
often as he used to. The following dialogue takes place between Mrs Anna and her
friend Mary:
(53) Mrs.Anna: Me ksehase o Petros
me forgot-3s the Peter
Peter forgot me
Mary: 0 PETROS na se ksehasi, kiria Anna?
The Peter na you forgot-3s-PF, Mrs. Anna?
PETER forget you, Mrs Anna?
Mary is here implicating that Peter could never forget Mrs Anna, that she is
surprised Mrs Anna could think that he did, that she is annoyed with her for
thinking so, etc.
Similar questions can also be asked with non na-clauses as in (54):
(54) Mrs Anna: Me ksehase o Petros
me forgot-3s the Peter
Peter forgot me
Mary: 0 PETROS se ksehase, kiria Anna?
The Peter you forgot-3s, Mrs Anna?
PETER forgot you, Mrs Anna?
In (54) Mary is implicating that Peter has not forgotten Mrs Anna, that she is
surprised Mrs Anna thought so, etc. (54), however, sounds less dramatic", less
emotional than (53).
The first point I want to make here is that Mary's utterance in (53) and (54)
is not an interrogative. It is not uttered with a high rising intonation as is the case
with all the yes-no interrogative na-clauses we have considered so far; the subject
u PeterN
 receives focal stress and the intonation is generally falling with a slight rise
at the end. I will use the # to mark this intonation pattern. Moreover, Mary's
utterance cannot be followed up by the expression i oh! Nor not; nor can you have
polarity items in such an utterance:
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(55) a. *0 PETROS na se ksehasi/se ksehase I ohi#
The Peter na you forget-3s-PF/you forgot-3s or not#
*PETER forget you/forgot you or not#
b. *0 PETROS na ksehasVksehase kanena#
The Peter na forget-3s-PF/forgot-3s anyone#
*PETER forget/forgot anyone#
I want to suggest that Mary's utterance in (53) and (54) is echoic: it is interpretively
used to represent Mrs Anna's utterance in (54) or a thought behind it in (53) and
to express an attitude towards its content.'° In (54) Mary attributes to Mrs Anna
the proposition that Peter forgot her. In (53), on the other hand, Mary attributes to
Mrs Anna the thought that it is possible for Peter to forget her. This proposition is
a logical implication of Mrs Anna's utterance in (53): if Peter did forget her then it
follows that it is possible for Peter to forget her. On the basis of linguistic clues, like
the particular intonation pattern, the focus on "Peter, and contextual assumptions
such as that Peter is very fond of Mrs Anna, that he is in general very loyal to his
friends etc., the hearer is intended to infer that Mary's attitude towards the
proposition Peter forgot Mrs Anna" in (54) and "It is possible for Peter to forget
Mrs Anna" in (53) is that of questioning their truth. In other words, Mary regards
these propositions as interpretively representing relevant thoughts. Which
thoughts? Peter forgot Mrs Anna" in (54) and "It is possible for Peter to forget Mrs
Anna" in (53). From whose point of view does the speaker regard these
propositions as relevant? In this context these propositions are considered as
relevant to the speaker herself. It would be relevant to the speaker to entertain the
thought that Peter forgot Mrs Anna because she doesn't believe he did; and it
would be relevant to the speaker to entertain the thought that it is possible for
Peter to forget Mrs Anna because she doesn't believe it is possible. This is why
Mary sounds surprised and is understood to be expressing her feelings rather than
asking a question. In this way she implicates that it is not possible for Peter to
forget Mrs Anna in (53), and that Peter did not forget Mrs Anna in (54). Moreover
she is implicating that she did not expect Mrs Anna to think in this way, that she
'°Echo-questions are in general echoic in this sense. See Blakemore
(forthcoming).
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is disappointed with the fact that Mrs Anna has so little faith in Peter, that she is
annoyed with her, etc.1'
It is now easy to see why (53) sounds NstrongerN, more udramaticN than
(54). As a result of the semantic contrast between na- and non na-clauses, the set
of implicatures communicated by (53) is not identical to that communicated by (54).
In (54) Mary uttering a non na-clause is implicating that Peter did not forget Mrs
Anna, whereas in (53) uttering a na-clause Mary is implicating that it is not (even)
possible for Peter to forget Mrs Anna. This entails that Peter did not actually forget
Mrs Anna. So, (53) communicates everything that (54) communicates plus the
assumption that it is not even possible for Peter to forget Mrs Anna.
The second type of na-rhetorical questions, according to Pavlidou, involves
Nwhy..interrogatives with which the speaker expresses a negative evaluation of P;
it is taken for granted that -P is possible. The insinuated answer is that -P should
hold. Again the rhetorical question counts as rebuttal or disapproval of what the
addressee reported. Suppose, for example, that Kostas has recently repeatedly
burst into tears for some reason that most of his friends including Jane find
ridiculous. Peter knows that Jane believes that Kostas has no reason for crying.
Later Peter informs Jane that Kostas is crying again and Jane exclaims:
(56)	 Jane: Jati na klei?
Why na cry-3s-IPF
Why cry?
(56) does not expect an answer. The speaker is implicating that Kostas should not
be crying, that she is surprised that he is crying, that she disapproves of this
behaviour, that she is annoyed with Kostas, etc.
How does this interpretation come about? The speaker uttering the
interrogative in (56) indicates that she considers some completion of the logical
form it encodes as relevant from someone's point of view. Given the contextual
assumption that Jane thinks there is no reason for Kostas's distress, the hearer is
expected to infer that a proposition providing a reason for Kostas's behaviour
"These examples differ from ironical utterances in that the speaker's primary
attitude in (53) and (54) is not that of rejecting the proposition expressed by her
utterance but rather that of questioning.
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would be relevant from the speaker's point of view. We could informally paraphrase
(56) in the following way: it would be relevant to me (the speaker) to entertain
some completion of the following representation: the state of affairs in which
Kostas is crying because... is possibleN. So, the speaker is inviting the hearer to
think of the ways in which such a representation would be relevant to her. It would
be relevant to the speaker to entertain such a proposition because she thinks there
is no possible world in which Kostas has reason to cry. Given standard contextual
assumptions that one should not be distressed if there is no reason, the speaker
is implicating that Kostas should not be crying as well as that she had not
expected him to do so, that she is irritated with him, etc. In this way we can offer
a psychologically plausible explanation of the emotive-exclamative character of
questions like (56): the speaker is not asking such a question in order to seek or
offer information but in order to express her feelings.
Similar effects could be achieved with a non na-question in the same
context:
(57) Jane: Jati klei?
Why cry-3s
Why is he crying?
(57), however, does not sound as emphatic as (56). This is due to the semantic
contrast between na- and non na-clauses. Uttering (57) in this context the speaker
is implicating that there is no reason in this world for Kostas to cry. Uttering (56),
on the other hand, the speaker implicates that there is no possible world in which
there is a reason for Kostas to cry. This entails that there is no reason for Kostas's
crying in this world. So uttering (56), the speaker makes the strong'statement that
it is not even possible that Kostas has a reason for crying and succeeds in giving
rise to all the implicatures (57) yields in the same context and more.
Pavlidou's third kind of na-rhetorical question also concerns why-
interrogatives with which the speaker expresses a negative evaluation of P: in this
case N-P is held not to be possible or achievable any longer. The implied answer
is that the speaker would rather have that -P. The function of the question is to
express a countertactual wish of the speaker (Pavlidou 1991: 21). For example,
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suppose the speaker has just found out that her son has died in a car accident. In
her grief she exclaims:
(58) A: Jati na pethani o gios mou?
Why na die-3s-PF the son mine
Why should my son die? (=why should it be the case that my son is dead?)
In (58) the speaker is understood as communicating the counterfactual wish that
her son were not dead. Moreover, she expresses her grief, her anger, etc. towards
the fact that her son has died.
This interpretation is arrived at in much the same way as with the previous
example. Uttering the interrogative in (58) the speaker indicates that she would find
the answer to her question as relevant from someone's point of view. In this
context the speaker could not be regarding the answer to her question as relevant
to the hearer: she is not offering the hearer some information nor is she reminding
the hearer of a piece of information he has apparently forgotten. Rather it would
be relevant from her own point of view if she were given an explanation for why
her son died, precisely because she strongly believes that there is no possible
world in which there is some explanation, some reason for his death (at least not
one that she would find satisfactory). She is thereby implicating that the world in
which her son died for some reason is not a possible one. Given standard
contextual assumptions, such as that she loved her child and wanted him to live
a long and happy life, the hearer will infer that the speaker's wish is that her son
had not died, a countert actual wish since her son is now dead. In this respect (58)
differs from (56). The implicated wish in (56) - that Kostas stops crying - may come
true as far as both speaker and hearer are concerned. The implicated wish in (58),
on the other hand, can never become true. In other words, the contexts in which
these two pairs of utterances are interpreted differ with respect to assumptions
about the possibility/impossibility of the described state of affairs. In this way we
can explain Pavlidou's observation that the second and the third type only differ
with respect to whether the communicated wish is counterfactual or not. Moreover,
in this context by uttering (58) the speaker is communicating that she is sad,
desperate, angry. Again, the speaker is exclaiming rather than asking.
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Similar effects may be achieved by uttering the corresponding non na-
question in this context:
(59) A: Jati pethane o gios mou?
Why died-3s the son mine
Why did my son die?
However, as expected, (58) sounds more emphatic, more emotional than (59). This
is because uttering (59) the speaker is implicating that there is no satisfactory
explanation for her son's death in this world, whereas in (58) the speaker is making
the stronger statement that there is no possible world in which such an explanation
can be given. This entails that her son died for no good reason in this world, and
so succeeds in communicating what (59) communicates in this context and more.
The next type of na-rhetorical questions that Pavlidou (1991:21) discusses
involves wh-interrogatives with which the speaker indicates that it is impossible
to make a true proposition out of the function expressed with the question s . For
example, suppose it is Christmas eve and all the shops are closed when Peter,
who is madly in love with Jane, proposes that we go out and buy some flowers for
her. I exclaim:
(60) Pou na vroume louloudia tetia mera?
where na find-i pl-IPF flowers such day
Where to find (=could we ever find) flowers on such a day?
(adapted from Pavlidou 1987:1022)
The speaker is communicating that we could never find flowers on hristmas eve,
that Peter is a fool, that she is surprised or irritated with this idea, etc.
Uttering the interrogative in (60) the speaker indicates that it would be
relevant from someone's point of view to entertain some completion of the
proposition it is possible that we find flowers at ______ . From whose point of
view is this relevant? Well, in this context it would be relevant to the speaker to be
told that they could find flowers somewhere since she believes that it will not be
possible for them to find flowers anywhere on that day. The speaker in (60) sounds
surprised precisely because she doesn't believe they could find flowers anywhere
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on Christmas eve. If the hearer trusts the speaker, he will infer further that it will
not be possible for them to find flowers anywhere. Given additional assumptions,
such as that Peter is full of such mad ideas and the speaker's patience is at its
limit, the hearer may infer that the speaker is irritated, fed up with him, etc.
As with the previous examples we considered, similar effects could be
achieved with a non na-question (in the future), which, however, would sound less
emphatic because of the semantic contrast between na- and non na-clauses.
Finally, the last type of na-rhetorical questions is, according to Pavlidou
(1991: 22), about wh-interrogatives (except for why-interrogatives) with which the
speaker echoes a previous question indicating that she is not very happy with a
certain state of aftairs. Such questions are common in phatic sequences. For
example, suppose you know I don't have a job, which is causing me great financial
problems. You meet me in the street and say:
(61)	 A: jasou, 05 ise?
Hello, how be-2nd
Hello, how are you?
B: Pos na ime?
How na be-ist?
How should I be?
As Pavlidou points out, the speaker is here implicating that she cannot report any
positive changes. The interpretation process here is similar to the examples we
have considered so far. On the basis of the context the hearer is expected to infer
that the proposition It is possible/potential that I [the speaker] am wellN would be
relevant to the speaker because she does not believe that it is possible/potential
for her to feel any better. This explains the bitterness of B's utterance, the
overtones of sadness, desperation, anger, etc.12
The first thing to note about the relevance theoretic analysis proposed here
is that the interpretation of what Pavlidou considers different types of na-rhetorical
questions involves similar processes. In other words, in terms of utterance
12As Pavlidou notes, this expression has been standardised. So, even when
there is no context like the one I described, B's question on its own suffices to
make the hearer infer that something is wrong with the speaker.
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interpretation we do not need to distinguish the five categories of na-rhetorical
questions that Pavlidou proposes. Moreover, these categories do not contribute to
the interpretation process: the hearer does not need to be aware of the five
categories of na-rhetorical questions nor does he need to match a na-interrogative
he is processing to one of these categories in order to interpret it. As I showed, the
interpretation of these interrogatives is driven by considerations of context and
optimal relevance.
Finishing up, I want to comment briefly on two more issues. The first one
has to do with the "exclamative nature of these questions; the second one with
their classification as "rhetorical" questions.
The na- and non na-questions we considered in this section are intuitively
felt to be very close in meaning to exclamatives. The speaker is felt to be
exclaiming rather than asking about something. This exclamative nature is noted
in traditional grammars (Tzartzanos 1945/1989: 310) and Pavlidou (1991: 21) also
points out that "all these interrogatives can be uttered in a more or less
exclamatory tone of voice". On the relevance analysis I am proposing, the affinity
between such utterances and exciamatives can be explained. As I said in section
3.3, exclamatives like (62),
(62)	 How tall Jane is!
have been semantically analysed within relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson
1986, 1988a, Clark 1991) as interpretive representations of relevant thoughts, like
interrogatives. Two features, however, which are optional in the case of
interrogatives, are encoded by exciamatives: the thought represented by an
exclamative is already available to the speaker and it is regarded as relevant to the
speaker herself. So, in (62) the speaker already knows that Jane is very tall and
indicates that she herself finds this relevant (the speaker is for example surprised
at Jane's height, had not expected her to be so tall, etc.). In the case of the na-
and non na-interrogatives I considered in this section, the semantic indeterminacy
relating to from whose point of view the interpreted thought is relevant, is
contextually resolved in favour of the speaker, that is in the way characteristic of
exclamatives. On the other hand, the thought represented by such questions is not
available to the speaker as in exciamatives; it is rather the negation of that
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proposition which is available to the speaker (it is manifest in the context that the
speaker believes that there is no true completion of the proposition expressed).
This explains how such questions are similar and how they differ from
exclamatives like (62) and why they are felt to be somewhere between questions
and exclamations.
Pavlidou classifies the na-questions we considered here as rhetoricar
because the speaker does not expect an answer. Moreover, as we have seen, the
suggested answer involves the negation of the proposition expressed. Notice first
that on the account I am proposing these two properties are not defining features
of any class of questions. On the relevance account, a psychologically plausible
explanation is given of how the negative implicatures come about (as a result of
the hearer's search for optimal relevance in the given context), and for why no
answer is expected (the speaker strongly believes that there is no true completion
of the logical form expressed by her utterance).
Moreover, notice here that there are several types of questions which do
not expect an answer, and we would not want to call all of them rhetorical". As I
pointed out in section 3.3, questions like those in (63), usually called rhetorical
questions,
(63) a. What was your New Year's resolution?
Context: Mary to John who has just lit his first cigarette of the year despite
his promise to stop smoking.
(Wilson and Sperber 1988a:92)
b. What do you say when you get a present?
Context: His mother to little Johnny who has just received present.
c. Remember Peter Smith? He was always very bad with money. After all,
who had to ask the bank for a loan at the end of every year?
(suggested by D.Wilson)
do not expect an answer: the answer is already known by both speaker and
hearer. Why then are they being uttered? Wilson and Sperber (1 988a) argue that,
like all interrogatives, such questions interpretively represent relevant propositions.
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In such cases the speaker regards the answer to her question as relevant from the
hearer's point of view. In particular such questions act as reminders: they remind
the hearer of a proposition which he appears to have forgotten. For example, (63a)
achieves optimal relevance partly by reminding the hearer that his New Year's
resolution was to stop smoking, (63b) by reminding little Johnny that you say
thank you when you get a present, and (63c) by reminding the hearer that Peter
Smith had to ask the bank for a loan at the end of every year. Some questions
which do not expect an answer function as reminders, others achieve relevance
by expressing the speaker's emotions, like the ones we discussed in this chapter,
others expect no answer because noone can give an answer, like for example the
self-addressed question in (64), etc:
(64) Now, where did I put my pen?13
13The question arises at this point whether there are na-exclamatives in MG,
i.e. clauses with exciamative structure where the verb is preceded by na. The
answer is, I think, no. In MG there is a distinct exclamative structure illustrated in
(i):
(i) Ti grigora pou tha perasoun i meres stin eksohi!
what fast that will pass the days in country
How quickly the days in the country will pass!
A na-verb form cannot be used here:
(ii) *Ti gngora pou na perasoun i meres stin eksohi!
what fast that na pass-3p1-PF the days in country
How quickly the days in the country will pass!
In addition, utterances like (iii) may be understood either as interrogative or as
exclamative depending on the intonation:
(iii) Poso poli tis aresoun i karameles
How much her Iike-3p1 the candies
How much she likes candies!/ How much does she like candies?
When (iii) is uttered with a high fall it is likely to be understood as an exclamative,
when it is uttered with a high rise it is likely to be understood as a question. (iv),
however, is ungrammatical when uttered with a high fall; it may only be uttered
with a high rise and it is understood as a question:
(iv) Poso poli na tis aresoun i karameles?
How much na her Iike-3p1 the candies?
How much might she like candies?
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It follows that questions which do not expect answers do not form a natural class
in terms of the way in which they are interpreted.
3.7. Summary
In this chapter I have introduced the relevance-theoretic distinction between two
ways of using a representation: descriptively and interpretively. Na-clauses were
argued in earlier chapters to encode information about a particular kind of
descriptive attitude, namely the information that the proposition expressed is
entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world. I have shown
that the relevance-theoretic assumption that any utterance may be used
interpretively is useful in accounting for certain uses of na-clauses where a na-
clause seems to represent another representation rather than describe a state of
affairs in a possible world. In addition, I discussed na-clauses used to express
emotions like surprise and disapproval and na-clauses used in narrative contexts,
and showed that in terms of the way they are interpreted such na-clauses are quite
similar. Their interpretation involves the embedding of the higher level explicature
It is possible... TM
 under a higher propositional attitude verb TMthe speaker is
surprised/disapproves.... In the remainder of the chapter I discussed interrogative
na-clauses. I argued that the interpretation of na-interrogatives is parasitic on the
interpretation of na-declaratives, i.e. that a na-interrogative indicates that the
speaker would regard a na-answer as relevant. The differences in meaning
between na- and non na-interrogatives, as well as the fact that certain types of
questions may be performed only by na-clauses and others only by non na-clauses
are accounted for on the basis of the semantic contrast between na- and non na-
clauses as defined in earlier chapters. Finally, I have shown that descriptive
categories like dubitative, deliberative, urhetoricalN etc. do not contribute to the
interpretation process but are simply names for possible interpretations of
interrogatives. In the same vein, I showed in chapter 2 that speech act labels such
as advising, permitting, Nrequesting, etc. play no role in the way hearers
understand the utterances they process. The interpretation of interrogative na-
clauses is a function of what they linguistically encode, on the one hand, and of
considerations of optimal relevance, on the other.
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CHAPTER 4
On Definite and Indefinite Descriptions
4.1. Introduction
I argued in the previous chapters that mood indicators, like na in Modern Greek,
encode procedural information concerning the speaker's attitude towards the
proposition expressed. Moreover, I argued that such information contributes to the
explicitly communicated content of the utterance by instructing the hearer to
construct a particular type of higher level explicature. In the next chapter I will
discuss the interpretation of na- and non na-relative clauses which depend on
definite or indefinite descriptions. It has been shown in the literature that definite
and indefinite descriptions may be interpreted attributively or referentially. In
Modern Greek indefinite descriptions followed by na-relatives may be interpreted
attributively only, whereas definite and indefinite descriptions followed by non na-
relatives may be interpreted either referentially or attributively. I will show in the
next chapter that this is due to the semantic contrast between na- and non na-
clauses as defined in chapter 1. By way of preparation for the discussion in the
next chapter, I will now take a closer look at the various ways in which definite and
indefinite descriptions may be interpreted. I will argue that the referential use of
definite descriptions (and perhaps indefinite descriptions as well) is best accounted
for as contributing to the explicitly communicated content of an utterance. In
contrast to mood indicators, however, the referential use of definite and (perhaps)
indefinite descriptions contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance, i.e.
to the basic explicature of the utterance (and not to the higher level explicatures).
The process of pragmatic enrichment, as constrained by considerations of optimal
relevance, which was crucial for the interpretation of na-clauses will be shown to
be also crucially involved in the derivation of the referential interpretation of definite
descriptions (and perhaps indefinite ones as well).
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4.2. The referential-attributive distinction
It is widely acknowledged in the literature (Donnellan 1966/1977, Knpke 1977,
Gnce 1969, Searle 1979a, Récanati 1989a, 1993, Neale 1990, Rouchota 1992a)
that definite descriptions may be interpreted in two distinct ways: attributively and
referentially. Donnellan (1966/1977:46) introduces the referentiaVattributive
distinction in his paper NReference and Definite Descriptions as follows:
•A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion
states something about whoever or whatever is the so and so. A speaker
who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other
hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what
he is talking about and states something about that person or thingTM.
Donnellan illustrates this distinction with the well known example in (1):
(1)	 The murderer of Smith is insane
Suppose the speaker comes upon Smith foully murdered by someone unknown to
her. Because of the brutality of the crime she might exclaim The murderer of
Smith is insane". What the speaker means to say on this occasion is that whoever
murdered Smith is (must be) insane. In this case the definite description "the
murderer of Smith" is used attributively'. Suppose now that Perkins is on trial for
Smith's murder. Observing his behaviour the speaker might utter (1) meaning to
state that Perkins is insane. In this case the speaker has a particular individual in
mind to whom she wishes to refer. The definite description "the murderer of Smith"
is used referentially.
The referentiaVattnbutive distinction carries over to indefinite descriptions
as well (Chastain 1975, Hall-Partee 1972, Wilson 1978, Donnellan 1978, Fodor
and Sag 1982, King 1988, Ludlow and Neale 1991, Rouchota 1992b). For
example, suppose that all the computers in our building behave strangely, so you
1According to Donnellan (1966/1977) the phrase "whoever/whatever he/shelit
is" can characteristically accompany definite descriptions when they are
attributively used. Donnellan restricts himself to the discussion of utterances of the
form The F is G.
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call the computer centre to ask for help. When you hang up you say to your
colleague:
(2) A computer expert will come to have a look
In this context the indefinite description Na computer expert" is used attributively.
The hearer is expected to understand that some computer expert or other will
come to take a look at the computers.
Suppose now that you are going out tonight with Peter who has been
courting you for a long time. You have agreed that he will meet you at the little
coffee shop opposite your house. I know this arrangement and looking out of your
window I tell you:
(3) An admirer of yours is waiting for you at the coffee shop
In this context the hearer is intended to realise that it is Peter who is waiting for
her. The speaker is using the indefinite description an admirer of yours"
referentially, i.e. to pick out a particular individual.
Given that definite and indefinite descriptions may be interpreted in these
two ways, the question arises whether or not they are semantically ambiguous. In
the first part of this chapter I will argue against the semantic ambiguity position and
in favour of a pragmatic account of the various ways in which definite and indefinite
descriptions may be interpreted. In the second part I will show how a
psychologically plausible explanation for these interpretations can be given within
relevance theory.
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4.3. On the semantics of definite and Indefinite descriptions
It is not clear whether Donnellan considers the referentiaVattributive distinction to
be semantic or pragmatic in nature. On the one hand, he argues that this
distinction has significant consequences for the truth conditions of a sentence. For
example, if Smith was not murdered after all, then (1) on the attributive reading
would have to be false, whereas on the referential reading it could be either true
or false depending on whether Perkins is insane or not. Such observations suggest
that the referential/attributive distinction is semantic. On the other hand, Donnellan
consistently talks of the two uses of definite descriptions and claims that it is
unlikely that definite descriptions are syntactically or semantically ambiguous.
Moreover, he says (1966/1977:59), in parentheses admittedly,
perhaps we could say that the sentence is pragmatically ambiguous: the
distinction between roles that the description plays is a function of the
speaker's intentionsN.
I will argue that definite and indefinite descriptions are not semantically
ambiguous. Before I discuss the various arguments that have been brought
forward to support the semantic ambiguity thesis, I want to explain why an analysis
which assigns a univocal (though distinct) semantics to definite and indefinite
descriptions and accounts for any interpretation which departs from this semantics
in pragmatic terms is preferable to a semantic ambiguity based analysis.
4.3.1. General considerations
If definite and indefinite descriptions are ambiguous, then the referential-attributive
distinction amounts to there being two distinct senses rather than uses of definite
and indefinite descnptions. Kripke (1977) puts forward some basic objections to
this claim. Kripke's discussion focuses on definite descriptions but most of his
arguments apply to indefinite descriptions as well.
To choose between an analysis of definite descriptions in terms of a
semantic ambiguity or in terms of a pragmatic indeterminacy, Knpke proposes the
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following test. Let's make the hypothesis that there is a language which is similar
to English except that the truth conditions of sentences with definite descriptions
are stipulated to coincide with Russell's: for example, the present king of France
is bald" is to be true if and only if exactly one person is king of France and that
person is bald. This Russell language (Knpke distinguishes three versions: the
strong, the intermediate and the weak Russell language) is to be contrasted with
what Kripke calls the D-language. In D-languages the referential-attributive
distinction is semantic in nature and affects truth conditions. An unambiguous
version of the D-language would be a language in which there are two different
words for the definite article, say "the" and "ze", encoding respectively the
attributive and the referential definite descriptions. The ambiguous version of the
D-language has only one word "the" which may be interpreted according to the
semantics of "the" or of "ze" . The question now is, is English a Russell language
or a D-language? Kripke shows that the referential-attributive distinction will arise
in any of the Russell languages and could be accounted for pragmatically on the
basis of the distinction between speaker's reference and semantic reference. Since
Donnellan's distinction arises in the Russell languages, the fact that it arises in
English provides no argument against the hypothesis that definite descriptions are
semantically univocal in English. Moreover, Kripke continues (1977:18),
"If Donnellan had possessed a clear intuition that "Her husband is kind to
her", uttered in reference to the kind lover of a woman married to a cruel
husband, expressed literal truth, then he would have adduced a
phenomenon that conforms to the ambiguous D-language but is
incompatible with any Russell language. But Donnellan makes no such
assertion: he cautiously, and correctly, confines himself to the weaker claim
that the speaker spoke truly of the man to whom he referred. This weaker
claim, we have seen, would hold for a speaker of a Russell language.N
The conclusion that Kripke draws is that there is no evidence that English is the
ambiguous D-language rather than a Russell language.
Moreover, according to Kripke, we could consult our intuitions,
independently of any empirical evidence: would we be surprised if we found a
language with two different words for the alleged two senses of definite
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descriptions or a language with two different words for the two senses of indefinite
descriptions? The answer seems to me to be positive, which suggests that our
expectations favour a unitary semantic account of definite and indefinite
descnptions. Then, Knpke says, we could investigate whether there are in fact
languages which have two distinct words to express the two allegedly distinct
senses. If no such language is found, then this is evidence in favour of a univocal
semantic analysis of definite descriptions. As far as I know, such an investigation
has not been undertaken.
Considerations hinging on building a semantic theory as economically as
possible, usually expressed in terms of Modified Occam's Razor do not multiply
senses beyond necessity, also favour a univocal semantic account for definite and
indefinite descriptions. If the various interpretations can be explained on the basis
of general communicative principles of the sort proposed by Grice (1975/1989), the
need for which is independently motivated, then they should be accounted for in
this way.
In addition to such methodological considerations, there are two other
arguments which, in my view, strongly favour a pragmatic account of the two uses
of definite and indefinite descriptions over a semantic one. Definite and indefinite
descriptions are not the only linguistic devices which admit of a referential
interpretation. Common quantifiers also allow referential interpretations. For
example, suppose it is common knowledge that Smith is the only person taking
Jones' seminar. One evening Jones throws a party and Smith is the only person
who turns up. When asked next morning whether his party was a success, Jones
utters (4):
(4)	 Well, everyone taking my seminar turned up
intending to communicate that only Smith turned up. 2 In this context (4), which
contains a universal quantifier, is used to communicate a singular proposition.
Since not only definite and indefinite descriptions but quantifiers as well are
susceptible to referential uses, it is more likely that whether these expressions are
used referentially or non-referentially is a pragmatically determined aspect of the
2Example (4) is taken from Neale (1990: 87). The point about quantifiers
admitting of a referential interpretation is attributed by Neale to Sainsbury (1979).
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interpretation of the utterance. Otherwise, one would have to pursue the claim that
not only definite and indefinite descriptions, but quantifiers in general are
semantically ambiguous.3
Second, the attributive and the referential interpretations are not the only
readings that indefinite and definite descriptions may have. Suppose, for example,
that Peter wants to know what I did on Sunday and I say:
(5) A friend of mine from Cambridge paid me a visit
In this case the speaker communicates that she is speaking about a particular
individual; she does not, however, intend Peter to realise who this individual is. The
speaker may want to conceal from Peter the identity of this friend or she may want
to avoid bothering Peter with details that she considers irrelevant. This use of the
indefinite description is neither attributive nor referential (since the speaker does
not intend the hearer to pick out the particular individual she is talking about).
Following Ludlow and Neale (1991), I will call this use specific.
Definite descriptions may also be interpreted specifically. Suppose, for
example, you ask me why contrary to my habits I took the tube to come to your
place and I answer with (6):
(6) My neighbour told me that the buses are on strike
The hearer will interpret the definite description umy neighbourTM specifically: there
is a particular neighbour that the speaker is talking about (even if the hearer is
incapable of identifying this person).
In addition to the attributive, the referential and the specific use, indefinite
and definite descriptions exhibit at least two more distinct uses, the predicative use
as in (7) and (8), and the generic use as in (9) and (10):
(7) John is a teacher
(8) Peter is the teacher of my son
(9) A pig likes to roll in the mud
3As far as I know, no one has tried to argue that quantifiers are semantically
ambiguous between attributive and referential uses.
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(10) The whale is in danger of becoming extinct
Récanati (1993:293) mentions one more use of definite descriptions, the functional
use, which was first pointed out by Barwise and Perry (1983:158-9). For example,
consider:
(11) The President changes every four years
Uttering (11) the speaker need not be, and possibly isn't, talking about a particular
individual; nor is she talking about whoever is President. Rather, she is saying that
the value of the function President changes every year.
All this suggests that if definite and indefinite descriptions are semantically
ambiguous, then they are not two ways ambiguous but multiply ambiguous: definite
descriptions would be six ways ambiguous and indefinite descriptions would be five
ways ambiguous. Such a proliferation of the senses of definite and indefinite
descriptions makes the semantic ambiguity thesis even less attractive.4
Considerations of the type mentioned in this section suggest strongly that
a univocal semantics and a pragmatic account of the various uses of definite and
indefinite descriptions is preferable to the stipulation of a semantic ambiguity. In
the following sections I will consider the arguments usually invoked in favour of the
semantic ambiguity thesis and I will show that under closer scrutiny none of them
offers good evidence for this thesis.
4.3.2. Truth conditions
The referential-attributive distinction has significant consequences for the truth-
conditions of a sentence of the form Nthe F is G. Following Donnellan (1966/1977),
(1) on the attributive reading is true if and only if there is a unique x such that x is
Smith's murderer and x is insane. With regard to the referential reading, however,
Donnellan feels that the speaker may have stated something true or false of the
person to whom he referred, i.e. of Perkins, that man in the dock. This has been
l will have nothing more to say about the predicative, the generic or the
functional use in this thesis.
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taken to suggest that on this reading the truth-conditions of sentences of the form
The F is G1 are given by the singular proposition a is G, where a is an individual
or object rather than a quantified expression (Peacocke 1975, Homsby 1977,
Kaplan 1978). It follows that definite descriptions are semantically ambiguous.
Influenced by Donnellan's ideas, many philosophers and linguists, for
example Chastain (1975), Wilson (1978), Fodor and Sag (1982) and Stich (1986),
claim that indefinite descriptions must be semantically ambiguous as well, because
they make different contributions to the truth-conditions of the utterances that
contain them, depending on whether they are used attributively or referentially. On
this view, (2) where the indefinite description is interpreted attributively, is true if
and only if the set of computer experts who will come to take a look at our
computers is non-empty. (3), on the other hand, where the indefinite description
is used referentially, is true if and only if the particular man to whom the speaker
intended to refer, i.e. Peter, is waiting for the hearer at the coffee shop.
There are two points to be made here. First, the intuitions about the truth
conditions of (1) on the referential interpretation and (3) are not clear. Many people
(Hall-Partee 1972, Fodor and Sag 1982, Barwise and Perry 1983, Récanati 1 989a,
1993, see also references in the first paragraph of this section) think that (1) on the
referential reading is true if and only if Perkins is insane. However, Grice (1969)
and more recently Neale (1990) think that the truth conditions of (1), whether it is
interpreted referentially or attributively, are the same and given by the general
proposition there is a unique x such that x is Smith's murderer and x is insaneN.
Gnce suggests and Neale explores in more detail a pragmatic account for the
referential use of definite descriptions. I will discuss this account in section 4.5.5.
As for (3), where the indefinite description is used referentially, intuitions about the
truth conditions are even fuzzier. In contrast to the proponents of the semantic
ambiguity thesis mentioned earher, other writers (Ludlow and Neale 1991, Récanati
1 989a, Rouchota 1 992b) claim that (3) is true simply if there is at least one admirer
of the hearer such that he is waiting for her at the coffee shop (and the reference
to a particular individual is captured at the level of implicature).
Second, even if some representation of the intended referent contributes
to the truth-conditions of (1) and (3) on the referential reading, it does not follow
necessarily that definite and indefinite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. As
I explained in chapter 1, it has been convincingly argued within relevance theory
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that the standard claim that different truth conditions mean different semantic
representations is wrong (Sperber and Wilson (1986), Carston (1988), Wilson and
Sperber (1993)). Given the distinction between linguistic semantics and semantics
of mental/conceptual representations, argued for in chapter 1, definite and
indefinite descriptions may have a univocal (though distinct) linguistic semantics,
and thus be semantically unambiguous, but allow different propositions to be
expressed as a result of different ways of enriching this linguistic semantics in
particular contexts of use. This is the view argued for in Rouchota (1992a) and
discussed here in section 4555
4.3.3. Anaphora
The second type of argument in support of an analysis of definite and indefinite
descriptions as semantically ambiguous stems from considerations concerning
anaphora. This argument was originally expressed in connection with indefinite
descriptions in Strawson (1950, 1952) and is also found in Chastain (1975) and
Donnellan (1978).
Consider the following example, adapted from Chastain (1975:210):
(12) There is a mosquito in here. You can hear it buzzing. See, it just landed on
my left arm. Now its biting me. [the speaker swats the mosquito]. Not much
left of it now, is there!
The argument goes like this: the pronoun 1t is anaphoric on the indefinite
description a mosquito. An anaphoric pronoun can be either a bound variable or
a genuine referring expression. Here it is not a bound variable, It is rather a
referring expression inheriting its reference from the noun phrase in the antecedent
5Pragmatic processes operating at the level of what is said are also argued by
Récanati (1 989a, 1993) to account for the referential interpretation, though with a
rather different outcome from that which I shall argue for.
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utterance. Now, if 1t inherits its reference from a mosquito, then the indefinite
description must itself be a referring expression.6
Consider now an example with a definite description used referentially:
(13) The girl in the pink suit is one of my students. She is clever.
The definite description the girl in the pink suit could be argued to be a referring
expression because the pronoun •she takes its reference from this definite
descnption.
The problems relating to anaphora considerations have been very influential
in the study of the semantics of definite and indefinite descriptions. They have led
to the development of new semantic theories like Discourse Representation Theory
and File Change Semantics and to the rejection of the Russellian semantics. The
important point for our discussion is that, whatever semantic theory you choose,
anaphora considerations do not provide good evidence for the semantic ambiguity
position. As Neale (1990) argues in detail, pronouns may be anaphoric on definite
and indefinite descriptions which are clearly not referential. For example, suppose
that the speaker is standing at a badly lit corner of a Street when she notices a
syringe and utters (14):
(14) A drug addict spent the night here. He left a syringe behind
Consider also (15) with a definite description from Neale (1 990:175):
(15) The inventor of the wheel was a genius. I suspect s/he ate fish on a daily
basis.
Moreover, as Neale (1990:177) argues, such anaphora considerations are
weak because they apply to other quantifiers when they are patently not being
used referentially as well:
(16) Few students passed the exam but they got a first
6The best reconstruction of the argument from anaphora is to be found in Neale
(1990:175-176), from which I have drawn heavily in this paragraph.
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On the basis of the anaphora argument not only definite and indefinite descnptions
but most quantifiers would come out as ambiguous.
The discussion in this section suggests that anaphora considerations do not
provide convincing evidence for the semantic ambiguity position.7
4.3.4. Scope constraints
The third argument in support of the view that definite and indefinite descriptions
are semantically ambiguous has to do with the behaviour of indefinites with respect
to scope. Fodor and Sag (1982) have argued that, in order to maintain a unitary
Russellian semantics for indefinite descriptions, we would have to attribute
exceptional scope islandN escaping properties to indefinites. This problem is
solved if indefinite descriptions are treated as ambiguous, i.e. if they are assigned
a semantically distinct referential sense as well.
Let me take an example to illustrate Fodor and Sag's view. Consider the
following:
(17) A woman in the physics class thinks that every lecturer is after her
(18) Every woman in the physics class thinks that a lecturer is after her
For Fodor and Sag an embedded clause introduced by an attitude verb is one of
the linguistic constructions which create scope islands. A scope island is a
syntactic constituent which confines the scope of quantifiers to that constituent. So,
as expected, there is no reading of (17) in which Nevery lecturer takes wide scope
over a womanN. But, surprisingly, in (18) the indefinite description a lecturer TM can
take wide scope. So, either indefinites are quantifiers which behave exceptionally
with respect to scope constraints or they are semantically ambiguous. Fodor and
Sag choose the second alternative in order to avoid complicating the principles
governing quantifier scope.
The same ambiguity arises with respect to definite descriptions in
sentences with attitude verbs. For example:
7For more on this issue see Neale (1990: 165-221).
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(19)	 Bill wants to marry the most beautiful girl in town
(19) may be interpreted either with the definite description taking wide scope with
respect to the verb or with the definite description taking narrow scope.
The most important point against this view is made by Kripke (1972, 1977)
and is explained in detail in Neale (1990: 121-124) and in Ludlow and Neale
(1991). It is pointed out that the reading on which the indefinite description takes
wide scope in (18), does not necessarily coincide with a referential interpretation
of the indefinite. It may be that the speaker is talking about a particular individual
and intends his hearer to identify this individual (referential interpretation);
alternatively, it may be that the speaker does not intend the hearer to identify this
lecturer, nor does she intend to talk about a particular lecturer but only about some
lecturer or other (attributive reading). The same holds for (19) on the reading on
which the definite description takes wide scope. This observation severely
undermines the scope argument, as it shows that the referential interpretation of
definite and indefinite descriptions cannot be defined as the reading of the
utterance on which the (in)definite description takes the widest possible scope.8
4.4. A sketch of the semantics of descriptions
I have argued so far that definite and indefinite descriptions are not semantically
ambiguous. In the last part of this chapter I will show how three of the various uses
of definite and indefinite descriptions can be adequately accounted for within a
pragmatic theory. In this section I will discuss the semantics of definite and
indefinite descriptions.
Until a decade or two ago the most popular theory of the semantics of
definite and indefinite descriptions was the one proposed by Russell (1905, 1919).
According to Russell, both definite and indefinite descriptions are existentially
quantified phrases of the form 3x(Fx & Vy(Fy -* y=x)) and 3xFx respectively. On
this view, the only difference between definite and indefinite descriptions is that
definite descriptions signify a unique entity.
8For a more detailed discussion of the related issues see King (1988), Neale
(1990), Ludlowand Neate (1991), Enc (1991), Rouchota (1992b) and Ruys (1992).
197
However, this way of distinguishing between definite and indefinite
descriptions seems at best less than exhaustive. Compare the following examples
adapted from Chastain (1975:205-206):
(20) a. At eleven o'clock that morning, an ARVN officer stood a young prisoner,
bound and blindfolded, up against a wall. He asked the prisoner several
questions. When the prisoner failed to answer, he beat him repeatedly.
After the beating, the prisoner was forced to remain standing against the
wall for several hours
b. At eleven o'clock that morning, an ARVN officer stood a young prisoner,
bound and blindfolded, up against a wall. He asked a young prisoner
several questions. When a young prisoner failed to answer he beat him
repeatedly. After the beating, a young prisoner was forced to remain
standing against the wall for several hours
On the most typical interpretation of (20a) the italicised definite noun phrases are
understood as in some sense referring back to the indefinite description "a young
prisoner" in the first utterance. On the most typical interpretation of (20b), on the
other hand, the italicised indefinite descriptions can not be understood as referring
back to the indefinite description in the first utterance. The speaker is understood
to be speaking about a different young prisoner every time she uses the indefinite
description "a young prisoner". In other words, whereas definite descriptions
introduce already existing or given or, in some sense, familiar representations,
indefinites can be used only to introduce novel representations (which might then
be used as referents for definite descriptions). The Russellian semantics does not
capture the familiarity-novelty contrast which has been taken as the basic condition
determining the choice between a definite and an indefinite description by other
authors in the past like, for example, Christophersen (1939) and Jespersen (1949)
and more recently Heim (1982, 1983).
More importantly, Heim (1982, 1983) and Kamp (1984) have argued
convincingly that the Russellian semantics should be rejected. The relevant cases,
on which Heim and Kamp base their attack on the Russellian semantics are (a)
examples, such as
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(21) a. There's a mosquito in here. You can hear it buzzing
b. A drug addict spent the night here. He left a syringe behind
These were discussed in section 4.3.3. where it was argued that such examples
do not provide evidence for the semantic ambiguity thesis. They do, however,
suggest that indefinite descriptions, whether used attributively or referentially, may
be better seen as some sort of referring expression rather than an existentially
quantified statement. Since the pronouns it and he are referring expressions
picking up their reference from the indefinite descriptions a mosquito and a drug
addict, the latter may be some sort of referring expression as well; and (b) the so-
called donkey-sentences, like for example
(22) a. Every man who bought a donkey vaccinated it
b. If John buys a donkey, he vaccinates it
where the indefinite description a donkey seems to introduce wide-scope universal
quantification. (For a detailed discussion of the issues that (a) and (b) raise see
Heim (1982: 1-119); for a brief presentation see Neale (1990: 222-224), from
where (22a&b) are taken; for a recent defence of the Russellian account with
respect to anaphora problems see Neale (1990:165-265) and Ludlow and Neale
(1991)).
Heim and Kamp propose instead that definites and indefinites should be
analysed as variable-like elements establishing reference markers or discourse
referents. The term discourse referent was first introduced by Karttunen (1 968a,b,
1976) and is intended to be distinct from the term Nreferentu: a noun phrase may
have a discourse referent even when it has no referent. Conside,' (23), which is
taken from Heim (1983: 164):
(23) a. Every cat ate its food
b. John didn't see a cat
In (23a) the personal pronoun its, a type of definite noun phrase, functions as a so-
called bound-variable pronoun and does not refer to any particular cat. Similarly
in (23b), when the negation takes wide scope, which seems to be the preferred
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interpretation, the indefinite a cat fails to refer. Both its and a cat, however, may
be said to establish discourse referents.
In Heim's theory, definite noun phrases, one type of which is definite
descriptions, pick out an already familiar discourse referent, whereas an indefinite
noun phrase, one type of which is indefinite descriptions, introduce a new
discourse referent. For example a proposal in (24) introduces a new discourse
referent, whereas the proposal picks out an old one, in this case the one
introduced by the indefinite description:
(24) Mary put forward a proposal. The proposal was accepted by everyone.
-	 More precisely in Heim's File Change Semantics, discourse referents are thought
of as NfilesN, and the novelty-familiarity contrast is understood on the basis of the
concept of "file (Helm 1983, 1982: 274-326). Roughly, the idea is this. The
listener's task of understanding consists in file-keeping. At any time in the course
of an utterance the file contains the information that has been conveyed by the
utterance up to that point. In other words, a file is a theoretical construct which
mediates between language and the world. A file consists of file cards. For every
indefinite description being processed a new file card must be opened; for every
definite description being processed an old file-card has to be updated. On this
view, the semantic representations of (25a) and (25b) are identical:
(25) a. A cat came in
b. The cat came in
As Heim (1 983:173) puts it,
•They [the articles, VA] are treated as though they weren't there at all when
it comes to semantic interpretation.
The definite and indefinite article differ in so far as they impose different WeIl-
formedness Constraints. The definite article (and definites in general) requires that
an already existing file card is updated, whereas the indefinite article (and
indefinites in general) requires that a new file card is introduced.
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The interpretation of definite and indefinite descriptions often, though not
always, involves an existential presupposition. For example, both (25a) and (25b)
typically presuppose that there is a cat. Both in Kamp's Discourse Representation
Theory and Heim's File Change Semantics the existential presupposition is not part
of the semantic representation of the utterance; rather it is built into the truth
definition itself. So, in Heim's framework, the file corresponding to (25a) is true if
there is at least one satisfying sequence, i.e. if there are actual individuals such
that they fit the description in the sentence (: if there is a cat and it came in).
Similarly, in Kamp's theory (25a) is true if there is a mapping from the model of the
discourse representation, which is Kamp's version of the theoretical construct
mediating between language and the world, onto an identical array of objects and
predicate ascriptions within the model of the real world against which truth
evaluation takes place (in Kamp's terminology, if the model of the representation
is Nembeddableu in the model of the world).
As I said earlier, definite descriptions carry, according to the Russellian
account, a presupposition/entailment of uniqueness, which distinguishes them from
indefinite descriptions, It has often been pointed out that this claim is too strong
and several attempts have been made to save the Russellian account by using
pragmatic principles to weaken it (Neale 1990: 93-102, Récanati 1986). According
to Heim (1982: 230-237, 370-384), the presupposition of uniqueness is not part of
the semantics of definite descriptions but rather follows from what she calls
Felicity Condition? and some account of the context of utterance. For a sentence
to be true or false with respect to a context, it first has to be felicitous with respect
to that context. The relevant felicity condition requires that the context supply a
unique value for the variable established by a definite, when this variable is free.
Moreover, definite descriptions presuppose their descriptive content whereas
indefinites simply assert it. So, for example, processing (26)
(26) The President of the United States is visiting Greece
you will find in the context that there is exactly one value for the variable
corresponding to the definite description for which it is presupposed that it is the
President of the US. On the other hand, processing (25b) you will probably be
aware of the existence of several cats and still be able to eliminate all but one as
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unlikely candidates, simply by using some common sense and by taking the
speaker to be reasonably rational and cooperative. In such a case there need not
be a unique cat; there just needs to be a unique most likely cat (Heim 1982:235).
One of the greatest problems with Heim's account is that definite
descriptions often introduce novel discourse referents (Hawkins 1991, Kempson
1986, Kempson forthcoming). Consider the examples in (27) (adapted from
Kempson forthcoming and Heim 1982: 371):
(27) a. Watch out! The cyclist doesn't know where he's going
b. The woman Bill fell in love with last summer died
c. Turn off the light
c. Simon read a book about Schubert and wrote to the author
In all these cases the definite descriptions introduce a new discourse referent
rather than pick up an old one. To account for such cases, Heim postulates an
accommodation N
 mechanism which links these definite descriptions to file cards
that already exist. (For a critical review of Lewis's accommodation principle, on
which Heim is based, see Blakemore 1992: 67-69).
Kempson (1986, 1990, forthcoming) develops a unified account of anaphora
which is based, on the one hand, on relevance theory and, on the other, on an
account of the semantics of definite descriptions reminiscent of Heim's and
Kamp's. She adopts the claim that definites and indefinites establish discourse
referents but rejects Heim's familiarity condition. She proposes that
•the concept of definiteness associated with both pronouns and definite
NPs is simply that of guaranteed accessibility (Kempson 1986:214).
In the relevance-theoretic framework a representation is accessible if it can be
recovered from the context or if it can be constructed on the basis of the context.
On this view, uniqueness follows from the semantics of a definite description and
the principle of relevance:
•Antecedent identification is made by virtue of the guarantee that a
representation of an individual is immediately, recognisably accessible to
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the hearer about whom he or she is to understand the speaker as making
an assertion. If there is any doubt as to which individual that should be,
then the hearer will have to put processing effort into deciding which
individual it is. However, the speaker's utterance in that form is a guarantee
that no such processing cost is necessary. Thus, if the speaker is obeying
the principle of relevance, as we would assume him or her to be, there can
only be one such individuar. (Kempson 1986: 216)
In more recent work, Kempson (forthcoming: 36) suggests that the meaning of the
definite article is procedural (rather than conceptual):
NThe intrinsic content of the definite article is merely an indication that the
conceptual representation to be assigned is accessible at no unjustifiable
processing cOstN.
There is no doubt that a lot more needs to be said about the semantics of
definite and indefinite descriptions. In the spirit of the work of Heim, Kamp and
Kempson, I will assume that definite and indefinite descriptions set up
representations of individuals or objects. In addition, definite descriptions encode
the information that the representations they set up are easily accessible, i.e. either
recoverable from the context or constructable on the basis of the context. I will also
assume that this meaning is procedural.
4.5. The pragmatics of definite and indefinite descriptions
In the remainder of this chapter I will show how three of the uses of definite and
indefinite descriptions, the attributive, the referential and the specific use, can be
accounted for on the basis of general communicative principles.
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4.5.1. AttrIbutive use
I will start by looking at the attributive interpretation of definite and indefinite
descriptions.
Let us consider again the case of Smith's murderer. Suppose that A and
B come upon Smith foully murdered and, because of the brutal nature of the crime,
A exclaims:
(1)	 The murderer of Smith is insane
On the relevance view the interpretation of (1) in this context is along the following
lines. Linguistic decoding will result in an incomplete logical form which will give
access to the concepts named in the utterance. In the context given above, the
hearer will not try to identify a particular referent, since the proposition expressed,
"There is an x such that x is Smith's murderer and x is insane", is the minimal
semantically complete, i.e. truth evaluable, representation which gives rise to
enough contextual effects for no unjustifiable effort. For example, the information
contained in (1) may combine with the hearer's assumption that insane murderers
are difficult to catch, to contextually imply that Smith's murderer will be difficult to
catch. Alternatively, (1) may be providing further evidence for, and therefore
strengthening, the hearer's assumption that whoever wanted to harm Smith was
insane. This interpretation is the first one that comes to mind and yields an
adequate range of effects to be worth the hearer's attention. So, the hearer will
accept it as the one the speaker intended. The point is that in this context an
interpretation which satisfies the criterion of consistency with tIe principle of
relevance is reached without identifying a particular referent.
How does the hearer recover the proposition expressed "There is an x such
that x is Smith's murderer and x is insane"? The idea is that the hearer recovers
this proposition by pragmatically enriching the logical form of the utterance.
Remember that according to the semantic analysis I outlined, the hearer has to set
up a conceptual representation in line with the content of the description. Notice
further that the additional information encoded by the definite description, that the
representation it sets up is easily accessible, is procedural and therefore does not
appear in the proposition expressed by the utterance. Remember, also that,
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according to Kempson (1986), the uniqueness implication follows from the
procedural meaning encoded by a definite description. Now, if we assume that this
procedural meaning does not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance,
then the uniqueness implication does not appear in the proposition expressed
either. As a result, definite and indefinite descriptions make identical contributions
to the propositions expressed by the utterances in which they occur. As for the
existential phrase there is...., it seems reasonable to assume that hearers infer
that definite and indefinite descriptions imply existence, unless they are instructed
not to do so (for example, in fictional contexts).9
Notice that for the attributive interpretation to arise, it is not necessary that
the speaker does not know who Smith's murderer is. Suppose, for example, that
A is a policewoman and that she knows Smith's murderer because he gave himself
up after the crime. Suppose also that B is aware of this. Upon seeing the dead
body, A may still exclaim (1), without intending B to interpret the definite
description referentially. The propositional form There is an x such that x is
Smith's murderer and x is insane may achieve optimal relevance by, for example,
strengthening the hearer's existing belief that A thinks all murderers are insane. If
this is the case, then the hearer will accept this interpretation and will not infer that
the definite description was used to pick out the individual who committed the
murder.
Neale (1990) does not discuss the derivation of the attributive interpretation
of definite descriptions. Presumably, it is simply derived via decoding. Assuming
the Russellian semantics, as Neale (1990) does, the proposition expressed by (1)
is there is a unique x such that x is Smith's murderer and x is insan&.
Ludlow and Neale (1991) are a little bit more explicit in thqir treatment of
the attributive use of indefinite descriptions. Let us consider (2) again. All the
computers in our building behave strangely and you call the computer centre to
ask for help. You are told that they will send a computer expert over. When you
hang up you say to your colleague:
(2)	 A computer expert will come to have a look
l believe that the implication of existence may be shown ultimately to follow
from relevance-theoretic considerations as well: it is somehow not relevant to talk
about things that do not exist, except in certain specific circumstances.
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All that a rational speaker, i.e. a speaker who takes into account what the
hearer is capable of recovenng, may have intended to communicate in this context
is that some computer expert or other will come to have a look.
Ludlow and Neale propose the following account for the attributive use. In
the spirit of Grice they draw a distinction between the proposition expressed (PE)
and the proposition(s) meant (PM), i.e. the proposition(s) the speaker intends to
communicate. They adopt the Russellian semantics, so, on their account, the
proposition expressed (PE) by (2) would be something like there is an x such that
x is a computer expert and x will come to have a look. In this case the proposition
expressed is also intended by the speaker to be communicated, so PE=PM. In
addition to the PE and the PM Ludlow and Neale's machinery involves what they
call the speaker's ground (SG), i.e. the proposition that is the object of the most
relevant belief furnishing the grounds for the utterance. In the case of (2) the
speaker's ground would be a general proposition that some computer expert will
come to take a look. So, the attributive use of indefinite descriptions (and
presumably of definite ones as well) is a case where SG=PE=PM. As we will see
in the following sections PE, PM and SG do not always coincide, thus providing
Ludlow and Neale with a way of identifying and describing each of the uses of
indefinite descriptions.
Note, however, that Ludlow and Neale's description of the attributive use
as the case where SG=PE=PM=a general proposition of the type there is an x,
x is a computer expert and x will come to have a Iook is not adequate. As I
explained earlier in connection with definite descriptions, SG does not have to be
a general proposition for the description to be interpreted attributively. For example,
the speaker of (2) may know that a particular computer expert called Peter is going
to take a look at their computers. Still she may utter (2) with the intention to inform
the hearer that some person with the property of computer expert is coming. What
is crucial for the way in which definite and indefinite descriptions are interpreted in
different contexts is not what the speaker believes but which of her beliefs she
intends to communicate.'°
10Perhaps this problem would not anse if Ludlow and Neale had explained what
makes a certain belief of the speaker the most relevant belief furnishing the
grounds for her utteranceN. The role of SG will be further discussed in later
sections.
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On the relevance account I am developing, the proposition expressed by
(2) in this context will be there is an x such that x is a computer expert and x will
come to have a look. This will be derived pragmatically by enriching the semantic
representation of the utterance along the lines outlined earlier with respect to (1).
The only difference is that the indefinite description in (2) does not convey the
guarantee of immediate accessibility and, consequently, the implication of
uniqueness. Within relevance theory, a psychologically plausible explanation is
given for why the proposition expressed is also the proposition meant, to use
Ludlow and Neale's terminology. The hearer will choose this interpretation because
it is consistent with the principle of relevance: it achieves an adequate range of
contextual effects without putting the hearer to unjustifiable effort in deriving them.
For example, it may combine with the hearer's belief that computer experts can
repair computers to yield the contextual implication that the computers will soon be
in operation again.
4.5.2. Specific use
In this section I will discuss what I will call the specific use of definite and indefinite
descriptions. The discussion will focus on indefinite descriptions but the proposed
analysis carries over to the specific use of definite descriptions.
Let me start by taking a closer look at the uses of indefinite descriptions
that have been cited in the literature under the label NreferentialN Consider the
following example from Chastain (1975:212). Suppose that reading the morning
paper the speaker comes across the story that Dr. M.DeBakey from Texas stated
at a press conference that an artificial heart could be developed witIin the next five
years. The speaker then reports this to the hearer by uttering (28):
(28) A doctor from Texas claims that artificial hearts will be developed within five
years
Chastain, like most philosophers who have written on the subject, claims that this
is a referential use of the indefinite description a doctor from Texas because the
speaker has a particular individual in mind.
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The aim of a pragmatic theory, however, is to provide an account of the
way in which utterances are interpreted. In doing this for (28), what is of interest
is not whether the speaker has a particular individual in mind but whether she
intends to communicate that she has a particular individual in mind.
Bearing this point in mind, let us consider the various interpretations that
(28) may have in different contexts. If it is not manifest to the hearer that the
speaker has read a story about a particular doctor in the newspaper, say, for
example, the hearer is not aware that (28) is a report, then all the hearer will be
able to recover (and in these circumstances all a rational speaker could have
intended to communicate) is Nsome doctor (or other) from Texas claims that
artificial hearts will be developed within five yearsN. This would be the attributive
use discussed in the last section. On the other hand, if it is manifest to the hearer
that the speaker is talking about a particular individual, because for example, the
hearer knows that the speaker reads the relevant section in the morning paper, the
case that Chastain probably had in mind, then all the speaker could have intended
to communicate is that Na particular doctor from Texas claims that artificial hearts
will be developed within five year?. Let us call this the specific use. In a slightly
different context (28) might communicate something stronger. Suppose, for
example, that we can both see our colleague from Texas, Dr M. DeBakey,
approaching, and nodding in his direction I utter (28). In this context the hearer will
most naturally take me to have intended to communicate that NDr M.DeBakey
claims that artificial hearts will be developed within five yearsN. Let us call this the
referential use.
It follows that, in addition to the attributive reading of the indefinite
description, (28) has two more interpretations, depending on whether the speaker
intends the hearer to identify the individual she is talking about or not. Like Ludlow
and Neale (1991), I will distinguish the specific and the referential use of indefinite
descriptions. According to Ludlow and Neale (1991:177):
An indefinite description 'an F' is being used referentially in an utterance
of 'An F is G' if (i) the speaker intends to communicate something about
a particular individual band (ii) the speaker is using 'an F' intending that his
audience shall realise that it is b that he intends to communicate something
about.
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The same understanding of the referential use with connection to definite
descriptions is to be found in Neale (1990) and independently in Rouchota (1 992a).
The referential interpretation will be discussed in detail in the next section. For the
time being I want to concentrate on what has been misleadingly called the
referential use in the literature and which I will call specific. In what follows I will
use the term specific to refer to cases where uttering a sentence of the form 'an
F is G' the speaker intends to communicate that she has a particular
individuaVobject in mind to whom/which she ascribes G, but she does not overtly
intend the hearer to identify this individual/object (although of course he might).
In their discussion of the specific use Ludlow and Neale make the same
mistake as Chastain: they confuse the beliefs that the speaker may hold with the
beliefs the speaker intends to communicate with her utterance. They give the
following example: the speaker has been informed that Mr Beastly, an auditor from
the IRS who visited her last year, is coming to see her today. The speaker has
no reason to expect [the hearer,VR] to know of Mr Beastly, or to know that [the
speaker] was audited by the IRS last year (Ludlow and Neale 1991:181). In this
context the speaker utters (29):
(29) An auditor is coming to see me today
According to Ludlow and Neale all the speaker intends to communicate, the PM,
is the general proposition that some auditor is coming to see the speaker on the
day of the utterance. (This is, on their analysis, the PE by the utterance as well).
Nevertheless, Ludlow and Neale call this use specific because the speaker has
singular grounds for asserting (29), i.e. the speaker has the singula,r belief that Mr
Beastly is coming to see her. However, if our aim is to account for the way (29) is
interpreted, we would be interested in the singular grounds of the speaker just in
case they were part of what the speaker intended to communicate. And in this
case they are not. In this context the indefinite description in (29) is interpreted
attributively.
Ludlow and Neale distinguish between the weakly specific use of an
indefinite and the strongly specific use of an indefinite. In the case of the weakly
specific use, the hearer has no reason to think that the speaker has a particular
individual in mind, like for example in (29). In the case of the strongly specific
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use, the speaker has reasons to believe that the speaker has singular grounds for
her assertion. As I argued, the indefinite description in (29) should not be thought
of as specific at all.
Let me now turn to the cases that Ludlow and Neale charactense as
strongly specific. Consider the following example adapted from Ludlow and Neale
(1 991 :181). Suppose we have been talking about the pressure on academics to
publish their work. You have been claiming that they are under no such pressure,
and then I utter (30):
(30) A colleague of mine has been sacked for failing to publish
As Ludlow and Neale correctly point out, it is difficult to see how a hearer
processing such an utterance would not infer that the speaker is speaking about
a particular individual. Ludlow and Neale offer the following analysis for such
examples. The speaker's ground (SG) is the singular belief that a particular
individual, for example, Mark, was sacked for failing to publish. The proposition
expressed (PE) by the utterance involves the Russellian formulation of the
semantics of indefinites. Informally: "there is an x such that x is a colleague of the
speaker and x was sacked for failing to publish". According to Ludlow and Neale,
the speaker here does not intend to communicate that she has singular grounds
for her assertion; "However, you [the hearer, VR] would undoubtedly take me to
have singular grounds for this assertion.. .upon reflection I would expect you to
realise that a singular belief furnishes the grounds for my utterance"
 (Ludlow and
Neale 1991:181).
Two questions arise here. How can we account for the fact that the hearer
is likely to infer that the speaker has a particular person in min1? And, is the
indefinite description in (30) interpreted specifically, in other words does the
speaker intend to communicate that she knows of a particular colleague of hers
that s/he was sacked because s/he didn't publish?
In the context given for (30) the speaker intends to communicate that
academics are indeed under pressure to publish because they may lose their job
if they don't. Intuitively there is a difference between the conclusion "academics are
under pressure to publish their work", which the hearer will infer on the basis of
relevance considerations, and the conclusion "the speaker has a particular
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colleague in mind, which the hearer cannot help but derive. The difference seems
to be that whereas the former is essential to establish the point of the utterance,
the latter is not.
Compare, now, the following example, where the same situation arises with
respect to a definite description. Suppose you ask me why, contrary to my habits,
I took the tube to come to your place and I answer with (6),
(6)	 My neighbour told me that the buses are on strike
Suppose the hearer has no means of identifying the speaker's neighbour and the
speaker knows this very well and does not expect him to do so. Still, the hearer
cannot but interpret the definite description specifically: there is a particular
neighbour that the speaker is talking about, the speaker has an individuated
representation of the neighbour she is speaking about. Notice, moreover, that in
a way similar to (30) the point of uttering (6) does not lie with the implicature that
the speaker has a particular individual in mind when she uses the definite
description Nmy neighbourN .
 Rather, (6) achieves relevance by explaining why the
speaker did not take the tube.
Here's how we can account for the interpretation of the indefinite
description in (30) in relevance-theoretic terms. Each concept in the semantic
representation of the utterance gives access to encyclopaedic information related
to this concept. Some of the encyclopaedic assumptions that these concepts give
access to are intended by the speaker to be entertained by the hearer and to form
part of the context against which the utterance is intended to be processed. On the
relevance view, the construction of the context in which the utterance is intended
to be processed is part of the inferential phase of utterance interpretation. So, for
example, in setting up the concept COLLEAGUE there are certain more or less
trivial assumptions that we hold about colleagues and which will become
immediately accessible. For example, that colleagues are people that we work
with, we normally see them every day, we know their names, we are able to
recognise them, we get on more or less well with them, and so on and so forth.
More importantly for the interpretation of (30), the group of concepts COLLEAGUE
OF SPEAKER make accessible assumptions of the type: the speaker works with
this person, the speaker sees this person every day, the speaker can recognise
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this person, probably knows his/her name, has a more or less superficial relation
with him/her, etc.
On this view, it is easy to explain how the hearer cannot fail to realise that
the speaker has a singular belief concerning some particular colleague, as Ludlow
and Neale put it, while interpreting (30). The trivial piece of information that the
speaker has an individuated representation of the colleague who got sacked
becomes automatically accessible through the corresponding concepts, in
particular through the encyclopaedic assumptions that these concepts activate.
This piece of information is part of the Nscriptu or the encyclopaedic chunk
associated with being colleagues.
Notice, however, that the claim that this assumption will be accessed does
not mean that it is one of the assumptions which will be crucially involved in
establishing the relevance of the utterance. On the relevance view, not every
assumption intentionally made manifest by an utterance is communicated with the
same strength. Some implicatures are stronger, others are weaker. The implicature
academics are under great pressure to publish their work is a strong implicature
of the utterance. It is a contextual implication derived inferentially on the basis of
the proposition expressed by (30) and an assumption like If academics get sacked
for failing to publish, then they are under pressure to publish. On the other hand,
to the extent that the assumption the speaker has a particular individual in mind"
was intended to be communicated, it is a weakly communicated implicature which
contributes to the interpretation process by setting up part of the context (however
trivial this part may be). Since the speaker intended to communicate this
assumption in uttering (30), even if only weakly, the indefinite description is used
specifically. (It is difficult to imagine that in this context the speake did not intend
to communicate that she knows the person who got sacked for failing to publish;
if asked whether she has a specific case in mind, she would presumably
acknowledge it). The interpretation of the definite description my neighbour" in (6)
could be accounted for in the same way.
Are we to conclude from the discussion so far that the implicature
associated with the specific reading of an indefinite (or definite) description never
contributes to the relevance of the utterance in a crucial way? The answer is no.
Ludlow and Neale (1 991 :181, fnl8) mention in a footnote the following example
from Fodor and Sag (1982), where the speaker intends to convey that he has
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singular grounds for his assertion: Suppose that the speaker is about to return
some tests she has just marked. Suppose, further, that the speaker has been told
that a pupil in this class, Henry, cheated. Before she hands back the papers, the
speaker utters (31):
(31) A student in this class cheated in the examination
The speaker addresses herself to all the students in the class and she does not
intend them to identify the individual who cheated (although of course Henry will
understand that the speaker knows that he cheated). What the speaker intends to
communicate in this context is that she knows of one of the students that he
cheated.
On the relevance-theoretic account, the assumption that the speaker has
a particular student in mind would be a contextual implication following from the
proposition expressed by (31) and contextual assumptions about why the teacher
would utter (31) in the first place. Is this interpretation consistent with the principle
of relevance? It is certainly an interpretation that the speaker might have expected
to give rise to enough effects to be worth the hearer's attention. For example, if the
speaker has a particular individual in mind in uttering (31), she is warning everyone
that when students cheat she can find out, that therefore they should not try to
cheat, that she may not take the issue further now but if it happens again there will
be a penalty and so on and so forth. So, this interpretation is consistent with the
first clause of the definition of optimal relevance. Assuming that the intended
effects could not have been achieved in a more economical way, this interpretation
satisfies the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance,and is the one
the hearer must choose.
Summing up, the assumption that the speaker has a particular individual
in mind, associated with the specific interpretation of a description, is sometimes
weakly implicated and contributes to the overall relevance of the utterance only
indirectly, by forming part of the context against which the utterance is to be
interpreted. This is what happens in (30). Sometimes, however, the assumption
that the speaker has a particular individual in mind makes a crucial contribution to
the way the utterance achieves relevance. And this is what happens in (31).
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I would like to finish this section with a brief comment on what Ludlow and
Neale call speaker's ground (SG) for an assertion. I have already expressed
serious doubts with regard to the role of SG within a psychologically plausible
account of the way definite and indefinite descriptions are interpreted. In
accounting for the particular interpretation of an utterance, we are interested in
those beliefs of the speaker which she intends to communicate. Now I want to
point out that even in terms of simply describing what is going on in the various
uses of description, SG is not useful. According to Ludlow and Neale, SG
coincides with PM in the case of the attributive use, where we have SG=PM= a
general proposition, and in the case of the referential use, where we have
SG=PM= a singular proposition where the subject is an identified individual (see
next section). The SG coincides with the PM in some cases of what Ludlow and
Neale call the strongly specific use, as in example (31). The speaker's ground is
not part of what the speaker intends to communicate only in the weakly specific
uses, as in example (29), and in some of the strongly specific uses, as in example
(30). So, you might claim that SG is useful in keeping apart these cases from the
rest. But, as I have argued, Ludlow and Neale's analysis of these cases is
inadequate. The indefinite description in (29) is interpreted attributively, not
specifically, and the speaker does intend to communicate, although only weakly,
that she has a particular individual in mind in (30). I conclude that the level SG is
redundant for the purposes of our discussion.
4.5.3. Referential use
There are two issues with respect to the referential use of definite and indefinite
descriptions that have been central in the literature and that I am ging to discuss
here. The first one has to do with the descriptive content of the definite or indefinite
description: Is it communicated? What is its role in the interpretation of the
utterance? Is it part of the proposition expressed by the utterance? The second
issue is whether the referential interpretation of a definite or indefinite description
is an implicature or part of an explicature of the utterance containing it. These
questions end up being decisive for what we take the proposition expressed by an
utterance with a referentially used definite or indefinite description to be. The views
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I am arguing for here were initially presented in Rouchota (1992a) and Rouchota
(1992b).
In his onginal formulation of the referentiaVattributive distinction Donnellan
(1966/1977:46) argued that in the attributive use a definite description is used
essentially, in the sense that the speaker wishes to assert something about
whatever or whoever fits that description. It follows that if a definite description is
used attributively it contributes to the proposition expressed. In the referential use,
on the other hand, the definite description is only a tool for doing a certain job, i.e.
calling attention to a person or thing. When the definite description is used
referentially, Donnellan (1966/1977:61-64) argues that it is not clear what is meant
by the statement. The problem is this. If the description does not fit the referent
but the predicate is true of the referent then, according to Donnellan, we would like
to hold that the speaker has said something true. So, Donnellan believes that it is
only the referent (and not the content of the description) that appears in the
proposition expressed. This ties up with his claim that in the referential use the
definite description is nothing but a device to enable the hearer to pick out the
individual or thing that the speaker is talking about: a device that could be replaced
by any other device which could do the same job.
Similarly, Searle (1 979a) argues within the speech act framework that in the
referential use the descriptive content of the expression used is not part of the
proposition expressed by the utterance. 1 ' Also, Récanati (1989a, 1993), in an
altogether different framework, argues that on the referential reading the
proposition expressed is a singular one of the form 'a is G' where a is the
individual or object that satisfies the descriptive content of the definite or indefinite
description. Récanati (1 989a) claims that the descriptive content itself does not
appear in the proposition expressed but rather functions as a contetual condition,
i.e. as a condition which must be contextually satisfied for the sentence to express
a definite proposition. In more recent work Récanati (1993: 277-299) puts forward
the view that the descriptive content of a definite or indefinite description
contributes to the interpretation process by activating a de reN concept under
which this descriptive content is filed. The characteristic property of Nde re"
concepts is the truth-conditional irrelevance of their descriptive content.
11 For a detailed review of Searle's account see Rouchota (1 992a: 149-151).
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On the view represented by Donnellan, Searle and Récanati, the definite
description itself does not contribute to the proposition expressed when used
referentially because (a) it does not contribute to the truth conditions of the
utterance, and (b) it is inessential, in the sense that its only function is to secure
reference and it could therefore be replaced by any other expression capable of
picking out the right referent.
On the other hand, Grice in his paper Vacuous NamesN (1969) takes a
different position. He argues that what is said by an utterance containing a
definite description is the same on both the referential and the attributive
interpretation of the description. Grice assumes the Russellian semantics for
definite descriptions and so the proposition expressed by, for example, (1) is there
is a unique x such that x is Smith's murderer and x is insane" on either reading.
On his view, the description itself is part of "what is said" and if it does not fit the
referent then what the speaker has literally said is false (though on the referential
reading she may have implicated something true if the intended referent is actually
insane). Neale (1990) and Ludlow and Neale (1991) argue in the same way. They
seem to take over the view that the only contribution of the descriptive content to
the interpretation process is to help the hearer to establish the referent.
I want to argue (a) that on the referential interpretation both the
definite/indefinite description itself and (some representation of) the intended
referent a contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance and (b) that the
descriptive content of the description does not simply help to establish reference
but plays an important role in the interpretation of the utterance by contributing to
the construction of the context in which the utterance has an optimally relevant
interpretation.
Consider the following examples:
(32) The fat apple-pie is sitting in his usual chair
(33) The last daft old hen you dealt with this morning kept bothering me all
afternoon
(34) The magician is in bed
(35) Is the king in his countinghouse?
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Suppose (32) is uttered by a waitress to refer playfully to a regular customer who
happens to be fat, always asks for an apple-pie and has a place where he usually
sits. Suppose that (33) is uttered by an angry salesman who has been serving an
irritating customer. (34) could be used by the doctors in a mental hospital to refer
to a patient who is called Fordell and thinks he is a magician. (35), finally, is an
example from Donnellan where the speaker uses the expression the king to refer
to the person that she considers to be a usurper. In this example the speaker
conforms to the code other people are using to make sure that her question will
be understood.
In all these examples the definite descriptions could be replaced by more
Naccurateu ones. So,
(36) The fat customer is sitting in his usual chair
(37) The last customer you dealt with this morning kept bothering me all
afternoon
(38) Fordell is in bed
(39) Is the usurper in his countinghouse?
With the examples (36)-(39) the speaker will (everything else being equal) succeed
in referring to the person referred to by the corresponding definite descriptions in
examples (32)-(35). It is, however, clear that although reference is preserved the
change of the definite description has not left the meaning conveyed by the
utterance unaffected. So, (36) does not have the humorous effect of (32). (37)
lacks the expression of anger, aggression, sarcasm characteristic of (33). (38) may
be more difficult to process than (34), if Fordell is always referred to as the
magician and no one remembers his real name any more. (39), lastly, may be
incomprehensible if, for example, the usurper is the real king's twin brother and
nobody has understood that the real king has disappeared. Alternatively, (39) may
be inappropriate because it fails to serve the speaker's intentions: suppose the
speaker wants to know whether the usurper is in the countinghouse because she
intends to have him killed, If she utters (39) she will probably be arrested by the
guards rather than get the information she wants.
These examples suggest that, contrary to what is usually assumed, the
descriptive content of the definite description contributes to the information
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conveyed by an utterance with a referentially used definite description. This seems
to be correct not only for uses like those in (32)-(35), which one might claim are
non literal and therefore different, but also in indisputably literal cases. For
example, consider the utterance in (40) below:
(40) The notoriously moody tennis player threw his racquet at his opponent's
head
Say that (40) is uttered by a sports reporter commenting on McEnroe's behaviour
during his last game. Of course the reporter could have referred to McEnroe as
McEnroe or Nthe former Wimbledon champion or the American (suppose the
other player is a Russian) etc. All these and many other descriptions would have
ensured reference to the particular individual the speaker wishes to speak about.
The descriptive content of the definite description the notoriously moody tennis
player, however, not only serves to pick out the right individual, but also
contributes to the effects achieved by (40) by alluding to the fact that there have
been many other occasions when McEnroe behaved inappropriately on court. This
may be intended to communicate that the speaker disapproves of McEnroe, and
perhaps of bad tempered people in general, that he wants the regulations of the
game to prevent such behaviour, that he wants players who behave in this way to
be punished and so on. None of these assumptions would have been
communicated as easily in this context by any of the other definite descriptions. It
follows that the speaker has chosen this particular definite description to refer to
McEnroe because she thought it to be the most efficient way to achieve her
intended effects.
The same situation arises with indefinite descriptions used rferentially. For
example, suppose that the speaker and the hearer are attending a function and
they notice Jones, whom they both know to be a convicted embezzler. Seeing
Jones flirting with the hearer's sister the speaker utters (41):
(41) A convicted embezzler is flirting with your sister
(adapted from Wilson 1978:57)
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In this context the speaker intends to say something of the particular individual, let
us call him Jones, who flirts with the hearer's sister. Compare now (41) with (42)
uttered in the same context:
(42) Jones is flirting with your sister
It is clear that replacing the indefinite description with the name of the referent
affects the import of the utterance. (41) draws the hearer's attention to the fact that
the referent is a convicted embezzler and relies on his inferential abilities to pick
out the intended referent. Uttering (42), on the other hand, the speaker refers to
the particular individual she intends to speak about in a more straightforward way
but does not directly focus the hearer's attention on the fact that Jones is a
convicted embezzler. The descriptive content of the indefinite description in (41)
together with other contextual assumptions encourages the hearer to infer that his
sister is in danger, that even clever women fall for a convicted embezzler's charms
and so on.
Such examples show clearly that the descriptive content of a definite or
indefinite description used referentially plays a richer role than merely securing
reference. This, moreover, casts doubt on the claim usually made (Donnellan
1966/1977, Searle 1 979a, Récanati 1 989a) that the descriptive content of a
referentially used definite or indefinite description does not contribute to the
proposition expressed by the utterance. I will take the position that it does.
So, my claim is that the proposition expressed by an utterance like (40),
when the definite description is used referentially, is (43) below,
(43) The notoriously moody tennis player, i.e. McEnroe, threw hi racquet at his
opponent's head
where both the definite description and some individuating representation of the
person to whom it is used to refer appear. For (43) to be true, it must be the case
that the notoriously moody tennis player and x are the same person and that this
person threw his racquet at his opponent's head.12'3
12The same truth conditional specification is proposed by Wilson (1978).
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On the other hand, when the definite description the notoriously moody
tennis player" is used attributively, the proposition expressed by (40) differs from
(43) in that it does not involve an individuating representation of the intended
referent. In this case the proposition expressed is true if some individual
compatible with the content of the definite description exhibited bad tempered
behaviour.
In the same vein, the proposition expressed by (41) on the referential
interpretation will contain the descriptive content of the indefinite description TMa
convicted embezzler. However, it is not, intuitively, as obvious as in the case of
(40), that the proposition expressed by (41) contains some individuating
representation of the intended referent. I will discuss this point further in section
4.5.5.
Let me give a few more arguments to support the claim that the descriptive
content of a referentially used definite or indefinite description contributes to the
proposition expressed by the utterance. Consider the following utterances:
(44) The man reading the newspaper left it behind
(45) A woman in a white suit stained it with wine
Suppose the definite description in (44) is used referentially to pick out Smith.
Suppose that (45) is addressed to the only woman in the room who wears a white
suit; in this context the indefinite description is intended to pick up that particular
woman, If following Donnellan, Searle and Récanati we assume that the
proposition expressed is a left it behind" and "b stained it with wine", then it is not
clear how we can account for the interpretation of the anaphoric pronoun It" and
therefore the truth conditions of (44) and (45) (setting aside the possibility that it
is deictic and takes its antecedent from the context). On the other hand, this
' 3To be more precise, (40) on the referential interpretation communicates
explicitly two propositions:
(i) The notoriously moody tennis-player threw his racquet at his opponent's
head
(ii) McEnroe1 threw his racquet at his opponent's head
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problem does not arise if we assume that the descriptive content of these
descriptions contributes to the propositions expressed by these utterances
respectively.'4
Another consideration is this. The descriptive content of a definite/indefinite
descnption encodes conceptual information and is therefore, according to Wilson
and Sperber (1993), expected to contribute either to the proposition expressed by
the utterance or to one of its higher level explicatures. On the relevance view,
higher level explicatures are truth evaluable representations that the speaker
intends to communicate explicitly and are formed by embedding the proposition
expressed by the utterance under a propositional attitude or speech act verb. Mood
indicators like imperative syntax or na-clauses encode procedural information about
propositional attitude which contributes to the construction of a higher level
explicature communicated by the utterance. Sentence adverbs like useriouslyu and
franklyN
 are examples of linguistic expressions which encode conceptual
information and may contribute to one of the higher level explicatures
communicated by the utterance. Definite descriptions, however, are very different
from mood indicators or such adverbs: their semantics does not contain speech act
or propositional attitude information. Finally, pronouns have been convincingly
argued (Wilson and Sperber (1993), Kleiber (1990), Reboul (1990), and Kempson
(forthcoming)) to encode procedural information about the minimal properties of a
suitable referent and thus to contribute to the proposition expressed by the
utterance. It is, however, very clear that the descriptive content of definite/indefinite
descriptions encodes conceptual rather than procedural information.' 5
 So, given
our independently motivated pragmatic machinery, it seems that the descriptive
content of a definite/indefinite description has to contribute to the proposition
expressed by the utterance.
Finally, let me briefly go back to the issue of the truth conditions of
utterances with referentially used descriptions. In my opinion, when a referentially
interpreted definite description is used accurately (i.e. the description fits the
referent), then intuitions about the possible contribution of the descriptive content
'4This argument was suggested in a seminar at UCL by F.Récanati and was
attributed to D.Sperber.
15Although the definite article itself might encode procedural information as
argued in Kempson (forthcoming). See section 4.4.
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to the truth conditions are not clear. However, when a referentially interpreted
definite description is used inaccurately, then there is a very clear intuition that the
speaker has said something which is false and something else which is true.
Consider for example,
(46)	 Your sister is very beautiful
used referentially to pick out the woman who is actually the hearer's mother. The
proposed formulation of the truth conditions of utterances with definite descriptions
used referentially has the advantage that it captures these intuitions about the truth
value of such utterances. I will pick up this issue again in section 4.5.5.
4.5.4. Relevance and the referential use
I pointed out in the last section that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, when
definite/indefinite descriptions are used to pick out a particular individual or thing
they very rarely serve only that function. In this section I will show how the choice
of a particular definite description to guide the assignment of reference is
constrained by the principle of relevance and how the principle of relevance can
also accommodate those cases where the definite description seems to function
solely to pick out a specific referent. For a similar relevance-theoretic account of
indefinite descriptions interpreted referentially see Rouchota (1992b).
Let me reconsider one of the examples mentioned earlier:
(40) The notoriously moody tennis player threw his racquet at his opponent's
head
Utterances are processed in a context. For Sperber and Wilson (1986:132-142),
the context in which an utterance is processed is psychologically defined: it is
understood as a set of assumptions that the individual holds and which are brought
to bear on the interpretation of the utterance. Sperber and Wilson argue that the
standard view that the context in which an utterance is processed is determined
at the start of the act of utterance is not plausible. The context for the interpretation
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of an utterance is at least partly derivable from the concepts encoded by the words
used in the utterance. So, at least some of the assumptions that play a role in the
interpretation of an utterance may not be accessible pnor to the act of utterance.
Moreover, Sperber and Wilson argue that the context in which an utterance is
processed is not given but chosen: on the relevance view the intended context is
chosen by the criterion of consistency with the pnnciple of relevance, i.e. hearers
select the context in which the utterance yields adequate contextual effects for no
unjustifiable effort in a way the speaker could manifestly have foreseen.
Bearing this in mind, let us trace the interpretation of (40) assuming that the
definite description is used referentially. Decoding the first part of the utterance, i.e.
the definite description "the notoriously moody tennis player", the hearer will gain
access to the corresponding concepts, i.e. he will gain access to the information
stored under "notoriously", "moody", "tennis", "player". The presence of the definite
article guarantees that the constructed concept is easily accessible. According to
Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Wilson (to appear, b), reference assignment
involves the retrieval or construction of an appropriate conceptual representation,
one that uniquely identifies the intended referent. This representation is part of the
proposition expressed by the utterance. The encyclopaedic information stored
under the concepts encoded in the expression •the notoriously moody tennis
player" helps the hearer to fix the intended referent. Assuming that (40) is part of
a report on today's game of tennis between McEnroe and X and given that
McEnroe is widely known for making trouble on court, the hearer will infer that the
speaker intends to refer to McEnroe. The proposition expressed in this case will
be "The notoriously moody tennis player, i.e. John McEnroe, threw his racquet at
his opponent's head". This proposition is the most easily accessible one in the
particular context that gives rise to enough contextual effects to be worth the
hearer's attention. For example, given the appropriate contextual assumptions it
may contextually imply that McEnroe should be banned from playing tennis, that
such behaviour decreases the popularity of tennis, that McEnroe is arrogant, etc.
I have shown so far how in a straightforward case, where the intended
referent fits the descriptive content of the definite description, the hearer identifies
the individual about whom the speaker intends to talk. Reference assignment
depends partly on the descriptive content of the definite description and is driven
by the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance. What is important is
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that reference assignment, picking out the intended referent, is done in a particular
way determined by the speaker's choice of the definite description.
So, the question is why does the speaker choose the particular definite
description 'the notoriously moody tennis player'? Certainly there are other ways,
maybe even less costly ones, of referring to McEnroe, for example 'McEnroe', 'the
American' (say X is Russian), 'the former Wimbledon champion' (say X has never
played at Wimbledon), etc. Well, let us think again of one of the ways in which (40)
could achieve relevance. When processed against the assumption in (47), (40) will
give rise to the contextual implication in (48),
(47) If tennis players repeatedly behave inappropriately on court, they should be
banned from playing tennis
(48) McEnroe should be banned from playing tennis
But how does the contextual assumption in (47) come to bear on the interpretation
of the utterance? Processing the expression 'the notoriously moody tennis player',
the hearer will not only uniquely identify McEnroe, but also he will access several
assumptions about notoriously moody tennis players such as, for example, that
they upset their opponents and the public, that they are aggressive people, that
they are not popular among their colleagues, and most likely that they repeatedly
behave inappropriately on court (this is why they are 'notoriously moody'). This
last assumption together with other contextual assumptions about punishing such
behaviour will cause the hearer to hypothesise that the assumption in (47) may be
part of the context in which the speaker intends (40) to be processed. On this
analysis the first interpretation of (40) that comes to mind achieves an adequate
range of effects, one of them being the contextual implication tn (48), for no
unjustifiable processing effort and could therefore be taken as the one intended by
the speaker. So, the claim is that the descriptive content of the particular definite
description that the speaker chose to use contributes to the interpretation process
by giving access to part of the context in which the speaker intends the hearer to
process her utterance. This is exactly why the speaker chose this description
instead of any other.
Since, on the relevance view, speakers intend their utterances to cause
enough changes to the hearer's representation of the world without causing
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unjustifiable expenditure of processing effort, one would expect that speakers
would build up their utterances in such a way that the interpretation process is to
some extent guided. One way of doing this is by making sure that the nght context
is accessed. To put it in other words, by using the particular definite description
the notoriously moody tennis player the speaker has already indicated the
direction in which relevance is to be sought by providing the hearer with evidence
that the context in which the utterance is processed should contain assumptions
about notoriously moody tennis players. So, the implication in (48) is one that the
speaker has encouraged the hearer to derive.
On this analysis, it is easy to see why changing the definite description
used in an utterance affects its import. Different definite descriptions wiH give
access to different concepts. Different concepts have different encyclopaedic
entries and thus contribute to the creation of context in a different way. Compare,
for example, (49) and (50) below:
(49) The moody tennis player walked off court
(50) McEnroe walked oft court
Both (49) and (50) convey the information that McEnroe walked off court. Because
of the particular concepts in the definite description, however, (49) succeeds in
suggesting, in addition, an explanation for why McEnroe walked off court. This is
not to say that in processing (50) the hearer may not infer that McEnroe's bad
temper was the reason for him leaving the court. In fact, if the hearer has ever
heard about McEnroe before, he is very likely to find in the encyclopaedic entry
stored information about McEnroe's bad behaviour on court. So, he may construct
the hypothesis that McEnroe walked off court as a result of his bad temper. The
point is that in (50) the speaker gives no clear indication in her utterance that this
is the way she expects it to be interpreted, i.e. she does not encourage the hearer
to process her utterance in such a context. The point is that the speaker's
utterance itself does not necessarily make it manifest that among the assumptions
the speaker intended to communicate was an assumption about McEnroe's bad
temper, which is crucial to establish the relevance of the utterance.
Now compare (40) with (51) below:
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(51) The Wimbledon champion threw his racquet at his opponent's head
Suppose that in the context in which (51) is being processed the description the
Wimbledon winner secures reference to McEnroe. Notice that the concepts
encoded in this definite description do not directly give access to any assumptions
about McEnroe's ongoing inappropriate behaviour. Of course, the speaker
accessing the assumption that the Wimbledon winner talked about here is
McEnroe may access the concept McEnroe, which might contain information
about McEnroe's frequent tantrums during tennis matches. So, (51) could give rise
to the contextual implication in (48), but it would do so in a way different from (40),
i.e. by first giving access to encyclopaedic information stored under the concepts
encoded in the definite description. So, the context built up by (51) will be larger
than the one built up by (40) because it will also contain assumptions about
Wimbledon winners. So, if (51) is intended to achieve relevance by giving rise to
(48), then it is more costly to process than (40). According to the principle of
relevance, if the speaker chooses to utter (51), then she does not only intend to
imply (48) but she also wants to say something about McEnroe as a Wimbledon
champion. For example, she may wish to make mutually manifest the assumption
such champions do not set the best example for younger players. Such
considerations support the claim made earlier that the descriptive content of a
referentially used definite description not only enables the hearer to identify the
referent but may also contribute to the relevance of the utterance by helping the
hearer to set up the intended context.
Are there cases where the descriptive content of the defirite description
plays no other role than helping to identify the referent? Yes, there are. For
example, consider (52):
(52) Give this paper to the man with the belly standing by the wall
Among the set of assumptions that the speaker intends to communicate with (52)
is that there is one particular man to whom this paper should be handed and this
is the man standing by the wall. In such uses, definite descriptions behave very
much like demonstratives. Compare:
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(53) Give this paper to that man
In such a case the speaker makes sure that the definite description she
uses secures reference. That is, among all the possible ways of referring to a
particular individual or thing, she will choose the one that she thinks will enable the
hearer to pick out the intended referent most easily.
Such cases, where the definite description serves solely to secure
reference, illustrate one type of referentially used definite descriptions. They are
at the one end of the spectrum of the ways in which a speaker could make use of
a referential definite description. Intermediate cases, where a definite description
is used partly to secure reference and partly for other reasons, are illustrated by
examples (40) and (51). At the other end of the spectrum, there are cases where
securing reference is the least important of the speaker's intentions although still
one of them. For example,
(32)	 The fat apple pie is sitting in his usual chair
(34) The magician is in bed
(54) Peter eventually married the free ticket to the opera
(adapted from Sperber 1975:411)
(55) The block of ice just left the room
(56) The present king of France does not exist
In examples like (32), (54) and (55) the choice of the particular definite description
is certainly not aimed primarily at securing reference, It is more important that the
hearer recovers the speaker's attitude towards the referent, and this is the way in
which the particular definite description contributes to the relevance of the whole
utterance. The humorous flavour of (32) together with assumptions about how the
person referred to looks and behaves, the implicit expression of contempt in (54)
together with a bunch of assumptions about what kind of person Peter is, what
kind of person his wife is and what sort of marriage they have, and, finally, the
implicit expression of dislike in (55) together with several assumptions about the
character of the person referred to, are recovered at least partly on the basis of the
way the particular definite descriptions guide the hearer to build the context in
which to interpret the corresponding utterances. Finally, in (34) and (56) the
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speaker has a particular attitude towards the content of the description: she does
not endorse it, but rather attributes it to someone else.16
To sum up, so far I have argued (a) that the descriptive content of
definite/indefinite descriptions used referentially contributes to the proposition
expressed by the utterances containing them and (b) that the standard assumption
that referentially used definite and indefinite descriptions only serve to pick out a
certain individual is not correct. Definite and indefinite descriptions used to secure
reference rarely have only this purpose in communication. Usually, in addition to
referring to a specific individual or thing, such descriptions help the hearer build up
the context in which the speaker intends her utterance to be interpreted and thus
give rise to contextual effects which a different description would not.17
16For a relevance-theoretic account of the way the examples in the last
paragraph are interpreted see Rouchota (1992a:158-160), Sperber and Wilson
(1983:64-66) and Wilson (1991 a). Roughly, the idea is that the definite descriptions
in (34) and (56) are used attributively (in the relevance theoretic sense, see
chapter 3). Utterances like (32), (54) and (55), on the other hand, are similar to
metaphorical utterances in that they are interpretations of complex thoughts (see
chapter 3). For example, uttering (32), the speaker intends to make manifest a
wide range of implicatures like Nthis man is always eating apple pies', 'this man
is very fat", The almost looks like an apple pie", the speaker does not like people
who cannot control their appetite', etc. For a discussion of the issues relating to
existential presupposition usually raised in connection with utterances like (56) see
Atlas (1989) and Burton-Roberts (1989).
'7Carston (1 993b) builds on the ideas argued for here and in Rouchota
(1 992a:1 58). She argues that an implication like 'McEnroe is the notoriously moody
tennis player' while a part of the truth-conditional content (proposition expressed)
plays a background role, i.e. it is not relevant in its own right, but may in addition
to helping the hearer secure reference, make more accessible the intended
context. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986: 202-217), background
implications do not have contextual effects of their own but contribute to overall
relevance in some other way, for example by increasing the accessibility of a
context in which effects can be achieved and thus reducing the processing effort
needed to achieve those effects. As I showed in this section, this is exactly how
the descriptive content of a definite or indefinite description contributes to the
interpretation process when the description is used referentially.
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4.5.5. The referential use and explicit content
The issue I want to discuss in this section is the status of the singular assumption
a is G which is communicated when a definite or an indefinite description is
interpreted referentially.
In a Gricean framework like that proposed in Neale (1990) for definite
descriptions and assumed in Ludlow and Neale (1991) for indefinite descriptions,
this proposition is a conversational implicature derived via the maxim of relevance
and quality. For example, consider the referential interpretation of (1), repeated
below, when uttered in the court of justice to pick out Perkins.
(1)	 The murderer of Smith is insane
Applying Neale's (1990:89) analysis for the referential use of definite descriptions
we get:
(a) The speaker has expressed the proposition Nthere is a unique x such that x is
Smith's murderer and x is insane
(b) There is no reason to suppose that the speaker is not observing the CP and
maxims.
(C) The speaker could not be doing so unless she thought that Perkins is insane.
On the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxim of relation, she must
be attempting to convey something beyond the general proposition that whoever
is uniquely Smith's murderer is insane. On the assumption that the speaker is
adhering to the maxim of Quality, she must have adequate eviderce for thinking
that Smith's murderer is insane. The hearer knows that the speaker knows that
Perkins is Smith's murderer, therefore the speaker thinks that Perkins is insane.
(d) The speaker knows (and knows that the hearer knows that she knows) that the
hearer knows that Perkins is Smith's murderer, that the hearer knows that the
speaker knows that Perkins is insane and that the hearer can see that the speaker
thinks the supposition that she thinks that Perkins is insan& is required.
(e) The speaker has done nothing to stop the hearer thinking that Perkins is
insane.
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(f) The speaker intends the hearer to think, or is at least willing to allow the hearer
to think, that Perkins is insane.
(g) The speaker has implicated that Perkins is insane.
This analysis inherits the problems of the Gncean framework within which it is
placed. Both the maxim of relation and the maxim of quality on which this analysis
depends are problematic (Sperber and Wilson 1986:31-38 and Wilson and Sperber
1981). I will show shortly that a much more adequate analysis can be given within
relevance theory.
The other problem with this analysis is that it does not capture the intuition
discussed in sections 4.3.2 and 4.5.3 that when a definite description is used
referentially the intended referent (or rather some individuated representation of it)
contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance.
Let us go back to Grice's original account of the referential-attributive
distinction. According to Grice, the truth-conditions of utterances with definite
descriptions, whether attributively or referentially used, are identical, and given by
the Russellian account ('with suitable provision for unexpressed restrictions to
cover cases in which, for example, someone uses the phrase the table meaning
thereby the table in this room', Gnce 1969: 142). Gnce clearly views Donnellan's
distinction as falling within the domain of pragmatics. Discussing the referential use
of the example jones' butler mixed up the hats and the coats, Grice (1969:142)
argues that 'if the speaker has used [referentially] a descriptive phrase (i.e. Jones'
butler) which in fact has no application , then what the speaker has said will,
strictly speaking, be false.., but what he meant may be true (for example, that a
certain particular individual [who is in fact Jones' gardener] mixed up the hats and
coats)'. So, Grice takes the proposition that a certain individual mixed up the hats
and the coats to be an implicature of the utterance Jones' butler mixed up the
hats and coats. Although Grice does not explain which of his maxims play a role
in the derivation of such an implicature, the obvious candidate seems to be the
maxim of relation. This is the line of analysis developed by Neale (1990).
Notice, however, that the claim that a speaker uttering Jones' butler mixed
up the hats and the coats intended to imply that a certain individual mixed up the
hats and the coats is slightly odd in a Gricean framework because it does not
mesh with Gnce's definition of what is said. In Logic and Conversation Grice
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(1975/1989: 25) defines the level of what is saidN as follows: •But for a full
identification of what the speaker had said, one would need to know (a) the identity
of X, (b) the time of utterance, and (C) the meaning, on the particular occasion of
utterance of the phrase in the grip of a vice. " . '8 Moreover, remember that,
according to Gnce, reference assignment is a contextually determined procedure
which contributes to the level of "what is said" rather than to the level of "what is
implicated". Now, the characteristic property of definite descriptions referentially
used is that the hearer is intended to identify the referent. In the example that
Grice discusses the speaker intended to say something of a certain individual
whom she (mistakenly in this case) believed to be Jones' butler. What the hearer
is expected to do in this case is to fix the referent. This suggests that the
referential use of definite descriptions is a case where the hearer has to assign
reference. As such it is a pragmatically determined aspect of the interpretation
which contributes to the explicitly communicated content of an utterance.19
This is the position I assumed in the last two sections. Some representation
of the intended referent is part of the proposition expressed by an utterance with
a referentially interpreted definite description. So, not only the concepts encoded
in the definite description but also the intended referent contributes to the basic
explicature of the utterance (see footnote 13).
Let's take an example and follow the interpretation process. Suppose A and
B are lecturers and have been discussing in the secretary's room what they ought
to do with old exam papers. None of them knows what to do. At that point the
Head of the department, Professor Darby, comes into the room. A pointing at
Professor Darby turns to B and utters (57):
(57) The Head of the Department will know
' 8 lt would only be fair, however, to mention here that Grice goes on to say:
"This brief indication of my use of say leaves it open whether a man who says
(today) Harold Wilson is a great man and another who says (also today) The
British Prime Minister is a great man would, if each knew that the two singular
terms had the same reference, have said the same thing". (Gnce 1975/1 989: 25).
' 91t is interesting to note here that in his later paper "Presupposition and
Conversational Implicature" Grice suggests that definite descriptions may be best
treated semantically as "a special subclass of referential expressions" (Grice 1981:
198), though, admittedly, at the very end of an analysis built on the Russelian
semantics.
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Processing the definite description the Head of the bepartment", the hearer will
gain access to the corresponding concepts. In this context, the interpretation on
which (57) expresses the proposition "The Head of the Department, whoever he
is, will know what to do with the old exam papers", cannot be the intended one
because it doesn't satisfy the hearer's expectation of relevance in this context. On
the basis of the linguistically encoded content of the description and other
contextual assumptions, such as that the speaker is pointing to Professor Darby
and that Professor Darby is the Head of the department, the hearer will easily infer
that the speaker intends to say something of Professor Darby. So, the proposition
expressed by (57) is "the Head of the Department, i.e. Professor Darby, will know
what to do with the old exam papers". On this interpretation the utterance is
optimally relevant. This piece of information is worth the hearer's attention in this
context because it gives rise to an adequate range of contextual effects for no
unjustifiable effort: since Professor Darby will know what to do with these
documents, A and B can now find out what they ought to do and get on with their
work. Notice in addition that, on this interpretation, (57) not only succeeds in
communicating something about a particular individual, but it also suggests an
explanation for why the intended referent will know what to do with the old exam
papers (because he is the Head of the bepartment).2°
I have so far analysed the referential interpretation of a definite description
as a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance interpretation which contributes
to the proposition expressed by the utterance. I have also shown how we can
provide a psychologically plausible pragmatic account of the referential
20Having argued for an explicature analysis of the referential use of definite
descriptions, it is interesting to compare, as was noted by Carston (1 993b), the
interpretation of utterances like these:
(I)	 Smith's murderer is insane (referential interpretation)
(ii)	 Perkins is Smith's murderer and he is insane
Carston (1 993b) points out that (i)-(ii) seem to be truth conditionally equivalent but
clearly they differ in pragmatic terms, i.e. in the effects they achieve and the
allocation of processing effort they require. More examples, I think, can be added
to this list:
(iii) Smith's murderer, Perkins, is insane
(iv) Perkins, Smith's murderer, is insane
(v) Perkins is Smith's murderer. He is insane
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interpretation of definite descriptions within relevance theory. The idea is that the
hearer will assign reference and thus enrich further the proposition expressed by
an utterance with a definite description whenever the result of the standard
enrichments (building in the existential implication and taking into account the
implication of uniqueness) is too weak to be consistent with the principle of
relevance. Let's now turn to the referential use of indefinite descriptions.
Consider again the example in (41):
(41) A convicted embezzler is flirting with your sister
when the hearer is intended to identify Jones as the person flirting with his sister.
In a Gricean framework, such as the one developed by Neale (1990) and
Ludlow and Neale (1991), the proposition Jones is flirting with your sister would
be a conversational implicature derived through the maxim of relation. The
derivation of this implicature would be similar to the one presented earlier for
definite descriptions and would face the same problems. A much more adequate
account can be given within relevance theory.
On the relevance view, processing the indefinite description in (41) involves
setting up a representation constrained by the concepts CONVICTED and
EMBEZZLER. According to the context given earlier for (41), the hearer knows that
Jones is a convicted embezzler. So, gaining access to the concepts CONVICTED
and EMBEZZLER, he is likely to retrieve the assumption that Jones is a convicted
embezzler. The concept Jones itself must be easily accessible to the hearer
since, according to the context, he has noticed that Jones is at the party. So, he
may construct the hypothesis that the speaker intends to communicate something
about Jones, namely that Jones is flirting with his sister. This hypothesis about the
intended interpretation of (41) is clearly the easiest one to construct in this context.
Moreover, it gives rise to a wide range of effects which make it worth the hearer's
attention. For example, it may yield the contextual implication that the hearer's
sister should be warned, it may strengthen the hearer's prior belief that Jones
takes advantage of women who fall for his charms, it may contradict and eliminate
the hearer's belief that his sister never talks to strangers and so on and so forth.
Since on this interpretation the utterance in (41) yields enough contextual effects
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without putting the hearer to unjustified effort, this is the interpretation the hearer
will recover.
Notice that, on this view, the proposition Jones is flirting with your sister"
is a contextual implication inferentially derived from the interaction between the
proposition expressed by the utterance, Nthere is an x, x is a convicted embezzler
and x is flirting with your sister", and other assumptions such as that Jones is a
convicted embezzler, that there is no other convicted embezzler around and that
the speaker is talking about some person in the room. Why is the proposition
communicated on the referential interpretation of an indefinite description an
implicature of the utterance?
The main argument for analysing the referential interpretation of a definite
description as contributing to the basic explicature of the utterance is that the
representation of the intended referent contributes to the truth-conditions of the
utterance (Donnellan 1966/1977, Searle 1979a, Récanati 1989a, 1993, Rouchota
1 992a, etc.). In the same vein, the main argument for treating the referential
interpretation of an indefinite description as contributing to the implicatures of an
utterance is the intuition that the representation of the intended referent does not
contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance (Ludlow and Neale 1991,
Récanati 1 989a, Rouchota 1 992b). Unfortunately, however, people's intuitions
about the truth conditions of utterances containing referentially used definite and
indefinite descriptions are fuzzy. So, in contrast to the authors mentioned above,
Grice (1969) claims that the intended referent does not contribute to "what is said"
by an utterance with a referentially interpreted definite description, and Chastain
(1975), Stich (1986), etc. believe that the intended referent does contribute to the
truth conditions of an utterance with a referentially used indefinite description.
Clearly, what we need is a way of sharpening our intuitions about the truth-
conditions of such utterances.
One way of checking our intuitions about the truth-conditions of utterances
is the scope test. This has also been used effectively by Carston (1988) in
connection with conjoined sentences, Wilson (1991 b) and lfantidou (1 993a, 1 993b)
in connection with adverbials and parentheticals. 21 Genuine conversational
implicatures as defined by Gnce do not fall under the scope of logical operators.
21 For discussion of the scope test see also Récanati (1989a) and Récanati
(1993:269-274).
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So, for example, Cohen (1971) argued that the temporal connotation often carried
by a conjunction is not a genuine conversational implicature by showing that the
result of embedding a conjunction and its reversed counterpart under the scope of
conditionals with contradictory consequents is not a contradictory sentence. So,
(58) If the old king died from a heart attack and a republic was declared
Sam will be happy, but if a republic was declared and the old king
died of a heart attack Sam will be unhappy
Trying to do something similar with indefinite descriptions we get:
(59) If a convicted embezzler is flirting with your sister, then we should warn
her, but if a convicted embezzler is flirting with your sister then we need not
warn her
This conjunction of conditionals forms a contradictory utterance which suggests
that the information that Jones is flirting with your sister is not part of the explicitly
communicated content of (41). So, the scope test seems to justify the analysis of
the referential use of indefinite descriptions as contributing to the implicitly
communicated content of an utterance. Application of the same test on the
referential use of definite descriptions, however, suggests that it is an implicature
too. Consider (60):
(60) If Smith's murderer is insane then we should put him in a separate cell, but
if Smith's murderer is insane then we need not put him in a cell
or,
(61) It is always the same in detective stories: either Smith's murderer is insane
or Smith's murderer is insane
The conditional is contradictory and the disjunction is redundant.
Despite these results, however, there are some reasons for not abandoning
the explicature analysis of the referential use of definite descriptions. First, I want
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to point out that the way we applied the scope test in the last paragraph will not
give us reliable results, since an utterance with a referentially interpreted
description always entails the corresponding utterance with an attributively
interpreted description (The murderer of Smith, Perkins, is insane entails The
murderer of Smith is insaneN). Second, I will show that if we apply the test in a
slightly different way, there are some indications that at least the referential
interpretation of definite descriptions should be seen as contributing to the
proposition expressed by the utterance.
In order to test whether an adverb like NallegedlyN contributes to the truth-
conditions of an utterance like NAllegedly, the ball was over the lin&, Wilson
(1991b) asks under what conditions the following conditional is true:
(62)	 If the ball was allegedly over the line, we should not count the point
Should we not count the point if the ball was over the line, or should we not count
the point if it was alleged that the ball was over the line. The latter is right, so
NallegedlyN
 contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance. We can use the
scope test in the same way for the referential interpretation of definite descriptions.
Suppose for example, that Perkins is accused of Smith's murderer. He's been
interrogated for hours. In the end, the officer in charge says:
(63)	 If Smith's murderer is insane, then we should stop this interrogation
The person they are interrogating is Perkins. Bearing this in mind one should ask:
under what conditions should they stop the interrogation they are carrying out? If
Smith's murderer, whoever he is, is insane or if Perkins is insane? Obviously, they
should stop their interrogation if Perkins is insane. The scope test suggests that
the referential interpretation of a definite description contributes to the proposition
expressed by the utterance. The test may be applied in the same way in
connection with indefinite descriptions. So, suppose that at a party witnessing
Jones, whom we both know to be a convicted embezzler, flirting with your sister
I say to you
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(64)	 If a convicted embezzler is flirting with your sister then you should take her
out of here as quickly as possible
Under what circumstances should you take your sister away from this party? If
Jones is flirting with her, or if any convicted embezzler is flirting with her?
Judgements here are not very clear. I would probably say that you should take
your sister away in case any convicted embezzler is flirting with her. This suggests
that the referential interpretation of indefinite descriptions does not contribute to the
proposition expressed by the utterance.
So, it seems that the scope test may provide us with some evidence that
while the referential interpretation of definite descriptions contributes to the
proposition expressed, the referential understanding of indefinites is implicated. In
any case we are clearly in need of further tests or criteria to distinguish between
pragmatically determined aspects of meaning which contribute to the explicature(s)
and those pragmatically determined aspects of meaning which contribute to the
implicatures of an utterance. It might turn out on the basis of more reliable tests
that the referential interpretation of both definite and indefinite descriptions can be
accounted for in parallel as contributing to the explicitly communicated content of
an utterance or that the status of the referential interpretation is different in the two
cases?2
4.6 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that definite and indefinite descriptions are not
semantically ambiguous between the referential, the attributive and the specific
An issue that has not been taken up here is whether the specific
interpretation of definite and indefinite descriptions contributes to the explicitly or
the implicitly communicated content of an utterance. In section 4.5.2 I have
analysed the specific interpretation as contributing to the implicitly communicated
content of the utterance. This, however, might turn out to be wrong once we have
a full set of criteria to distinguish between explicitly and implicitly communicated
aspects of utterance interpretation. Another issue that has not been discussed here
is the differences in meaning (if any) between an utterance with a referentially
interpreted definite description and an utterance with a referentially interpreted
indefinite description. For some preliminary remarks see Rouchota (1 992b: 290-
291).
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interpretation. I took the position that definite and indefinite descriptions are
referring expressions instructing the hearer to build up a representation in line with
their descriptive content. The semantic difference between definite and indefinite
descriptions is that definite descriptions guarantee that the representation the
hearer is expected to build is easily accessible. I have argued that assuming this
semantics we can account for the several uses/interpretations definite and
indefinite descriptions may have in pragmatic terms. I have discussed in greater
detail the referential interpretation of definite and indefinite descriptions. I have
argued that referentially interpreted definite and indefinite descriptions are seldom
used simply as tools for picking out the intended referent. Usually, in addition to
referring to a specific individual or thing, definite and indefinite descriptions help
the hearer build the context in which the speaker intends her utterance to be
processed and thus give rise to contextual effects which a different description
would not. I have also argued that the referential interpretation of at least definite
descriptions may be viewed as contributing to the explicitly communicated content
of an utterance. In the next chapter I will investigate the way in which the
interpretation of definite and indefinite descriptions interacts with the interpretation
of na-clauses in the grammatical environment of restrictive relative clauses.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INTERPRETATION OF NON NA- AND NA-RESTRICTIVE RELATIVES
5.1. Introduction
It has been argued with respect to many languages (Spanish, Romanian, French),
where there is a distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive mood, that
the choice of mood in a restrictive relative clause modifying a definite or indefinite
description reflects Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction: indicative
restrictive relatives are claimed to somehow force the referential interpretation
whereas subjunctive restrictive relatives impose the attributive interpretation. This
is often brought forward as evidence for the claim that the referential-attributive
distinction does not belong to the area of pragmatics but rather is a case of
semantic or even syntactic ambiguity (Hintikka 1969, Rivero 1975, Farkas 1985).
Similar observations have been put forward by Veloudis (1985) with respect
to indicative and subjunctive restrictive relatives in Modern Greek in the context of
intensional operators, i.e. propositional attitude verbs, future tense in its modal
interpretations, negation, interrogatives, imperatives and conditionals. Restrictive
relatives in the subjunctive may only occur in the context of one of these operators,
as we will see. Veloudis (1 985:123-129) takes over the claim often made in the
literature that the referential-attributive and the specific-nonspecific distinctions
coincide. He then argues that a definite description followed by a non na-RR, like
the one in (1), can be interpreted referentially/specifically only:
(1) 0 Janis theli na pantrefti tin kopela pou ehi ble matia
The John want-3s na marry-3s-PF the girl-acc that has blue eyes
John wants to marry the girl who has blue eyes
Note here that a definite description may not be followed by a na-RR:
(2) •0 Janis theli na pantrefti tin kopela pou na ehi ble matia
The John wants na marry-3s-PF the girl who na has blue eyes
John wants to marry the girl who has blue eyes
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Sentences like (2) are ungrammatical. For a syntactic account of such sentences
see Manzini (1994: 20). An indefinite description followed by a non na-AR, like the
one in (3), may be interpreted either referentially/specifically or
attributively/nonspecifically:
(3) 0 Janis theli na pantrefti mia kopela pou ehi ble matia
The John want-3s na marry-es-PF a girl that has blue eyes
John wants to marry a girl who has blue eyes
Finally, an indefinite description followed by a na-AR, like the one in (4),
can be interpreted attributively/nonspecifically only:
(4) 0 Janis theli na pantrefti mia kopela pou na ehi ble matia
The John want-3s na marry-3s-PF a girl that na has blue eyes
John wants to marry a girl who would have blue eyes12
I argued in chapter 4 that the referential-attributive distinction does not coincide
with the specific-nonspecific and that it lies within the area of pragmatics. Here, I
will show that, contrary to what Veloudis claims, definite descriptions in utterances
like (1) may be interpreted either referentially or attributively. As for the necessarily
attributive interpretation of the noun phrase in (3), I will argue that it is a direct
consequence of the semantics of na-clauses. With regard to what Veloudis calls
the specific-nonspecific distinction, I will argue that to the extent that it has to do
with the applicability of the rule of existential generalisation, it is to some extent
captured by the choice between a na- and a non na-relative. Finally, I will show
that, contrary to what Veloudis claims, a na-RR does not encode or force in any
way the interpretation on which the grammatical subject is taken to be responsible
1pou in its grammatical function of a relative pronoun is unspecified for gender
and number. The non na- and na- restrictive relatives discussed in this chapter
may be introduced either with pou or the normal relative pronoun o opios, i opia,
to opio which is marked for gender and number.
21n Modem Greek na-relatives may be either restrictive relatives or purpose
relatives. The discussion in this chapter concerns only na-restrictive relatives.
Veloudis (1985:113-114) offers a list of properties with respect to which na-
restrictive relatives are distinguished from na-purpose relatives.
240
for the content of the relative. I will argue that whether the content of the relative
is understood to be originating from the subject or the speaker depends on
considerations of optimal relevance.
5.2. Grammaticallsation of the referential-attributive distinction?
5.2.1. Definite descriptions and non na-restrictive relatives
Veloudis (1985) claims that in certain linguistic environments, the so-called
Intensional contexts, i.e. propositional attitude verbs, negation, future tense in its
modal interpretations, imperatives, na-clauses with imperatival force, questions,
hypothetical conditionals and counterfactuals, definite descriptions followed by non-
na-RRs are interpreted referentially only. Similar claims have been made for
Spanish (Rivero 1975). Here are a few examples from Modern Greek:
(5) Psahno ti gineka pou me magisa
look-is for the woman-acc that is witch
I am looking for the woman who is a witch
(6) Den sibatho ton ergati pou kiklofori afta ta filladia
Not like-is the worker-acc that distributes these leaflets
I do not like the worker who distributes these leaflets
(7) Tha apolisi ton ergati pou kiklofori afta ta filladia
will fire-3s the worker-acc that distributes these leaflets
He will fire the worker who distributes these leaflets
(8) Protine/Na protinis ti lisi pou ehi polla pleonektimata
Propose/na propose-2s-IMP the solution-acc that has many advantages
Propose/You should propose the solution which has many advantages
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(9) An ihe mialo tha ihe pantrefti ti gineka pou ehi lefta
if had-3s brain will had marned-3s the woman-acc that has money
If he had any brains he would have married the woman who has money
(10) Vrikes ton kathigiti pou bori na kathodigisi tin erevna sou?
Found-2s the professor-acc that can na supervise the research yours
Did you find the professor who can supervise your research?
(11) Ean entopisoume sintoma ton anthropo pou prodidi ta mistika tis
If locate-i p1 soon the man that betrays the secrets of
etenas mas, tha boresoume na prohorisoume me ta shedia mas
company ours will be able-ipl na go ahead-i p1 with the plans ours
If we identify the man who betrays the secrets of our company soon, we
will be able to go ahead with our plans
Note, first of all, that, if there are no intensional operators in a sentence,
definite descriptions followed by non na-RAs may be interpreted either attributively
or referentially, as we would expect given the pragmatic nature of Donnellan's
distinction. Suppose, for example, that our car was stolen and we still do not know
who the thief was. There is, however, evidence that the thief is lefthanded. Under
these circumstances, I can very well utter (12a) to inform you of the progress of
the investigation:
(12a) 0 anthropos pou ekiepse to aftokinito mas me aristerohir
The man that stole-3s the car our is left handed
The man who stole our car is lefthanded
In this context the definite description modified by the AR is used attributively: all
a rational speaker could have intended to communicate is that the man who stole
our car, whoever he is, is lefthanded. Suppose now that you and I know a car-
mechanic, Mr Flip, who is very good. We are now with John whose car has broken
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down, and none of the mechanics he has consulted has been able to repair it. In
this context I may say to you:
(12b) 0 anthropos pou hriazete o Janis den me edo
The man that need-3s the John not is here
The man that John needs is not here
In this context the definite description will be interpreted referentially; you, the
hearer, will understand that I am talking about Mr Flip.
Given such examples, there is no reason to assume a priori that definite
descriptions followed by non na-RRs in MG admit only of a referential
interpretation. Let us now return to Veloudis's claim regarding intensional contexts.
Is it true that the noun phrases in (5)-(1 1) can be understood referentially only?
The noun phrases in the examples in (5)-(9) certainly allow a referential
interpretation. They may be interpreted as picking out a particular referent given
a suitable context and considerations of relevance. So, for example, if we both
believe Jane to be a witch, I may, under certain circumstances, utter (5) expecting
you to infer that I am looking for Jane. If we both know that the worker who
distributes these leaflets is Peter, I may utter (6) intending you to understand that
I do not like Peter, or (7) expecting you to identify Peter as the person who is
going to be fired. Finally, consider (8). Suppose that you have just told me that
there are two ways to solve a particular problem and that we both agree on one
of them as being most advantageous. Uttering (8) in this context I will probably be
understood as advising you to propose that particular solution.
Notice, however, that the referential interpretation seems hardly available
for the examples (10) and (11). Let me start with (11). Assuming that both speaker
and hearer do not yet know who the man who betrays the secrets of their company
is, which seems to be the most natural interpretation of the antecedent of the
conditional, the definite description could never be intended to be interpreted
referentially. The definite description followed by the non na-AR in (10) is also
rather unlikely to be interpreted referentially. Since the speaker is asking whether
the hearer found the professor who can supervise his research, she may not even
know whether such a person exists at all. And even if she has reason to believe
that there is such a person, she probably does not know who this person is, so,
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she could not have used the noun phrase referentially. In these two examples the
information linguistically encoded in the utterance itself seems to impose the
attributive interpretation of the noun phrase. The existence of such examples
strongly suggests that definite descriptions followed by non na-AR in the
environment of the so-called intensional operators may be used attributively given
a suitable context. In fact, the attributive interpretation is the most natural
interpretation in all of the examples in (5)-(i 1).
The usual way of paraphrasing the attributive use of a definite description
is by adding the phrase whoever he/she/it is. So, one way of checking whether
the noun phrases in (5)-(9) admit of an attributive interpretation is to see whether
these utterances are still acceptable when followed by the test phrase. And,
indeed, they are as the English glosses show:
(5') Psahno ti gineka pou me magisa, opia ki an me
look for-is the woman-acc that be-3s witch, whoever and if be-3s
I am looking for the woman who is a witch, whoever she is/might be
(6') Den sibatho ton ergati pou kiklofori afta ta filladia, opios ki an me
Not like-is the worker-acc that distribute-3s these leaflets, whoever and if
be-3s
I do not like the worker who distributes these leaflets, whoever he is/might
be
(7') Tha apolisi ton ergati pou kiklofon afta ta filladia, opios ki an me
will fire-3s the worker-acc that distnbute-3s these leaflets, whoever and if
be-3s
She will fire the worker who distributes these leaflets, whoever he is/might
be
3Note that a referential interpretation of the noun phrase in (10) does not seem
altogether excluded. Suppose for example that we both know that Prof. Foggy is
the man who can supervise your research. Suppose further that you have suddenly
lost all contact with him, he has disappeared. If I utter (10) in this context, I will be
asking you whether you traced Prof. Foggy and the noun phrase will be used
referentially. Such observations simply strengthen the claim argued for in this
section that whether a definite description modified by a non na-RR is to be
interpreted referentially or attributively depends on pragmatic considerations.
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(8') Protine/Na protinis ti lisi pou ehi polla pleonektimata, opia ki an me
Propose/na propose-2s the solution-acc that have-3s many advantages,
whichever and it be-3s
Propose/You should propose the solution which has many advantages,
whichever it is/might be
(9') An ihe mialo tha ihe pantrefti ti gineka pou ehi lefta, opia ki an me
it had-3s brain will had married-3s the woman-acc that have-3s money,
whoever and if be-3s
If he had any brains he would have married the woman who has money,
whoever she is/may be
The fact that (5')-(9') are possible paraphrases of (5)-(9) provides evidence that the
noun phrases in these utterances may very well be interpreted attributivel?.
The next step is to try to find contexts in which the noun phrases in
utterances like those in (5)-(9) are indeed interpreted attributively. Let's take (5).
Suppose that I am a private detective and for some time now I have been looking
for the woman who is a witch. I still have no clues as to who she is or what she
looks like. I have been informed, however, that she will be at this party. So, I take
one of my assistants who is familiar with the story and go to this party. Later my
assistant finds me in the cellar and, surprised, he asks what I am doing there. I
answer with (5). In this context, since neither speaker nor hearer have an
individuated representation of this woman, the definite description followed by the
AR cannot but be interpreted attributively. Similar contexts where the attributive
interpretation is the only one available can be worked out for the examples (6)-(9).
4Certain doubts may be expressed with regard to the reliability of this test
because the phrase whoever he/she/it is may accompany a definite description
when it is used referentially, as in (i) below:
(i)	 I will sue the man whom we both saw stealing the money whoever he
is/might be
In cases like (I) the phrase 'whoever he is' may mean 'despite/no matter who he
is .
 This is not, however, the interpretation that this phrase is intended to have in
(5')-(9'). In these examples it simply indicates that the speaker does not have a
particular individual in mind.
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Moreover, one could think of contexts for utterances like those in (5)-(9)
where, although speaker and hearer do have an individuated representation of the
referent satisfying the description, the recovery of this representation is not
necessary for the utterance to be consistent with the principle of relevance and so
the noun phrase is interpreted attributively. Let's take, for example, (6). Suppose
that A and B know that John has recently been circulating certain leaflets which
upset the director of the company. As a result, John is going to be fired. Later at
the pub the following conversation takes place between A and B:
(13) A: Den sibatho tous diefthintes san ton diko mas
I do not like directors who behave like ours
B: Giati? Ti ekane?
Why? What did he do? (What's wrong with him?)
A: Gia paradigma, tha apolisi ton ergati pou kiklofori afta ta filadia.
For example, will fire-3s the worker-acc that circulates these the leaflets
For example, he will fire the worker who circulates these leaflets
In this context A's intention in using the definite description followed by the
restrictive relative is not to pick out John. Notice that the way I set up the context
A knows that B knows that John is going to be fired. So A would not be intending
to communicate the proposition the director will fire John. The point of A's
utterance is to explain why she doesn't like the director. So, what she intends to
communicate is that the director is the kind of person who would fire someone
because he circulates certain leaflets. In this case, though Ihe referential
interpretation is available, the utterance is consistent with the principle of relevance
when the noun phrase is interpreted attributively, which, in this context, is the first
interpretation to come to mind. So, this is the interpretation the hearer will choose.
Finally, it is noticeable that in all the examples I have used so far and in all
the examples Veloudis discusses the definite description followed by the non na-
AR occurs in object position. However, definite descriptions in subject position, the
position with respect to which the referential-attributive distinction was originally
discussed, may be followed by a non na-RR as we can see from (14):
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(14) a. To koritsi pou ehi ksantha malia den eftase akoma
the girl who has blonde hair not arrived-3s yet
The girl who has blonde hair hasn't arrived yet
b. To koritsi pou milai tris gloses tha vri efkola doulia
the girl who speak-3s three languages will find easy work
The girl who speaks three languages will find work easy
As expected, the definite descriptions in (14) may be interpreted either attributively
or referentially depending on the context and considerations of optimal relevance.
have shown in this section that contrary to what Veloudis (1985) claims,
the referential use of definite descriptions is not grammaticalised in MG by the use
of definite descriptions followed by non na-RRs in intensional contexts. Definite
descriptions modified by non na-RRs may be interpreted either attributively or
referentially depending on the context and considerations of relevance.
Let me finish by pointing out that analyses of the relevant Spanish (Rojas
1977, Rivero 1977) and French (Pavel 1976, Kleiber 1987) data show that definite
descriptions followed by indicative restrictive relatives in these languages may also
be interpreted referentially or attributively depending on the context. For example,
here is what Pavel (1976:147) says for the definite description followed by the
indicative relative in (15):
(15) Je cherche Ia femme qui peut m'aimer
I am looking for the woman who can love me
NIn [(15)] Ia femme qui peut m'aimer is not always referentially used. To be sure
I can designate Martine Ia femme quipeut m'aimer and then tell her brother using
[(15)] that I am looking for Martine. But I could just as well be an unhappy optimist
looking for the unique woman able to love me. [(15)] would be equally appropriate
for this use which is manifestly attributive.TM
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5.2.2. Indefinite descriptions and non na-restrictive relatives
As one would expect given the pragmatic nature of the referential-attributive
distinction, indefinite descriptions followed by non na-RRs in non-intensional
contexts, like the one in (16), may be used either attributively or referentially.
(16) Pirane aftes tis plirofones apo enan astronafti pou epestrepse htes apo to
fegari
took-3p1 these the informations from an astronaut that returned-3s
yesterday from the moon
They obtained this information from an astronaut who returned from the
moon yesterday
The speaker in (16) may either intend the hearer to pick out a particular astronaut
or she may simply intend to point out that it was an astronaut (rather than, for
example, a geologist) who provided the information in question.
As Veloudis (1985) says, indefinite descriptions modified by a non na-RR
in intensional linguistic contexts may be interpreted either referentially or
attributively. To take one example, consider (17) below,
(17) Thelo na horepso me ena nearo pou aristepse stis eksetasis tou
want-I to dance with a young that took a first in exams his
I want to dance with a young man who took a first in his exams
Say that the speaker has been invited to a party where there will be lots of young
men who have done well in their exams. The speaker does not know any of these
brilliant young men, she only knows the person who organises the party. When
asked why she is going to this party, the speaker may utter (17). All she could
have intended to communicate in this context is that she wants to dance with some
young man (or other) who has taken a first. The indefinite description followed by
the non na-RR is used attributively. Suppose now that the speaker addresses (17)
to Peter who took a first in his exams and who knows that the speaker wants to
dance with him, because, for example, she has been flirting with him for some
time. In this context the noun phrase a young man who took a first in his exams
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may be interpreted referentially. The speaker intends to communicate that she
wants to dance with Peter.
Despite examples like (17), it may seem that indefinite descriptions followed
by non na-RR in intensional contexts tend to be interpreted attributively. Consider,
for example, the following utterances:
(18) Na pantreftis mia gineka pou me eksipni
Na marry-2s-PF a woman that is clever
You should marry a woman who is clever
(19) An itan eksipnos o Janis tha pigene se ena panepistimio pou me gnosto
If were-3s clever the John will go-3s to a university that is well-known
If John were clever he would go to a university which is well-known
There are two considerations here. First, the fact that the indefinite descriptions in
(18) and (19) tend to be interpreted attributively is not surprising on the relevance-
oriented analysis I developed in chapter 4. The referential interpretation requires
the hearer to take an extra inferential step, i.e. to recover or construct an
individuating representation of the intended referent. The hearer will derive this
implicature, if this interpretation is the first one that comes to mind and yields
adequate contextual effects. There is, however, nothing in the context set up by
(18) and (19) that suggests that the referential interpretation was the one the
hearer was supposed to recover. In simple words, if there is no reason for the
hearer to derive the referential interpretation, then he will not. Placed in a suitable
context, on the other hand, the speaker of (18) may communicate that his hearer
should marry a particular woman, say Jane, who is clever, and the speaker of (19)
may communicate that if John was clever he would go to a particular university,
say UCL, which is well known.
Second, indefinite descriptions are less susceptible to the referential use
than definite descriptions, independently of whether they occur in intensional or
extensional linguistic environments. Picking out a uniquely identified
individuaVobject presupposes that it is accessible to both speaker and hearer. Now
remember that the definite article guarantees the accessibility and uniqueness of
the representation the hearer is expected to set up. As a result, the possibility of
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the referential interpretation of definite descriptions is easy to entertain even in the
absence of particular contextual information. Indefinite descriptions, on the other
hand, carry no guarantee of accessibility. For an indefinite description to be
interpreted referentially both accessibility and uniqueness are a function of the
context. As a result, in the absence of suitable contextual information it is not easy
to entertain the possibility of the referential interpretation of an indefinite
description. So, the intuition that indefinite descriptions followed by non na-RR in
intensional contexts do not trigger the referentia' interpretation as easily as definite
descriptions, in the absence of specific contextual information, can be explained
as an instance of a more general tendency.
5.2.3. Na-restrictive relatives
I have shown in the previous sections that the choice of a non na-RR as a modifier
for a definite or an indefinite description does not inevitably lead to the referential
interpretation of the noun phrase. Let me now turn to na-restrictive relatives. It is
correctly pointed out by Veloudis (1985) that indefinite descriptions followed by na-
RRs admit only of the attributive interpretation. I am going to argue in this section
that this is a direct consequence of the semantics of na-clauses as defined in
chapter 1. (Recall that, as I mentioned in the introduction, na-RRs may occur in the
scope of intensional operators only and that they may not modify definite
descriptions).
Indefinite descriptions followed by na-RRs in intensional contexts like the
ones in (20)-(26) cannot be interpreted either referentially or specifically (in the
sense defined in chapter 4):
(20) 0 Janis epithimi na erotefti mia galida pou na ehi prasina matia
The John desire-3s to fall in love a French that na have-3s green eyes
John desires to fall in love with a French woman who has green eyes
(21) I Maria den ehi vri ena arthro pou na sizita afto to thema
The Mary not have found-3s an article that na discuss-3s this the issue
Mary has not found a paper which discusses this issue
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(22) 0 Kostas tha proslavi mia gramatea pou na ksen grafomihani
The Kostas will hire-3s a secretary that na know-3s typewriter
Kostas will hire a secretary who knows how to type
(23) Agorase/na agorasis ena podilato pou na ehi tahitites
Buy/na buy-2s a bike that na have-3s gears
Buy/you should buy a bike which has gears
(24) Vrikes mia fousta pou na pigeni me tin blousa sou?
Found-2s a skirt that na go-3s with the blouse yours
Did you find a skirt which goes with your blouse
(25) An dis ena forema pou na sou aresi, na to agorasis
If see-2s a dress that na you Iike-3s, na it buy-2s
If you see a dress which you like, you should buy it
(26) Ean ihe mialo tha ihe pantrefti mia gineka pou na me morfomeni
If had-3s brain will had married-3s a woman that na is educated
If he had any brains he would have married a woman who is educated5
That the noun phrases in (20)-(26) cannot be interpreted referentially or specifically
can be shown by the unacceptability that results, if we try to continue the discourse
with utterances which presuppose the referential or specific use of the noun
phrase. For example, consider the unacceptability of the discourse in (27) 6
i have (mostly) translated the non na- and the na-relatives with the simple
indicative in English and so the semantic difference is lost in the English glosses.
It might be helpful to think of the na-relatives as representing what is known as the
narrow scope reading of the corresponding English utterances. Another way of
translating at least some of these na-relatives is with the English would. For
example, for (20) John desires to fall in love with a French woman who would
have green eyes
6Similar tests are used in Kleiber (1 987:70). The symbol *? is used to mark a
sequence of utterances as strongly unacceptable.
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(27) a. ?O Janis epithimi na erotefti mia galida pou na ehi prasina matia. Tin
lene Iren
The John desire-3s na fall in love a French that na has green eyes. Her
call-3p1 Iren
*?John desires to fall in love with a French woman who would have green
eyes. She is called Iren
b. *?A: 0 Kostas tha proslavi mia gramatea pou na kseri grafomihani.
B: Pia me?
A: The Kostas will hire a secretary that na know-3s typewriter
B: Who is-3s?
*?A: Kostas will hire a secretary who would know how to type.
B: Who is she?
Notice that if you replace the na-relatives with non na-relatives in the examples
above the referential interpretation is fine:
(28) a. 0 Janis epithimi na erotefti mia galida pou ehi prasina matia. Tin lene
I ren
The John desire-3s na fall in love a French that have-3s green eyes. Her
call-3p1 Iren
John desires to fall in love with a French woman who has green eyes. She
is called Iren
b. A: 0 Kostas tha proslavi mia gramatea pou kseri grafomihani.
A: The Kostas will hire-3s a secretary that know-3s typewriter
B: Pia?
B: Who/which one?
A: Kostas will hire a secretary who knows how to type.
B: Which one?
Moreover, indefinite descriptions followed by na-RRs in the subject position may
be interpreted attributively only:
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(29) Enas mathitis pou na apantise sosta den vrethike akoma
a pupil who na answered-3s correctly not found-3s yet
A pupil who answered correctly has not been found
It seems clear then that indefinite descriptions followed by na-RRs allow only the
attributive interpretation. That is, the hearer is intended to build a representation
on the basis of the concepts provided in the description and the relative only; the
pragmatic inferences which result in the specific or the referential interpretation of
indefinite descriptions are somehow prohibited.
For a definite or indefinite description to be used specifically or referentially
there is one prerequisite: there must exist an individuaVobject that the speaker has
in mind or intends the hearer to pick out. It seems that the use of a na-RR
excludes this prerequisite. This does not mean that the use of a na-relative in, for
example, (20) necessarily conveys that a French woman with green eyes does not
exist but it does not exclude this possibility. Intuitively, this seems to be the source
of the impossibility of a specific or referential use of the indefinite descriptions in
(20)-(26).
According to the semantic analysis of na-clauses that I proposed in chapter
1, the presence of the modal particle na in the relatives in (20)-(26) indicates that
the state of affairs described in the relative is true in some possible world. The
question arises, however, whether a restrictive relative clause can be said to be
describing a state of affairs? Doesn't it simply function as a modifier which ascribes
a property to the head noun?7
According to Wilson and Sperber (1986, 1 988a), the presence of a wh-word
in interrogatives and exclamatives indicates that such utterances are interpretive
representations of other thoughts. So, for example, an interrogative like (30)
(30) What is on the table?
has the semantic representation in (31)
(31) _____ is on the table
7For a recent syntactic analysis of relative clauses see Fabb (1990).
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which interpretively represents a relevant thought (the thought expressed by (31)
when it is completed). Extending this analysis to relative clauses, which are also
charactensed by the presence of a gap to be filled (the wh-word), we get the
following result: the relative in (32)
(32) John desires to fall in love with a French woman who has green eyes
is an interpretation of the complete thought A French woman has green eyes
which is itself a description of a state of affairs in the actual world 8 In the same
vein, the na-AR in, for example, (20) is an interpretive representation of the
thought a French woman has green eyes which is a description of a state of
affairs in a possible world, as the semantics of na-clauses dictates.
Given all this, the unavailability of the specific and referential use of the
noun phrases followed by na-AAs seems to follow from the semantics of na and
pragmatic considerations. In (20) the proposition Na French woman has green
eyes" is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world. It
follows that this proposition may or may not be a true description of the actual
world (the actual world being one of the possible worlds). Now, if this proposition
is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world, then nothing
follows as to whether this proposition is a true description of the actual world and
therefore nothing follows about whether a French woman with green eyes exists
in the actual world. Given the possibility that such a woman may not exist, it
cannot be the case that the speaker has in mind an individuating representation
of such a person, and so the specific and the referential uses of the noun phrase
are clearly excluded . By contrast definite and indefinite descriptions followed by
non na-ARs allow (given an appropriate context and considerations of relevance)
specific and referential readings, as we have seen in the previous sections,
81 am grateful to Deirdre Wilson for suggesting to me this analysis of relatives.
9An explanation similar to this is given in Kleiber (1987:71-73) for subjunctive
relatives in French, which also impose the attributive (or, according to Kleiber, the
"nonspecific ") reading. Kleiber claims that the subjunctive is the marker of
nonspecific hypothetical existence. Because of this semantics, the sub-class
defined by the noun phrase followed by the subjunctive relative may be empty,
which excludes the specific and the referential interpretation.
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because the indicative in the relative typically indicates that the proposition
expressed is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the actual world.
Two further considerations confirm the claim that it is the semantics of na-
clauses which disallows the referential and the specific interpretation in the
utterances above. First, na-RRs may occur only within the scope of an intensional
expression. The sentences in (33) are ungrammatical because of the clash
between the extensionality of the main clause and the semantics of the na-relative,
whereas the corresponding sentences in (34) with non na-RRs are fine:
(33) a. *0 Janis fita se ena panepistimio pou na me poli gnosto
The John study-3s at a university that na is very well-known
John is studying at a university which is very well-known
b. *To koritsi pou na kathete dipla mou me poli omorfo
the girl that na sit-3s next me-gen is very beautiful
The girl who's sitting next to me is very beautiful
(34) a. 0 Janis fita se ena panepistimio pou me poli gnosto
The John study-3s at a university that is very well-known
John is studying at a university which is very well-known
b. To koritsi pou kathete dipla mou me poli omorfo
the girl tha sit-3s next me-gen is very beautiful
The girl who is sitting next to me is very beautiful
So, a na-AR cannot modify a noun phrase which clearly refers to n individual or
object in this world.1°
10Apparent counterexamples to this claim may be utterances like (i):
(I) Agorase epitelous i Maria ena palto pou na tis pigeni
Bought eventually the Maria a coat that na her suits
Mary eventually bought a coat which suits her
(i) clearly entails that there is a coat which suits Mary (in fact she bought it).
Notice, however, that the word epitelous eventually is crucial for the acceptability
of (i); (ii) below is definitely ungrammatical:
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Second, if Klelber and Martin (1977) are right in arguing that a quantifier
like chaque carries a positive existential presupposition, and if their arguments
carry over to the Greek equivalent kathe, then kathe should be incompatible with
a na-AR in the same way that in French chaque is incompatible with a relative in
the subjunctive as shown in (35) and (36):
(35) *Je desire visiter chaque maison qui ait des volets veils
(36) Je desire visiter chaque maison qui a des volets veils
(Kleiber 1987:73)
This is indeed the case as the following examples show:
(37) *0 Janis theli na episkefti kathe spiti pou na ehi anakenisthi
The John want-3s na visit-3s-PF every house that na has been renovated-
3s
*?John wants to visit every house which would have been renovated
(38) *Q Janis den ehi episkefti kathe spiti pou na ehi anakenisthi
The John not have visited-3s every house that na have-3s been renovated
*?John has not visited every house which would have been renovated
(39) *Episkeftike o Janis kathe spiti pou na ehi anakenisthi?
Visited-3s the John every house that na has been renovated-3s
*?Did John visit every house which would have been renovated?
Compare these examples with the perfectly acceptable (40)-(42), where a non na-
RR is used:
(ii)	 *Agorase i Maria ena palto pou na tis pigeni
bought-3s the Maria a coat that na her suit-3s
Mary bought a coat which suits her
This is because the word epitelous in (i) suggests that Mary had been looking for
such a coat, thus creating an intensional context.
256
(40) 0 Janis theli na episkefti kathe spiti pou ehi anakenisthi
The John want-3s na visit-3s-PF every house that has been renovated
John wants to visit every house which has been renovated
(41) 0 Janis den ehi episkefti kathe spiti pou ehi anakenisthi
The John not has-3s visited every house that has been renovated
John has not visited every house which has been renovated
(42) Episkeftike o Janis kathe spiti pou ehi anakenisthi?
Visited-3s the John every house that has been renovated
Did John visit every house which has been renovated?
Before concluding this section, it is interesting to consider the conditions
which determine whether a speaker will use a na- or a non na-RR when she
intends the indefinite description to be interpreted attributively. Let us compare (43)
and (44):
(43) I Maria theli na diavasi ena vivlio pou eksigi tis diafores metaksi tis Agglikis
ke tis Ellinikis koultouras
The Mary want-3s na read-3s-PF a book-acc that explain-3s-PF the
differences between the English-gen and the Greek-gen culture-gen
Mary wants to read a book which explains the differences between English
and Greek culture
(44) I Maria theli na diavasi ena vivlio pou na eksigi tis diafores metaksi tis
Agglikis ke tis Ellinikis koultouras
The Mary want-3s na read-3s-PF a book-acc that na explain-3s-IPF the
differences between the English-gen and the Greek-gen culture
Mary wants to read a book which would explain the differences between
English and Greek culture
I have shown that the noun phrase ena vivio pou eksigi tis diafores metaksi
tis Agglikis ke tis Ellinikis koultouras a book which explains the differences
between English and Greek culture in (43) may be interpreted either referentially
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or attributively, depending on the context and considerations of optimal relevance.
On the other hand, I have argued that the noun phrase ena v/v/b pou na eksigi tis
diafores metaksi tis Agglikis ke tis Ellinikis koultouras a book which would explain
the differences between English and Greek culture in (44), which is linguistically
more complex, may only be interpreted attributively as a result of the semantics of
the na-RR. Imagine now a context where the speaker intends the NP a book to
be interpreted attributively but where the referential interpretation is more easily
accessible. For example, John is showing Peter a few books that he has just
bought and one of them is on the differences between Greek and English culture.
Suppose that Peter wants to say that his English girlfriend Mary wants to read
such a book. Suppose further that Peter is well-known for wanting to borrow things
from other people all the time. In this context, if Peter utters (43) pointing to John's
book, John is likely to interpret the NP referentially. This interpretation would be
very easily accessible given that there is an immediately accessible suitable
referent, and it would, given the rest of the context, yield an adequate range of
effects: for example, Peter may be implicating that he would like to borrow John's
new book. To exclude this interpretation, Peter will choose to utter (44). So,
depending on the accessibility of contexts, the linguistically costlier na-relative may
end up saving the hearer some processing effort by making the intended
interpretation explicit."
To sum up, definite and indefinite descriptions followed by non na-RRs may
be interpreted either referentially or attributively depending on considerations of
context and optimal relevance. Indefinite descriptions followed by na-RRs, on the
other hand, may be interpreted attributively only, as a result of the semantics of na.
' 1The same considerations about the accessibility of available contexts play a
role in the interpretation of utterances like (i) and (ii):
(i) You can have rice or vegetables
(ii) You can have rice and/or vegetables
The disjunction in (i) may be interpreted exclusively or inclusively. By contrast (ii),
which is linguistically more complex, allows the inclusive interpretation only. Now
suppose you are convinced that I am stingy. Given this you are likely to interpret
(i) exclusively. Now suppose further that I have set out to prove to you that I am
not stingy. In this context I will probably choose the linguistically more complex (ii),
which has the advantage of making the intended, i.e. the inclusive, interpretation
explicit.
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This does not provide any support for the view that definite and indefinite
descriptions are ambiguous between an attnbutive and a referential sense. We
simply have here a case where an interpretation which is usually contextually
determined (the attributive interpretation) is effectively imposed by the semantics
of the rest of the sentence.
5.3. The wide vs narrow scope distinction
5.3.1. Donnellan's distinction and the wide-narrow scope contrast
Veloudis (1985) conflates Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction with what he
calls the specific-nonspecific contrast. His analysis at this point is based on
Farkas (1985) who takes the specific-nonspecific distinction to be a matter of
scope and argues that the referential-attributive contrast is a subcase of the
specific-nonspecific distinction.
According to Farkas (1985), the specific-nonspecific ambiguity is the one
characteristically found in sentences of the form every sailor loves a girl and has
to do with considerations of scope (whether a girl takes wide or narrow scope
with respect to the universal quantifier). Now, an utterance like
(45) Mary wants to go to an Ivy League university
has, according to Farkas, two interpretations. It may mean that there is a specific
Ivy League university to which Mary wants to go or it may mean that Mary wants
to go to some Ivy League university or other. In the first interpretation the indefinite
description takes wide scope with respect to Nwant, in which case it is specific. In
the second interpretation the indefinite description takes narrow scope, i.e. falls
within the scope of want, in which case it is nonspecific. For Farkas, specific NPs
can only be referential and nonspecific NPs can only be attributive (see also
Heringer 1969, Hall-Partee 1972, Cole 1975 and Rivero 1975). It follows, according
to Farkas, that with regard to examples like (45) the specific-nonspecific and the
referential-attributive distinctions coincide and are adequately represented in terms
of scope.
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I have argued in chapter 4 that the referential-attributive distinction cannot
be defined in terms of scope variation, It has repeatedly been pointed out in the
literature that the claim that wide scope NPs can only be referential does not stand
up to close scrutiny (loup 1977, Kripke 1977, King 1988, Neale 1990, Ludlow and
Neale 1991). On the wide scope reading the utterance in (45) admits of two
interpretations. It may mean that there is a particular university, say X, to which
Mary wants to go or it may mean that there is some Ivy League university or other,
to which Mary wants to go. So, the wide scope (or specific) reading of the
utterance in (45) does not inevitably lead to the referential interpretation of the NP.
In other words, the referential use cannot be defined in terms of the wide scope
reading and the attributive use cannot be defined in terms of the narrow scope
reading.
Although the wide-narrow scope contrast does not represent the referential-
attributive distinction, it may be a way of representing two pairs of interpretations
of utterances like (45),12
First, utterances like (46),
(46) Fred wants to meet a Spanish girl who likes cycling
are assumed to be ambiguous between a reading on which you can infer that there
is a Spanish girl who likes cycling and a reading on which this inference would not
go through. The first reading is usually represented by a logical form where the
indefinite description followed by the relative takes wide scope over Nwantn; the
second reading is represented by letting the indefinite and the relative fall under
the scope of wantN. In this case the wide scope represents the reading of (46) on
which existential generalisation can go through, whereas the narrow scope
represents the reading on which existential generalisation fails.
Second, utterances like (47)
'2The way of understanding the wide-narrow contrast that I am about to present
relates to the distinction that philosophers draw between transparent and opaque
contexts (Quine 1969, Fodor 1979). The term opaque context is used for those
linguistic contexts (sentence forms) in which two inference rules, existential
generalisation and substitutivity of identicals, do not apply. Here, these two rules
are going to be discussed separately.
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(47) John wants to follow a course which is fun
are standardly taken to be ambiguous between the transparent and the opaque
interpretations. On the transparent interpretation, the speaker (but not necessarily
John) thinks of the course that John wants to follow that it is fun. On the opaque
interpretation it is John (and not the speaker) who thinks of the course he wants
to follow that it is fun. (For this construal of the transparent-opaque distinction see
Bach 1987: 194-218, especially 200-201; Récanati 1993:386-393, especially 389).
As we will see on the opaque interpretation of utterances like (47) the law of
substitution of identicals salva ventate does not apply.
In the remainder of this chapter I want to consider whether these two
distinctions, that may be represented in terms of scope variation, are in any sense
captured by the choice between a non na- and a na-AR.
5.3.2. Existential generalisation and the choice of mood
Farkas (1985) argues that in Romanian the mood of a relative clause
depends on whether the NP in which the relative occurs is within the scope of an
intensional operator. According to her, if an NP has narrow scope then it may take
a subjunctive relative. So, for example in (48) you can have a subjunctive relative
because the NP falls under the scope of the world-creating verb. On the other
hand, an utterance like (49) with an indicative relative, is ambiguous depending on
whether the NP takes wide or narrow scope with respect to uwantu.
(48) Ion vrea sa prinda un peste care sa aiba 5 kg
Ion wants to catch a fish which has(SUBJ) 5 kg
Ion wants to catch a fish which weighs 5 kg
(49) Ion vrea sa prinda un peste care are 5 kg
Ion wants to catch a fish which has(IND) 5 kg
Ion wants to catch a fish which weighs 5 kg
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Veloudis (1985) makes the same claims about MG. In (50), where the NP
falls within the scope of want, a na-RR is used. (51), on the other hand, is
ambiguous: the indefinite description and the relative may have wide or narrow
scope with respect to want:
(50) 0 Janis theli na piasi ena psari pou na zigizi 5 kila
the John want-3s na catch-3s-PF a fish that na weigh-3s 5 kilos
John wants to catch a fish which weighs 5 kilos
(51) 0 Janis theli na piasi ena psan pou zigizi 5 kila
The John want-3s na catch-3s-PF a fish that weigh-3s 5 kilos
John wants to catch a fish which weighs 5 kilos
If we take scope permutation as a means of representing the applicability
of the rule of existential generalisation, then we could claim that in Greek this is to
some extent reflected by the choice between a na- and a non na-RR in the
linguistic environment of intensional expressions. As I argued in section 5.2.3,
sentences like the ones in (20)-(26), where the indefinite description is followed by
a na-AR allow the narrow scope reading only, which means that existential
generalisation is never valid in such sentences. The fact that existential
generalisation is not possible in these examples simply follows from the semantics
of na-clauses. The na-relatives encode that the proposition expressed is
entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world. From this you
cannot infer that something satisfying the description given in the NP and the
relative exists in the actual world. Nor can you infer that something satisfying the
description does not exist in the actual world. Otherwise, all the utterances in (20)
to (26) would be somewhat contradictory. The speaker using the na-relative avoids
making any claims with regard to whether something satisfying the description
exists or not. So, the na-clause imposes the narrow scope interpretation of these
utterances and existential generalisation is not valid.
Let us now consider whether existential generalisation may apply when we
have indefinite descriptions followed by non na-ARs in the context of the
intensionat expressions:
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(52) 0 Janis epithimi na erotefti mia galida pou ehi prasina matia
The John desire-3s na fall in love a French that have-3s green eyes
John desires to fall in love with a French woman who has green eyes
(53) Agorase/na agorasis ena podilato pou ehi tahitites
Buy/na buy-2s a bike that have-3s gears
Buy/you should buy a bike which has gears
(54) 0 Kostas tha proslavi mia gramatea pou ksen grafomihani
The Kostas will hire-3s a secretary that know-3s typewriter
Kostas will hire a secretary who knows how to type
(55) An dis ena forema pou sou aresi, na to agorasis
If see-2s a dress that you Iike-3s, na it buy-2s
If you see a dress which you like, you should buy it
(56) I Maria den ehi vri ena arthro pou sizita afto to thema
The Mary not have-3s found an article that discuss-3s this the issue
Mary has not found a paper which discusses this issue
(57) Vrikes mia doulia pou se ikanopii?
found-2s a job that you satisfy-3s
Have you found a job that satisfies you?
According to Veloudis (1985), (52)-(57) allow both a wide and a narrow scope
reading. To the extent that scope permutation represents the possibility of inferring
the existential implication, this is compatible with the semantics of non na-RRs. As
I argued in chapter 1, a non na-clause encodes the information that the proposition
expressed is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in the base world. In
most cases the base world will be pragmatically set to be the actual world. Given
this, the implication of existence will be built into the proposition expressed (as
explained in chapter 4) and existential generalisation is possible. So, for example,
(52) has a reading on which the NP takes wide scope and which could be roughly
paraphrased as there is a French woman who has green eyes and John wants
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to marry her. In this case, John has a desire which is directed towards an
individual in the actual world. Alternatively, the base world indicated by the non na-
relative may be inferred to be the world defined by John's desire, in which case the
proposition expressed in the relative describes part of what John wants. So, (52)
has a reading on which the NP and the relative take narrow scope with respect to
want and could be roughly paraphrased as John wants that he fall in love with
a French woman with green eyes. In this case existential generalisation is not
warranted. Similar considerations hold for (53). If the base world indicated by the
indicative relative is taken to be the actual world, then existential generalisation will
go through; if, on the other hand, the base world is understood to be the potential
and desirable world described by the imperative/na-clause, then existential
generalisation cannot apply.
To the extent that the examples in (54)-(57) also have two interpretations
(one on which existential generalisation goes through and another on which it does
not), they should be accounted for pragmatically as well. A full discussion of these
examples will have to be based on the semantics of the future, conditional clauses,
negation and interrogatives, which does not (necessarily) involve possible worlds. 13
For example, natural language negation is usually taken to be semantically
equivalent to the logical operator - (Grice 1975/89, Kempson 1986, Carston 1994).
Assuming this semantics for the negation in (56), we cannot account for the
perfectly acceptable (58) by claiming that the base world in the relative is not
actual (there is nothing in the sentence that could cause the shift from the default
interpretation of the indicative to some other interpretation)14:
13For a semantic analysis of future which does not involve the concept of
possible worlds see Huntley (1980, 1984); for an analysis of conditionals which
does not involve possible worlds see Smith and Smith (1988). A semantic analysis
of interrogatives which does not hinge on the idea of possible worlds has been
proposed by Wilson and Sperber (1 988a) and was outlined in this thesis in chapter
3.
' 4Some arguments supporting the claim made here that (60) is not
contradictory are proposed in Carston (1994).
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(58)	 I Maria den ehi vri ena arthro pou sizita afto to thema giati tetio arthro den
ehi akoma grafti
The Mary not have-3s found an article that discuss-3s this the issue
because such article not have-3s yet written
Mary has not found a paper which discusses this issue because such a
paper hasn't been written yet
The interpretation of such an utterance depends on the way the scope or focus of
negation is pragmatically fixed (Burton-Roberts 1989, Carston 1994). I hope to
consider the interpretation of utterances like those in (52)-(57) in full detail in future
work.
Now, when will the speaker utter (52) and when will she utter (20) (with the
na-AR), if she intends to communicate that no existential generalisation is
warranted? Since (52) allows both interpretations, the speaker will choose it, in
order to communicate that existential generalisation does not go through, only if
she is certain that the hearer is capable of recovering the intended interpretation.
If she has doubts about whether the hearer can work out the intended
interpretation, she will utter (20) which allows only the narrow scope reading.
Finally, let's consider (59)-(61), where we have definite descriptions
followed by non na-relatives:
(59) 0 Janis epithimi na erotefti ti galida pou ehi prasina matia
The John desire-3s na fall in love the French that have-3s green eyes
John desires to fall in love with the French woman who has green eyes
(60) I Maria den ehi vri to arthro pou sizita afto to thema
The Mary not have-3s found the article that discuss-3s this the issue
Mary has not found the paper which discusses this issue
(61) Na shediasis to sakaki pou tha katapliksi ton diasimotero shediasti
na design-2s the jacket that will surpnse-3s the most famous fashion
designer
Design the jacket which will leave the most famous fashion designer
speechless
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Veloudis claims that definite descriptions followed by non na-relatives in the
linguistic context of intensional operators can be interpreted specifically only, i.e.
they must have wide scope. On the view discussed here, wide scope means that
existential generalisation goes through. This initially seems to be right for (59) and
(60) but not for (61), where it is clear that existential generalisation does not apply
(the jacket in question does not exist yet). Notice, moreover, that the following
examples are not contradictory:
(62) 0 Janis epithimi na erotefti ti galida pou ehi deka ipikootites alla den iparhi
kamia galida me deka ipikootites 	 -
The John desire-3s na fall in love-3s-PF the French that have-3s ten
nationalities but not exist-3s no French with ten nationalities
John desires to marry the French woman who has ten nationalities but
there is no French woman with ten nationalities
(63) I Maria den ehi vri to arthro pou sizita afto to thema giati tetio arthro den
ehi akoma grafti
The Mary not have-3s found the article that discuss-3s this the issue
because sich article not have-3s yet written
Maria has not found the paper which discusses this issue because such a
paper has not yet been written
Such examples suggest that (59) and (60) allow in principle both the wide and the
narrow scope readings, i.e. both a reading on which the existential generalisation
goes through and a reading on which it doesn't. Pragmatic considerations will help
the hearer decide which of the two interpretations is the intended one in a
particular context.
To conclude, I have shown in this section that sentences with definite or
indefinite descriptions followed by na-RRs in the context of intensional expressions
only allow the interpretation on which existential generalisation does not apply
(narrow scope). By contrast, utterances with definite or indefinite descriptions
followed by non na-RRs allow both the interpretation on which existential
generalisation goes through and the interpretation on which it does not. This
indeterminacy is resolved on the basis of considerations of context and optimal
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relevance on any given occasion. So, the wide-narrow scope distinction (or rather
this way of understanding it) is captured by the contrast between non na- and na-
relatives, in that na-RRs force the narrow scope (nonexistential) interpretation
whereas non na-RRs allow both interpretations.
5.3.3. The responsibility for the description and the choice of mood
Veloudis (1985:133) takes the transparent-opaque distinction, as construed in
section 5.3.1., to be semantic and he claims that an indefinite description followed
by a na-relative in the context of an intensional operator can be understood
opaquely only. So, for example, (64) below can only mean that it is John, the
grammatical subject, who regards the solution as one with many advantages
(opaque interpretation):
(64) 0 Janis theli na protini mia lisi pou na ehi polla pleonektimata
The John want-3s na propose a solution that na have-3s many advantages
John wants to propose a solution which has a lot of advantages
(Veloudis 1985: 134)
(65), on the other hand, where the indefinite description is modified by a non na-
relative may mean either that it is John (opaque interpretation), or that it is the
speaker (transparent interpretation), who regards the solution as very
advantageous:
(65) 0 Janis theli na protini mia lisi pou ehi polla pleonektimata
The John want-3s na propose a solution that have-3s many advantages
John wants to propose a solution which has a lot of advantages
(Veloudis 1985: 134)
In this section I want to show that, contrary to what Veloudis claims, the choice of
a na-relative does not inevitably lead to the opaque interpretation. Furthermore, I
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want to argue that the transparent-opaque distinction is not a matter of linguistic
semantics, and to suggest a pragmatic account within the framework of relevance
theory.
The question of whether the responsibility for the description lies with the
speaker or the grammatical subject leads in certain contexts, in particular in
quotation or indirect speech contexts and in the context of propositional attitude
verbs, to the non applicability of the inferential law of substitutivity of identicals. The
problem is usually presented in the following way. Whereas an argument like the
one in (66) is valid,
(66)	 a. Bill hit the busdnver
b. The busdriver is the man in the blue uniform
c. Bill hit the man in the blue uniform
the argument in (67) is valid only if Kate is aware of the proposition in (b):
(67)	 a. Kate believes that the singer of Sign of the Times" is blind
b. The singer of the Sign of the Times is Prince
c. Kate believes that Prince is blind
In other words (67a) is ambiguous between a reading on which Kate has a belief
about a particular individual (Prince), on which the inference in (67) is valid, and
a reading on which Kate holds the belief that the singer of Nsign of the Times is
blind, on which the inference in (67) is not valid. The contexts in which the rule of
substitutivity of identicals salva veritate is not valid are called opaque contexts and
the phenomenon illustrated by (67) is often called referential opacity (Cole 1975,
1978, Heringer 1969, Fodor 1979, McCawley 1970, 1973, Hasegawa 1972).
Couching this in psychologically plausible terms we might say that in the first case,
the transparent interpretation, Kate has two ways of thinking about Prince: As
Pnnce N
 and as the singer of Sign of the Times, so (67c) follows; in the second
case Kate thinks of the singer of the Sign of the Times only under this description;
it is the speaker who thinks of him also as Princ&; so, (67c) does not follow.
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The question regarding the status of the transparent - opaque distinction,
whether it is syntactidsemantic or pragmatic, has been widely discussed in the
literature (for an overview see Kleiber 1979, Richard 1990, Récanati 1993). I said
in section 5.3.1. that scope variation may be one way of representing this
distinction. However, regarding this distinction as an ambiguity in the logical
structure of the sentence, i.e. as the result of scope permutation, does not seem
right. As Bach (1987:207-8) argues, it does not follow from the fact that the alleged
ambiguity can be represented in terms of scope that it actually is a scope
ambiguity, i.e. that such utterances do have two difterent logical structures.
According to Bach, this distinction must be syntactically grounded if it is to qualify
as a semantic distinction rather than a case of pragmatic indeterminacy. However,
no such evidence seems to be available. (67a) may have either a transparent or
an opaque reading. The same holds, contrary to standard assumptions, of
sentences of the type "believe of", as for example in (68), which are standardly
taken to have the transparent reading only and thus to provide some support for
the scope ambiguity position.
(68)	 Kate believes of the singer of "Sign of the Times" that he is blind
There is little doubt that (68) is more readily interpreted transparently, but this does
not mean that the opaque interpretation is impossible. Let me reconstruct Bach's
argument. Suppose that there is no such person as the singer of "Sign of the
Times" but Kate believes that there is such a person and that he is blind. Then I
can report Kate's beliefs in the following way: Kate has this fantasy that the song
"Sign of the Times" has already been sung by someone. Moreover, she believes
of the singer of "Sign of the Times" that he is blind". In this context (68) is
interpreted opaquely (it is Kate who is responsible for the description, not the
speaker). So, since there are not two distinct syntactic structures corresponding to
the two distinct interpretations, there is no syntactic evidence for the alleged
ambiguity of sentences like (67a).
Moreover, Bach (1987:209-210) argues, even if we accept that such
sentences have two logical forms and that narrow scope with respect to the
propositional attitude verb corresponds to the opaque interpretation whereas wide
scope corresponds to the transparent interpretation, the notion of scope could still
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not explain this distinction. The idea would be that a sentence of the form us
believes that the F is G has the following two logical forms, assuming standard
Russellian formulation:
(69) a. S believes that (3x)(Fx & Vy(Fy—*y=x) & Gx)
b. (2x)(Fx & Vy(Fy..-+y=x) & S believes that Gx)
(from Bach 1987:209)
Notice, however, that the issue of the origin of the description arises again with
respect to the logical form in (69a). Mere inspection does not tell us whether some
coextensive 'f' can be substituted for 'F' in [(69a)].. .Unless we assume that the
context after 'believes that' in [(69a)] is opaque, we cannot exclude such
substitution. Of course, we can exclude it by stipulation, since we already know
that opacity prohibits substitution, but the point was to explain opacity in terms of
scope . N
 (Bach 1987:209). The same problem arises with respect to (6 gb), as Bach
notes. (69b) says that there is something that S believes to be G. But, obviously,
S thinks of that something in some particular way, which may be available to the
speaker as well or not. It follows that the wide-narrow scope contrast does not
correspond, and thus does not explain, the transparent-opaque distinction.
If the transparent-opaque distinction is not syntactic/semantic, then it might
be that the opacity generating component of the meaning of such an utterance can
be derived from conversational principles. Indeed many authors (Urmson 1968,
Barwise and Perry 1983, Salmon 1986) have analyzed the opaque reading of such
utterances as an implicature derivable through conversational maxims of the
Gricean sort. For such authors, (70a&b):
(70) a. John believes that Cicero is poor
b. John believes that Tully is poor
are truth-conditionally equivalent, they express the same proposition. The
difference between them is that they implicate different things, namely that Cicero
is thought of as Cicero in the first one whereas Cicero is thought of as Tully in the
second one. It is the communication of these implicatures which makes the law of
substitutivity of identicals apparently fail in these contexts. Strictly speaking,
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however, the two utterances literally say the same thing and therefore in principle
substitutivity of identicals is possible.
Récanati (1993: 326-347) offers a very detailed presentation of what he
calls uThe Implicature Theory, as well as very convincing arguments for dropping
it. The main problem with the implicature theory is that it cannot explain our
intuitions about the truth conditions of belief reports, i.e. that we normally
understand (70a) and (70b) to be truth conditionally distinct. In other words, we
tend to incorporate the "how Cicero is thought of' in the truth conditions of the
utterance. Récanati rejects the implicature theory but does not opt for the syntactic/
semantic ambiguity position. Instead, he proposes that it is the semantics of that-
clauses that needs to be reconsidered. (See Récanati 1993: 348-367).
A full discussion of the semantics of the propositional attitude contexts falls
beyond the scope of this dissertation. I want, however, to suggest a line of
investigation by putting forward the idea that a psychologically plausible account
of the transparent-opaque distinction should be based on the relevance theoretic
distinction between description and interpretation. In particular, such an account
would involve the notion of interpretive attributive use. As I explained in Chapter
3, a distinction is made within relevance theory between two ways in which a
representation can be used. Any representation can be used to represent some
state of affairs by virtue of its propositional form being true of that state of affairs,
in which case it is said to be a description, or to be used descriptively.
Alternatively, a thought or utterance (with some propositional form) may be used
to represent another thought or utterance (with some propositional form) by virtue
of a resemblance between the two propositional forms. In this case, the first
thought/utterance is said to be an interpretation of the second one or to be used
interpretively. One type of interpretive use is attributive use. An utterance is used
attributively when the speaker attributes the proposition expressed to someone
else. According to Sperber and Wilson, this is what happens typically in quotation
contexts, indirect speech contexts and belief reports, which, note, happen to be the
contexts where opacity typically anses. An attributively used utterance (or, more
generally, representation) may achieve relevance by informing the hearer of the
fact that someone has said something or thinks something. Or, an attributively
used representation may achieve relevance by informing the hearer that the
speaker has in mind what someone else has said or thinks and has a particular
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attitude towards that. (For a more detailed presentation of these concepts and
examples see Chapter 3 or Sperber and Wilson 1986: 224-231).
Let us start by taking an example in order to see how the transparent-
opaque distinction arises in real life conversations. Suppose that Mary saw me the
other day having lunch with my boyfriend. However, I didn't want to tell her that the
man she saw was my boyfriend, so I introduced him to her as the new head of the
philosophy department, which he is not. Later I tell this story to my friend Lucy,
and I utter (71):
(71) Mary believes that the new head of the philosophy department is cute
In this case the hearer has reason to infer that the definite description is used
opaquely, i.e. it is ascribed to Mary. She will realise that the speaker does not
intend to communicate that Mary thinks of the person who really is the new head
of the philosophy department (maybe there is no such person) that he is cute. The
speaker is attributing the definite description to Mary and dissociating herself from
it. She is saying that Mary believes that the person she thinks of as the new head
of the philosophy department is cute. So, the proposition expressed by (71) in this
context is along the lines of (72):
(72) Mary Smith believes that the person she believes is the new head of the
philosophy department is cute
The speaker may be implicating that Mary thought this man cute because she
thought he has the prestigious position of head, or she may be implicating that
Mary thought the speaker's boyfriend is cute and at the same time making fun of
the fact that Mary thinks of him as the new head of the philosophy department, etc.
In any case the description is simply mentioned by the speaker and attributed to
Mary. So, the opaque interpretation arises when the precise form under which the
subject holds a belief is part of what the speaker intends to communicate and is
therefore pertinent to the way the utterance is interpreted.
Now suppose that Mary has already met the person who is in fact the new
head of the philosophy department but she did not realise that the person she met
was the new head of the philosophy department. She thinks of the man she met
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as Nthe distinguished philosopher Prof. Wilter. Now suppose you and I know this
and we also know that Prof. Wilter is the new head of the philosophy department.
In this context if I utter (71) you will interpret it transparently, i.e. you will realise
that the description the new head of the philosophy department is not part of
Mary's belief, but rather my interpretation of Mary's belief. In this case it is the
speaker who takes responsibility for the description rather than the holder of the
belief. The description is not being used attributively as in the previous example.
The proposition expressed by (71) in this context is something like (73):
(73) Mary Smith believes that the person I know to be the new head of the
philosophy department is cute
So, on this account, the opaque interpretation will arise if the speaker intends to
communicate that she is attributing the description to Mary, whereas the
transparent interpretation will arise if the speaker takes responsibility for the
description herself. In fact there are more than just these two possibilities. Notice
first that in the case where the speaker intends to attribute the description to Mary,
she may also express an attitude towards it: either that of dissociation, as in the
example we considered, or that of endorsement, approval etc. On the other hand,
in the case where the speaker takes responsibility for the description it may be
manifest from the context and crucial for the interpretation of the utterance that
Mary also holds this representation or that she doesn't. Moreover, the speaker may
be attributing the description not to Mary but to someone else. So, suppose that
we all know the new head of the philosophy department, in fact he's been with us
for a while, so we never refer to him as uthe new head any more. The only
exception is the secretary, Sue, an older woman who can't bring herself to
acknowledge that the old head, for whom she worked all her life, is gone and
someone else has taken his place. Uttering (71) in this context, I would be most
likely understood to be attributing the definite description to Sue, thus indirectly
comparing Sue's sore feelings with Mary's rather positive feeling about this man.
In this case the proposition expressed by (71) would differ from (72) with respect
to the person to whom the description is attributed.
There is no doubt that a lot more needs to be said here. For example, it
may be reasonable to assume that in belief contexts the that-clause is an
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interpretive representation (more or less faithful) of the subject's (Mary's in (71))
original belief, on either the transparent or the opaque interpretation. This
complication does not arise for the intensional contexts in which na-AR occur,
since there is no reason to suspect, as in the case of belief contexts, that they are
inherently interpretive. Moreover, a full account of the transparent-opaque
distinction should look at multiple embeddings like (74), as well as at examples like
(75), where the potentially attributively used description is not in subject position.
(74) Tom thinks that Mary believes that the new head of the philosophy
department is cute
(75) Mary believes that Ann is in love with the new head of the philosophy
department.
Although this account is only very barely sketched here, it seems to have
a lot in its favour: (a) it doesn't stipulate an ambiguity between transparent and
opaque readings for which there is no independent evidence; (b) it makes use of
the independently motivated relevance-theoretic notion of (interpretive) attributive
use; so there is no need to expand the already existing pragmatic machinery (c)
it is more adequate than the implicature account because it makes the right
predictions about the truth conditions of utterances like (70a) and (70b): (70a) is
true if John holds as true the representation uCicero is poor, whereas (70b) is true
if John holds as true the representation Tully is pooru. The fact that the law of
substitutivity of identicals does not apply is not surprising on this view, since the
two representations, Cicero is pooru and Tully is pooru, are not identical (although
their extensions may be).
I will now return to the Greek data and Veloudis's claims. Let me first
discuss non na-RRs. Consider (64), repeated below:
(64)	 0 Janis theli na protini mia lisi pou ehi polla pleonektimata
The John wants to propose a solution that has many advantages
John wants to propose a solution which has a lot of advantages
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As Veloudis claims, (64) has two interpretations, as we can see from the
paraphrases in (76):
(76)	 a. 0 Janis theli na protini mia lisi pou ehi, kata ti gnomi tou, polla
pleonektimata
the Johns want-3s na propose-3s-IPF a solution that have-3s, according to
opinion his, many advantages
John wants to propose a solution which, in his opinion, has many
advantages
b. 0 Janis theli na protini mia lisi pou ehi, kata ti gnomi mou, polla
pleonektimata
the John want-3s na propose-3s-IPF a solution that have-3s, according the
opinion mine, many advantages
John wants to propose a solution which, in my opinion, has many
advantages
When (64) is interpreted as in (76a), the noun phrase mia lisi pou ehi polla
pleonektimata a solution which has many advantages is used attributively
(opaquely). The speaker does not take responsibility for the description; she
attributes it to John and perhaps expresses an attitude towards it. The speaker
may be endorsing John's view, or dissociating from John's position in a neutral
way (John and the speaker have different opinions but each respects the other's
views), or she may be dissociating from the contents of the description and
ridiculing John for ascribing to it, in which case the speaker is being ironical, etc.
When (64) is interpreted as in (76b), the noun phrase is interpreted descriptively:
the speaker takes responsibility for it, in the same way that she takes responsibility
for describing the world which is desirable to John. Additional assumptions, such
as that John also considers this solution advantageous or that in fact John does
not consider this solution advantageous, may be manifest in the context and may
play a role in the interpretation of the utterance. Alternatively, in a suitable context,
the noun phrase in (64) may originate neither from the speaker nor from the
grammatical subject, but rather be attributed to some third party. The same
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interpretive possibilities exist for definite descriptions followed by non na-RRs in
intensional contexts and they would be accounted for in a similar way.
Let's now return to na-RRs and Veloudis's claim that the description in the
relative may be associated with the grammatical subject only. The first thing to
note is that most of the contexts in which na-relatives appear do not belong to the
category of contexts in which opacity typically arises. Consider the following
examples:
(77) Fere mou/na mou fens ena potiri pou na mm me spasmeno
Bring-2s-imp/na bring-2s-PF me a glass that na not is broken
Bring/You should bring me a glass which is not broken
(78) Vrike o Petros ena kontsi pou na ton anehete?
Found-3s the Peter a girl that na him tolerate-3s
Did Peter find a girl who tolerates him?
(79) 0 Petros tha pantrefti mia kopella pou na ehi polla lefta
The Peter will marry-3s a girl that na have-3s a lot of money
Peter will marry a girl who has a lot of money
(80) 0 Petros den ehi diavasi ena vivlio pou na mm to engrini i Maria
The Peter not has read a books that na not it approves of the Mary
Peter has not read a book which Mary would not approve of
(81) Ean vri ena sakaki pou na teriazi me to panteloni tou, elpizo na to agorasi
If fin ds-3s a jacket that na go-3s with the trousers his, hope . 1 s na it buy-3s
If he finds a jacket which goes well with his trousers, I hope he will buy it
Imperatives, interrogatives, utterances in the future, negative utterances and
conditionals are not among the contexts the interpretation of which typically gives
rise to the transparent-opaque distinction, like for example belief reports. So, there
is nothing in these utterances to suggest a priori that the description in the relative
is to be interpreted de dicto.
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Moreover, the noun phrases in (77)-(81) do not have to be interpreted as
originating from the grammatical subject. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to
find a context in which the noun phrase in (77) ena potiripou na mm me spasmeno
a glass which is not brokenu may be interpreted as originating from the
grammatical subject (you) of the utterance. The noun phrases in (78)-(81) may
be interpreted either as originating from the grammatical subject or as originating
from the speaker depending on considerations of optimal relevance and context.
The noun phrase in (78) ena koritsi pou na ton anehete a girl who would tolerate
him is most likely to be associated with the speaker, on the standard assumption
that Peter does not think of himself as someone that other people have to
tolerate. In a different context it could, of course, be interpreted as attributed to
Peter. Suppose, for example, that Peter always thinks and speaks in the most
negative way about himself. Suppose further that often in the past I have
expressed my disapproval of Peter's tendency to put himself down; I, actually, think
that he is quite a nice person. In such a context, I may utter (78) echoing Peter's
views of himself. In particular, I would be attributing the noun phrase to Peter and
I would be dissociating myself from it. Consider now (79). On the basis of Peter's
very mercenary character, I may utter (79) taking full responsibility for the
description a girl who would have a lot of money. Now consider a different
context. Suppose, Peter always claims that he will solve his financial problems by
marrying a rich girl. However, on the basis of his otherwise very honest and
sentimental character I believe that Peter will eventually marry for love. In the
middle of a discussion about our future plans, I may jocularly utter (79) attributing
the noun phrase to Peter and dissociating myself from it. Similar contexts can
easily be constructed for the rest of the examples, so that the relevant noun
phrases may be interpreted as originating either from the grammatical subject or
the speaker.
The point I am trying to make about the na-relatives in (78)-(81) is that they
do not have to be interpreted opaquely, although, of course, they might given the
appropriate context. Remember that I argued in chapter 3 that some utterances
have to be interpreted as being used interpretively because they contain some
linguistic device which encodes interpretive use (for example, the particle rt in
Sissala). I then argued that na is not an interpretive use marker. The fact that the
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na-relatives in utterances like those in (77)-(81) do not have to be interpreted
opaquely provides further evidence for that claim.15
Now consider the interpretation of na-RRs in the context of propositional
attitude verbs, a context in which opacity does typically arise. As the following
examples show, the description in the relative does not have to originate from the
grammatical subject:
(82) a. 0 Kostas hriazete na vii mia gineka pou na tou pleni ke na tou sideroni
The Kostas need-3s na find-3s a woman that na his wash-3s and na his
iron-3s
alla den to paradehete
but not it accept-3s
Kostas needs to find a woman who would do the wash and the ironing for
him but he won't admit it
b. 0 Petros psahni na vii ena koritsi pou na tou thimizi tin Anna an
The Peter look-3s for na find-3s a girl that na his remind-3s the Anna
an ke o idios to arnite
if and the himself it deny-3s
Peter is looking for a girl who would remind him of Anna although he
denies it
' 5Notice here that the descriptions in the examples (77)-(81) may be associated
with the speaker, i.e. they may be interpreted transparently, although existential
generalisation is not warranted as explained earlier. The transparent interpretation
is usually understood to arise only if there is an object about which the subject is
said to be thinking (for example Récanati 1993: 389, 391). However, the construal
of the transparent-opaque distinction in terms of who is responsible for the
description allows it to be explained as an instance of a broader phenomenon
which is not confined to referring terms, i.e. terms which presuppose existence.
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c. Afto pou nomizo ego oti theli na agorasi o Kostas me ena spiti pou na
me
this that think-is I that want-3s na buy-3s the Kostas is a house that na is
pamthino ki as diafoni ekinos
extremely cheap and let disagree-3s he
What I think that Kostas wants is a house that would be extremely cheap,
and let him disagree (even though he disagrees)
The fact that the utterances in (82a-c) are perfectly acceptable although the
grammatical subject clearly rejects the description in the na-relative shows that,
contrary to what Veloudis claims, such utterances do have an interpretation where
the content of the na-relative originates from the speaker. Indefinite descriptions
followed by na-RRs in the context of propositional attitude verbs like want will be
interpreted either as exercised by the speaker or as ascribed to the subject
depending on the context and considerations of relevance.
A final consideration is this. If the na-structure was in any sense
responsible for isolating the opaque interpretation, then we would expect na-
relatives to co-occur easily with verbs like 'claim', 'think' and 'believe'. It is, after
all, such verbs which are typically associated with the transparent-opaque
distinction. However, this turns out to be impossible:
(83) a. *1 Maria ishirizete oti o Kostas forai ena panteloni pou na me metaksoto
the Maria claim-3s that the Kostas wear-3s a trouser that na is made of silk
Mary claims that Kostas is wearing a pair of trousers which is made of silk
b. *1 Maria nomizi/pistevi oti i fetini ipospifii me anthropi pou na ehoun
oreksi gia doulia
the Mary think/believe-3s that the this year's candidates are people that na
have-3s appetite for work
Mary thinks/believes that this year's candidates are people who are keen
to work
So, the transparent-opaque distinction is not grammaticalised in MG by the choice
between a non na- and a na-relative in the context of intensional expressions.
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However, in the absence of specific contextual information, when the description
and the relative fall in the scope of a propositional attitude verb, as in (84),
(84) 0 Kostas theli na agorasi ena spiti pou na me evrihoro
The Kostas wants na buy-3s a house that na is spacious
Kostas wants to buy a house which would be spacious
they tend to be understood opaquely, i.e. as being attributed to the subject (the
speaker may agree or disagree). This is because inference of the proposition
'there exists a house which is spacious' is not warranted here. The absence of this
inference not only excludes the referential interpretation, as I explained in 5.2.3,
but also it makes the opaque interpretation more prominent by suggesting that a
house which is spacious exists in a world which is potential and desirable from
Kostas's point of view and therefore is part of what Kostas desires. However, as
I have shown, this interpretation, although easily constructable, is not in any way
encoded or forced, and may be overturned by appropriate contextual information.
5.4. Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the relevance of certain semantic and pragmatic
distinctions to the interpretation of na-restrictive relatives in Modern Greek. I
argued in the last chapter that the referential-attributive distinction is pragmatic. In
this chapter I have shown that this distinction is captured in MG to a limited extent
by the choice between a non na- and a na-relative, in that indefinite descriptions
followed by na-relatives may be interpreted attributively only, whereas definite and
indefinite descriptions followed by non na-relatives may be interpreted either
referentially or attributively, depending on the context and considerations of
relevance. I argued that the isolation of the attributive interpretation was a direct
consequence of the semantics of na and therefore did not support the view that
definite and indefinite descriptions are ambiguous between an attributive and a
referential sense. In the second part of this chapter I discussed two other
distinctions which have often be represented and talked about in the literature in
terms of scope variation. The first distinction had to do with the applicability of the
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inferential rule of existential generalisation. I argued that the fact that existential
generalisation cannot apply to sentences with noun phrases followed by na-RRs
falls out from the semantics of na-clauses. As for utterances with noun phrases
followed by non na-RRs, I argued that they may have both interpretations, i.e. one
on which existential generalisation is allowed and another one on which it is not.
I suggested that this shou'd be seen as another case of semantic vagueness or
indeterminacy which is resolved pragmatically. Which interpretation is the intended
on in a particular context depends on considerations of optimal relevance. Finally,
I discussed the transparent-opaque distinction. I suggested that this distinction is
psychologically plausible and interesting for a theory of utterance interpretation to
the extent that it relates to the issue of who takes responsibility for a conceptual
representation. I have argued that this too is not a matter of linguistic semantics
but rather falls within the domain of pragmatics, and proposed that it could be
accounted for within relevance theory in terms of interpretive attributive use. With
respect to the Greek data, I showed that, contrary to what Veloudis (1985) claims,
na-relatives do not impose the opaque interpretation. The content of a na-relative
may be understood either as originating from the speaker or from the grammatical
subject depending on pragmatic considerations.
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EPILOGUE
In this thesis I have argued that the indicative and the subjunctive in Modern Greek
encode non-truth-conditional information about a particular type of propositional
attitude. A na-clause indicates that the proposition expressed is entertained as a
description of a state of affairs in a possible world. A non na-clause, on the other
hand, indicates that the proposition expressed is entertained as a description of a
state of affairs in the base world. This information is procedural rather than
conceptual. As I argued in detail with respect to the subjunctive, the information it
encodes does not contribute directly to the higher level explicatures of the
utterance; rather, it instructs the hearer to construct a certain type of higher level
explicature rather than another.
This thesis provides additional evidence for two basic relevance-theoretic
claims: the need to distinguish between conceptual and procedural meaning and
the claim that mood indicators are best analysed as encoding procedural meaning.
In addition, by discussing declarative and interrogative na-clauses, I have shown
how the procedural meaning encoded by the subjunctive may interact with the
procedural meaning of declaratives and interrogatives.
Furthermore, I have argued that the various interpretations of independent
na-clauses are a function of their linguistically encoded content and pragmatic
considerations, i.e. considerations of relevance. I have discussed na-clauses with
imperative-, optative- and hortative-Iike interpretations, na-clauses expressing
possibility, potentiality and strong emotions, like surprise and indignation, narrative
na-clauses, na-clauses which represent thoughts rather than states of affairs and
interrogative na-clauses, and showed that all these interpretations may receive a
psychologically plausible explanation within relevance theory. Moreover, I have
argued that the semantics of na provides us with an adequate basis for accounting
for the differences in meaning between independent na- and non na-clauses, and
for explaining the differences and similarities between the subjunctive and the
imperative. Finally, I discussed the interpretation of relative clauses in the
subjunctive and indicative. Subjunctive relative clauses impose certain restrictions
on the way the indefinite descriptions they modify are interpreted; indicative
relatives, on the other hand, do not impose any such restrictions on the definite
and indefinite descriptions they accompany. I have shown that these restrictions
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follow from the semantics of na-clauses and do not offer any evidence for the claim
that definite and indefinite descriptions are semantically ambiguous. On the
contrary, I have argued that definite and indefinite descriptions are not ambiguous;
their various interpretations can be explained on the basis of pragmatic
considerations.
This work raises a number of questions, which I cannot but leave to future
research. However, let me finish by pointing out a few.
The first question is whether the analysis presented here can be extended
to account for the subjunctive in other languages. Most of the interpretations of
independent clauses in the subjunctive discussed here arise in other languages as
well. For example, in German and French the subjunctive may be used instead of
the imperative (although perhaps not as freely as in MG), as in (1); in English and
in French the subjunctive may be used to express a wish as in (2); moreover, in
French subjunctive main clauses may express supposition or surprised
exclamation, as in (3):
(1) a. Nehme sich jeder noch schnell em Brot
(Donhauser 1988: 67)
b. Qu'il soit pendu
(2) a. God save the Queen
b. Que le roi vive
(3) a. Que l'ennemi vienne, le lâche s'enfuit
b. Moi, que je trahisse mon pays!
However, the subjunctive does not seem to be used in the same way in all
languages. For example, in German and Icelandic, but not in Modern Greek, it
typically occurs in indirect speech:
(4) a. Er sagte, sie hatten das getan
(Donhauser 1988: 69)
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b. Jon segir alitaf ad jordin se flot
John always says that the earth is (SUBJ) flat
(adapted from Sigurdhsson 1990: 328)
c. (Formadhurinn vardh oskaplega reidhur.) Tiligan vaen svivirdhileg 0g...
The chairman was furiously angry. The proposal was (SUBJ) outrageous
and..
(adapted from Sigurdhsson 1990:316)
According to Sigurdhsson (1990:327), the speaker is signalling with the subjunctive
that the proposition expressed is the responsibility of someone else, i.e. the
speaker does not take a stand on its truthfulness. It is not difficult to account for
such examples within the relevance-theoretic analysis I have developed. Using the
subjunctive, the speaker indicates that the proposition expressed is entertained as
a description of a state of affairs in a merely possible world, thereby suggesting
that she does not want to commit herself to the claim that the proposition
expressed is true in the actual world. In (4c) the hearer has to infer further that the
proposal was outrageous is attributed to the chairman; in (4a) and (4b) this
information is absorbed in the semantics of the main verb NsayN and the hearer will
access it by decoding. For example, processing (4b) from left to right the hearer
knows by the time he starts processing the clause •the earth is flat that it is
attributed to someone other than the speaker, namely John. On the other hand,
some explanation should be given for why na-clauses in MG are not typically used
in this way.
An issue that this dissertation leaves open is the semantic differences, if
any, between the subjunctive and the infinitive. As I said, in Modern Greek there
is no infinitival form. Now, the most natural way of translating some independent
na-clauses (and almost all complement na-clauses) into English is by using the
infinitive. For example,
(5)	 a. Na pemai oh tou tin ora brosta stin tileorasi
na spend-3s-IPF all his the time in front the television
To spend all his time in front of the TV
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b. 0 Petros na se ksehasi, kiria Anna?
the Peter na you forget-3s-PF, Mrs Anna
Peter forget you, Mrs Anna?
c. Jati na klei?
why na-cry-3s-IPF
Why cry?
This may suggest that there are certain similarities in meaning between the
infinitive and the subjunctive 1 . Moreover, although the infinitive cannot be used in
English to issue a command (i.e. instead of an imperative), this is possible in
certain situations in other languages, like for example, German:
(6)	 a. Wegtreten! Rühren
b. Nicht rauchen
However, the infinitive and the subjunctive are most likely to turn out not to be
synonymous: they are formally distinct and they don't share all their interpretations.
For example, as far as I know, infinitival clauses may not be used to express
wishes, or to make suppositions, or to signal indirect speech. A complete account
of the semantic differences between subjunctives and infinitives should be backed
by an account of their syntactic differences.
With respect to the subjunctive in Modern Greek, there is at least one
important issue that has not been discussed in this thesis. According to Veloudis
and Philippaki-Warburton (1983), there are two subjunctive particles in Modern
Greek: na and as. There are certain similarities and certain differences in the
distribution of the two particles. In contrast to na, as may occur in independent
clauses only. On the other hand, like na, as is incompatible with the future particle
tha (*as tha vreksi u*let will rain). Like na-clauses, as-clauses are marked for
pertective or imperfective aspect in the non-past forms. With respect to their
interpretations, there are significant differences between na- and as-clauses. As-
'It is, in fact, suggested by Huntley (1 984) that infinitives, like all non-indicatives
on his analysis, represent the described state of affairs as possible.
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clauses are typically interpreted as making suggestions, granting permission and
expressing wishes (both realisable and unrealisable). For example,
(7)	 a. As fame tora
as eat-i pl-PF now
Let us eat now
b. As diavaze
As studied-3s-IPF
Would that he had studied
c. As stamatisete tora
as stop-2p1-PF now
You may stop now
d. As vreksi, thee mou
as rain-3s-PF, god my
Let it rain, my God
Na-clauses and as-clauses do not seem to be synonymous: the interpretations that
as-clauses may have are a subset of the interpretations that na-clauses may have.
For example, as-clauses cannot be used to express mere possibility or potentiality;
also, as-clauses may not be interrogative. My impression is that the as+verb
construction is only a subjunctive-like construction, perhaps closer in meaning to
the let and let's constructions in English.2
Moreover, as-clauses may serve as antecedents to certain kinds of
conditionals, as discussed in detail in Nikiforidou (1990). For example,
(8)	 as teliosi tin doulia tou ke tha pame sinema
as finish-3s-PF the work his and will go-i p1 movies
Let him finish his work and we will go to the movies
2For a relevance-theoretic analysis of the let and let's constructions in English
see Clark (1993b).
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Recall that na-clauses may also serve as antecedents of conditionals. For
example,
(9)	 na teliosi tin doulia tou (ke) tha pame sinema
na finish-3s the work his will go-ipi movies
Should he finish his work we will go to the movies
There are many interesting issues here: How can we account for the differences
in meaning between as-conditionals, na-conditionals and conditionals where the
antecedent is in the indicative? Are sentences like (8) and (9) real conditionals?
By what criteria? And, finally, how does the account of such constructions fit in with
the procedural account of such modal devices as the subjunctive, the indicative
and the as-construction? A preliminary account of the semantics of as-clauses and
the several types of conditionals mentioned here is proposed in Rouchota (in
preparation).
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